Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 11

This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This 11th volume brings together 13 new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in the field, including moral conscientiousness and moral wrongness; impartiality and the boundaries of morality; moral testimony; Kant’s categorical imperative; and ethical theories as methods of ethics.

This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This seventh volume brings together thirteen new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in the field, including: instrumental reasoning; lying as infidelity; moral uncertaintism; subjective obligation; commendatory reasons; contractualism; and the definition of virtue.


This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This ninth volume brings together thirteen new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in the field, including: discretionary moral duties, third‐party forgiveness, subjective permissibility, agent‐relative prerogatives, and teleosemantics


This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This eighth volume brings together thirteen new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in the field, including: the irreplaceable value of human beings, interpersonal morality and conceptions of welfare, what it is for something to be good for an animal (including humans), the relation between good will and right action, moral advice and joint agency, moral responsibility and wrongdoing, the basis of equality, the role of needs claims in ethical theory, threshold conceptions of deontology, prudential reasons, the significance of evaluative beliefs, and Stoic conceptions of insults. This volume features chapters by Ben Bramble, Samantha Brennan, Talbot Brewer, Dale Dorsey, Patricio A. Fernandez, Guy Fletcher, Christine M. Korsgaard, Chelsea Rosenthal, Grant J. Rozeboom, Roy Sorensen, Julie Tannenbaum, and Alex Worsnip.


This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This tenth volume brings together eleven new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in the field, including: the irrelevance of deontological distinctions, willful ignorance and moral responsibility, rule worship and idealization objections, the Trolley Problem, and the limits of virtue ethics.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics features new work in normative ethical theory. This 11th volume includes chapters on the following topics: the significance of appreciation; the objective/subjective debate over wrongness; requests as a kind of wrong; the puzzle of taking comfort in the travails of others; finding meaning in one’s life; the boundaries of morality in light of the legitimacy of non-moral partialist pursuits; the value of moral testimony to those who testify; the category of “ordinary” wrongs that are not blameworthy; the practical role of Kant’s Categorical Imperative; the possibility of non-moral blame; reasons to reject the category of subjective obligation; how to understand the point of ethical theory; and the justification of social moral rules....


Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics brings together new work on various dimensions of normative ethical theory. This seventh volume features thirteen chapters dealing with practical reasoning, Bernard Williams’s ‘one thought too many’ complaint about impartial ethical theories, the concept of moral right, the wrongness of lying, moral choice under uncertainty, the notion of subjective obligation, commendatory reasons, desire satisfaction and time, a challenge to contractualism, the nature of creditworthiness, partiality toward oneself, the relation between virtue and action, and monism versus pluralism about non-derivative value....


Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics features new work in the field of normative ethical theory. This eighth volume features chapters which collectively address the following topics: the irreplaceable value of human beings, interpersonal morality and conceptions of welfare, what it is for something to be good for an animal (including humans), the relation between good will and right action, moral advice and joint agency, moral responsibility and wrongdoing, the basis of equality, the role of needs claims in ethical theory, threshold conceptions of deontology, prudential reasons, the significance of evaluative beliefs, and Stoic conceptions of insults....


2014 ◽  
Vol 62 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Héctor Wittwer

AbstractThe fact that the topic of emergency situations has been neglected almost completely by ethical theory raises the question why normative ethics has had so little to say about extreme situations so far. One can assume that this disinterest is not due to the rarity of emergency situations but rather to their peculiar properties. All ethical theories rest on the premise that moral agents make the most of their decisions under normal circumstances. The aim of the paper is to answer the question whether or not normative ethics is able to adequately evaluate emergency situations. In order to do this, different types of extreme situations must be distinguished. It is argued that, on the one hand, self-defence and agreements by which all the participants refrain from certain of their rights in order to enable some of them to survive are morally unproblematic. On the other hand, there are emergency situations that do not allow for a solution which would be morally acceptable to all of the involved persons. Hence, morality itself can be unacceptable under extreme circumstances.


Diametros ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Saja

The main purpose of the paper is to present a new framework of meta-ethics which I call the Functional Model of Analysis. It presupposes that the most important meta-ethical question is not “What is the meaning of normative words, sentences and what is the ontological fabric of the moral world?” but “What should morality and ethics be for?”. It is a form of meta-ethics that focuses on finding theoretical resources that can be helpful in understanding ongoing ethical debates between disciples of Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, Augustine, Hobbes, utilitarians and Kant, and in building normative ethical theories that can help us to answer normative questions. As an example of such output I will present a formal sketch of Hybrid Function Consequentialism – a normative ethical theory based upon the meta-ethical framework proposed here.


Author(s):  
Sandra Shapshay

Most contemporary ethical theorists do not look to Schopenhauer as a resource for contemporary normative ethics. Chapters 1 and 2 dispel one of the main reasons for this—namely, that Schopenhauer’s pessimism leads only to the recommendation of resignation. But there is another reason why Schopenhauer has been neglected as an ethical theorist that this chapter addresses. It is widely held that Schopenhauer espouses hard determinism, the view that human beings (in addition to non-human animals) are determined to act as they do on the basis of physical and psychological laws. Yet, without the presumption of freedom it makes little sense to offer a normative ethical theory. Accordingly, before reconstructing Schopenhauer’s normative ethical theory, one needs to get clearer on his views on freedom. This chapter begins with Schopenhauer’s grappling with the problem of how freedom is possible in his dissertation (1813) and traces the development of his theory of freedom through The World as Will and Representation (1818) and his essay “On the Freedom of the Will” (1839). Next, it offers an interpretation of Schopenhauer’s mature compatibilist view that shows how it aims to depart from, but remains highly indebted to Kant’s theory of freedom. This under-acknowledged debt is the “ghost of Kantian freedom” in Schopenhauer’s thought. Ultimately, for Schopenhauer, though we are each born with an innate character and are shaped largely by our empirical circumstances, a rational being is nonetheless responsible for her character, which she can shape and even, albeit rarely, transform.


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