Money laundering via underground currency exchange networks

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Teichmann ◽  
Marie-Christin Falker

Purpose This paper aims to demonstrate how illicit funds are being laundered through underground currency exchange networks. Design/methodology/approach Sixty interviews with money launderers and compliance officers were conducted to identify methods relevant to current money laundering issues. Further, a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers was administered. Findings The currency exchange method is highly suitable for money launderers with access to a criminal network. It may be used for placement or pre-placement. Evidently, the vast majority of compliance officers fail to recognize the utilization of this method in their daily business. Research limitations/implications Implications are based on the statements of 60 interviewees, comprising both alleged money launderers and compliance officers. Practical implications The study identified gaps in anti-money laundering mechanisms. The documentation of said inconsistencies aims to provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with useful insights into the minds of money launderers. Originality/value Whereas most prior literature focuses on money laundering prevention methods, how money launderers operate is not illustrated. This study comprehensively overviews the issue by interviewing not only compliance officers but also money launderers. Understanding how money launderers operate is essential to effectively prevent money laundering. In particular, compliance officers must be able to view money laundering from the criminal’s perspective to sufficiently combat the issue.

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann ◽  
Marie-Christin Falker

Purpose This paper aims to illustrate how illegally obtained funds are laundered through raw diamonds in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Design/methodology/approach To identify specific money laundering techniques involving raw diamonds, this study used a qualitative content analysis of data collected from 60 semi-standardized interviews with both criminals and prevention experts and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers. Findings Raw diamonds are extraordinarily suitable for money laundering in European German-speaking countries. In particular, they may be used in all three stages of the laundering process, namely, placement, layering and integration. Research limitations/implications Because the qualitative findings are based on semi-standardized interviews, their insights are limited to the perspectives of the 60 interviewees. Practical implications Identifying gaps in existing anti-money laundering mechanisms should provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how criminals operate. Originality/value While prior studies focus on the methods used by organizations to combat money laundering and how to improve anti-money laundering measures, this paper investigates how money launderers operate to avoid detection, thereby illustrating authentic experiences. Its findings provide valuable insights into the minds of money launderers and combines criminal perspective with that of prevention experts.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann ◽  
Marie-Christin Falker

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how illicit funds are laundered by using the gold method in German-speaking European countries. Design/methodology/approach To identify approaches to money laundering via gold, 60 semi-standardized interviews with money launderers and compliance officers were conducted. Further, a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers was administered. Findings The gold trade in European German-speaking countries remains extraordinarily suitable for money laundering. In particular, it may be used for placement and layering. Research limitations/implications The implications are based on the statements of 60 interviewees, including both money launderers and compliance officers. Thus, the derived results are limited to the perspectives of these 60 persons. Practical implications Based on this study’s findings, gaps in the existing anti-money laundering measures are identified. Documenting these inconsistencies should provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into the minds of money launderers. Originality/value As this study explores the perspectives of both compliance officers and money launderers, it provides a broad overview of the issues. Most existing literature fails to observe money laundering from the launderers’ perspective, focusing instead on methods to prevent money laundering. Effective prevention requires profound knowledge of how criminals operate. Only by adopting criminals’ perspective can compliance officers effectively spot money-laundering methods.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-500 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Teichmann ◽  
Marie-Christin Falker

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how illegally obtained funds are laundered by employment of consulting companies in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Design/methodology/approach A qualitative content analysis of 28 semi-standardized expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts, and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers led to the identification of concrete money-laundering techniques involving the employment of consulting companies. Findings Consulting companies continue to be used for money laundering in European German-speaking countries, especially in the layering and integration stages of the money laundering process, during which the origins of funds are concealed, and the money is integrated into the legal economy. Research limitations/implications Qualitative findings from the analysis of semi-standardized interviews are limited to the 28 interviewees’ perspectives. Practical implications Identification of gaps in existing anti-money-laundering mechanisms provides compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how criminals operate. Originality/value The existing literature focuses on organizations that combat money laundering and the improvement of anti-money-laundering measures. This paper outlines how money launderers avoid detection. Both preventative and criminal perspectives are considered.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 805-818
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann ◽  
Marie-Christin Falker

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to exemplify how money launderers in European German-speaking countries use deposit boxes to place incriminated funds. Design/methodology/approach During a qualitative content analysis of 60 semi-standardized expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers, concrete money laundering techniques using deposit boxes were identified. Findings Deposit boxes may be used to place incriminated funds or prepare for their subsequent placement. Thus, the method is highly suitable to the demands of small-scale money laundering. Research limitations/implications The study’s qualitative findings are limited to the perspectives of the 60 interview partners. The interviews were conducted in a semi-standardized fashion. Practical implications The present paper aims at identifying gaps in existing anti-money laundering mechanisms to provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with worthwhile insights into the minds of criminals. Originality/value The present paper illustrates how money launderers operate to avoid detection, capturing the perspective of the launderer. Thus, the reader is granted access to highly valuable information that is supposed to facilitate the introduction of new anti-money laundering measures. Moreover, it shows how compliance officers view the issue and what they consider to be important to the successful implementation of compliance mechanisms. Moreover, the officers’ statements will exhibit which methods they do and do not engage with on a daily basis.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-352
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Teichmann ◽  
Marie-Christin Falker

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how illegally obtained funds from Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland are laundered through the banking system in Dubai. Design/methodology/approach The study is conducted using a qualitative content analysis of 60 semi-structured expert interviews with both criminals and money laundering prevention experts, and a quantitative survey of 200 financial sector compliance officers. Findings Some banks in Dubai are highly suitable for all stages of the money laundering process. However, although certain banks have weak compliance mechanisms, others act in an exemplary manner. Research limitations/implications The qualitative findings are based on semi-structured interviews and are limited to the 60 interviewees’ perspectives. Practical implications Identification of gaps in anti-money laundering mechanisms provides compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how money laundering criminals operate. Originality/value The existing literature focuses mainly on organizations and the methods they use to combat money laundering. This paper outlines how money launderers operate to avoid detection. Authentic experiences are illustrated. The reader is provided with valuable insights into the minds of money launderers. Both lawful and criminal perspectives are taken into account.


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 370-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how criminals launder money in the real estate business in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Design/methodology/approach A qualitative content analysis of 58 semi-standardized expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts and a quantitative survey of 184 compliance officers led to the identification of concrete techniques of money laundering in the real estate sector. Findings Real estate companies in German-speaking countries in Europe continue to be extraordinarily suitable for money laundering. In particular, they can be used for placement, layering and integration, combined with violations of the tax code. Most importantly, however, they are the vehicles for one of the very few profitable methods of laundering money. Research limitations/implications As the qualitative findings are based on semi-standardized interviews, these are limited to the 58 interviewees’ perspectives. Practical implications The identification of gaps in existing anti-money laundering mechanisms is meant to provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how criminals operate. Originality/value While the existing literature focuses on organizations fighting money laundering and on the improvement of anti-money laundering measures, this paper describes how money launderers operate to avoid getting caught. Both prevention and criminal perspectives are taken into account.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann ◽  
Marie-Christin Falker

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how money launderers circumvent compliance measures by using exchange offices to launder incriminated funds. Design/methodology/approach The three-step process entailed carrying out unofficial interviews with money launderers, which gave first insight into the issue, followed by expert interviews that were reviewed by means of a qualitative study. The findings of the qualitative study were processed during the subsequent quantitative research. Findings Although exchange offices are a known threat to anti-money laundering efforts, they continue to be highly applicable. As exchange offices are responsible for their own compliance measures, compliance officers employed by other institutions do not encounter money laundering through exchange offices regularly. Research limitations/implications The findings of the study are limited to the experiences of the interviewed experts, which, naturally, are highly subjective. Further, they are geographically limited, as certain areas were not represented in the study. Practical implications During the literature review, a research gap was identified. The present study attempts to partially fill the same. The illustrated findings aimed at facilitating an improvement of anti-money laundering measures. The insights into the minds of money launderers provide valuable information for legislators, compliance officers and authorities. Originality/value Presently, the majority of the literature focuses on the issue of money laundering from a compliance perspective. However, accurately understanding how money launderers circumvent the existing prevention measures requires an exploration of their approaches. To effectively inhibit money laundering, it is necessary to gain a holistic overview of the issue, which entails the observation of both perspectives.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 410-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann

Purpose This paper aims to demonstrate how criminals launder money in the antiquities trade in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Design/methodology/approach A qualitative content analysis of 58 semi-structured expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts and a quantitative survey of 184 compliance officers revealed the concrete techniques used to launder money in the European antiquities trade. Findings The antiquities market facilitates the placement, layering and integration of the transfer of assets to terrorist organizations. Most importantly, it is among the few profitable methods of laundering money. Research limitations/implications As the findings of the qualitative study are based on semi-standardized interviews, they are limited to the 58 interviewees’ perspectives. Practical implications The identification of concrete methods of money laundering and terrorism financing aims to provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insight into criminal activity. Originality/value While the existing literature focuses on organizations fighting money laundering and the financing of terrorism, this study instead describes how criminals avoid detection by taking into account prevention and criminal perspectives.


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 520-533
Author(s):  
Brett Coombs-Goodfellow ◽  
Mark Eshwar Lokanan

PurposeThis paper aims to examine the influence Jones’ Moral Intensity Model (1991) has on the decision-making process of anti-money laundering (AML) compliance officers charged with reporting suspicious money laundering transactions in Jersey.Design/methodology/approachTen interviews were conducted to elicit participants’ views on the six dimensions of moral intensity and their influence on the compliance officers’ decision to submit a suspicious activity report (SAR) of potential money laundering.FindingsThe findings indicate that the officers’ moral intensity to submit a SAR seems to be heavily influenced by issue-specific contextual factors. Contexts (legal and legislative mandates) seem to have more of an effect on the moral intent and actions of the officers rather than directly affecting the decision to submit a report of a suspicious money laundering transaction.Research limitations/implicationsThe paper lays the groundwork for further work in this area and calls on researchers to develop instruments that can enhance the measurements of the dimensions of moral intensity.Practical implicationsThe setting (AML in the financial sector) is both timely and extremely interesting to keep studying, particularly in Jersey because of its dubious sensitive particularities.Originality/valueThe study is the first to examine Jersey AML sector through the lens of moral intensity. In this sense, the paper poses interesting questions, namely, to explore the dynamic complexities experienced by compliance officers in Jersey to detect and report suspicious money laundering activities and the decision-making criteria of actually submitting a SAR.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Brian Rubin ◽  
Adam Pollet

Purpose To analyze FINRA’s 2016 sanctions and cases, the issues that resulted in the most significant fines, emerging enforcement trends, and make predictions about key issues for FINRA for 2017 and beyond. Design/methodology/approach Discusses the sanctions and disciplinary actions in 2016 and prior years; details the top 2016 enforcement issues measured by total fines assessed, including anti-money laundering, variable annuities, trade reporting, books and records, and unregistered securities; explains current enforcement trends, including fines of $1 million or more, sanctions against compliance officers, and suitability cases; and analyzes three enforcement topics that will likely continue to receive heightened attention from FINRA in 2017 and beyond: restitution, cybersecurity, and senior investors. Findings The fines ordered by FINRA in 2016 reached an all-time high while the amount of restitution ordered and the number of disciplinary actions remained on par with prior years. Practical implications Firms and their representatives should heed the trends in both the substantial fines FINRA is ordering and the related enforcement issues in the cases FINRA has brought. Originality/value Expert analysis and guidance from experienced securities enforcement lawyers.


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