Conquering and coercing: Nonviolent anti-regime protests and the pathways to democracy

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (5) ◽  
pp. 650-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nam Kyu Kim ◽  
Alex M Kroeger

Recent research finds an association between nonviolent protests and democratic transitions. However, existing scholarship either does not specify the pathways through which nonviolent protests bring about democratization or conduct systematic empirical analyses demonstrating that the specified pathways are operative. This article proposes four pathways through which nonviolent anti-regime protests encourage democratic transitions, emphasizing their ability to directly conquer or indirectly coerce such transitions. Most simply, they can conquer democratic reforms by directly overthrowing authoritarian regimes and installing democracies. They can also coerce democratic reforms through three additional pathways. Nonviolent anti-regime protests can coerce incumbent elites into democratic reforms by threatening the survival of authoritarian regimes. They also increase the likelihood of elite splits, which promote negotiated democratic reforms. Finally, they encourage leadership change within the existing authoritarian regime. Following leadership change, nonviolent movements remain mobilized and are able to coerce democratic concessions from the regime’s new leaders. Our within-regime analyses provide robust empirical support for each pathway. We show that nonviolent anti-regime protests conquer democratic reforms by ousting autocratic regimes and replacing them with democracies. Nonviolent anti-regime protests also coerce elites into democratic reforms by threatening regime and leader survival. These findings highlight the importance of protest goals and tactics and also that nonviolent anti-regime protests have both direct and indirect effects on democratization.

2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 559-579 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abel Escribà-Folch ◽  
Tobias Böhmelt ◽  
Ulrich Pilster

How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations.


2020 ◽  
pp. 103-116
Author(s):  
Natasha Lindstaedt

For many years, the concept of an authoritarian regime was considered to be one large category, with little understanding of how these regimes differed. The study of authoritarian regimes has come a long way since. Though all authoritarian regimes share in common that there is no turnover in power of the executive, there are considerable differences that distinguish autocracies. Authoritarian regimes today are increasingly attempting to use ‘democratic’ institutions to prolong their rule. This has led to a rise in competitive authoritarian regimes, or hybrid regimes. In spite of these changes, authoritarian regimes are more robust than ever. This chapter explains the different ways in which authoritarian regimes are categorized. The chapter then explains how the different types of authoritarian regimes perform, and what factors make them more durable. As the chapter demonstrates, autocratic regimes have become increasingly better equipped to maintain themselves.


1998 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-93
Author(s):  
Kevin Neuhouser

Can democratic transitions be predicted? The elite-negotiation literature claims that the process is so complicated and contingent that the timing and process is unpredictable. The class-compromise framework, however, identifies structural conditions that make stabilization unlikely, specifying who will oppose the authoritarian regime and why. A “triggering” event—a collapse in export demand—also is identified that intensifies and extends opposition, making a transition likely within 1–3 years. To demonstrate the usefulness of the class-compromise framework, two very different authoritarian regimes are compared. In the Brazilian regime (1964–1985), the military ruled as an institution and pursued state-led development; the Chilean regime (1973–1989) was dominated by one general and was radically neo-liberal. Despite these differences, structural conditions pushed both regimes toward export-led growth and wage constraint, hurting workers and capitalists producing for the local market. When exports collapsed in the early 1980s, opposition spread and forced democratic transitions.


Author(s):  
Changyong Choi ◽  
Sang Hoon Jee

Abstract Utilizing state–society relations as a theoretic framework, this study investigates whether the Internet is used to facilitate or impede democratization in authoritarian regimes. The present paper uses governance practice as the mediating mechanism, along with a regime's degree of authoritarianism as a moderator, to measure the direct and indirect effects of the Internet on democratization. This research found that the Internet can be mobilized to suppress political freedom in authoritarian regimes, while at the same time reinforcing the legitimacy of the regime's basis—both of these deter democratization. The Internet, as a tool, must be complemented by democratic deliberation to fully generate democratization.


2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana M. Binder ◽  
Martin J. Bourgeois ◽  
Christine M. Shea Adams

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