This study examines the legitimacy of the recurrent conduct, adopted by the Jordanian
Executive Power, of issuing Provisional General Budget Laws, in the absence of the
Legislative Power. This study proves the unconstitutionality of such conduct, and looks
at the prospects of progress in the future.
Issuing Provisional General Budget Laws is a culmination of several misconceptions
of some important Constitutional Articles; especially the ones that reflect how the principle
of separation of powers is adopted in the Jordanian Constitution, and how the
different interlocking functions of both the Executive and the Legislative Powers should
be interpreted and applied.
Article 94, providing for the legislative function of the Executive Power in the
absence of the Legislative Power, is interpreted and applied broadly. Issuing Provisional
General Budget Laws mean that the Executive Power assumes the legislative Power and
not a temporary legislative role, as provided in the Constitution. Hence, contradicting
another two important systems provided therein: first, the financial check, as part of the
checks and balances system, provided in Chapter Eight, especially Article 112. Second,
the apportionment method, provided in Article 113, which should be applied in the
absence of the Legislator.
Unfortunately, the 2011 Constitutional Reform, although somewhat progressive, does
not remove such well-rooted misconceptions; leaving the Constitutional Court as the
last resort in rectifying the situation.