US public diplomacy in India: Obama’s legacy

The article discusses the main trends in US public diplomacy in India under Barack Obama. The Obama presidency was characterized by “Pivot to Asia”. India took one of the dominant positions in Obama’s Asian strategy. Furthermore, public diplomacy became the leading strategy tool. Particular attention is paid to the evolution of public diplomacy concepts. Two areas prevailed in public diplomacy in India – educational programs and the “women’s issue”. Washington also launched programs to increase literacy and access to technology.

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Twitter diplomacy between India and the United States: Agenda-building analysis of tweets during presidential state visits

Global Media and Communication ◽

10.1177/1742766518818859 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 15 (1) ◽

pp. 121-134 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Jane O’Boyle

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Public Diplomacy ◽

Prime Minister ◽

The United States ◽

Barack Obama ◽

Agenda Building ◽

White House ◽

Building Effects ◽

The Times

This analysis examines Twitter comments from the United States and India (N = 11,532) during reciprocal state visits by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Barack Obama. Results show the most retweets in both countries were generated from the White House and from The Times of India, reflecting agenda-building effects. The American comments had more individual sources and they were far more negative about Obama than about Modi, unlike the Indian comments. Discussion addresses implications for global public diplomacy and international effects of government agenda-building.

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The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia

International Security ◽

10.1162/isec_a_00238 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 40 (4) ◽

pp. 45-88 ◽

Cited By ~ 35

Author(s):

Nina Silove

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

The United States ◽

Barack Obama ◽

Historical Narrative ◽

Power Balance ◽

China’S Rise ◽

Pivot To Asia ◽

China's Rise ◽

Depth Interviews ◽

China’S Growth

American critics of the Barack Obama administration's 2011 “pivot to Asia” policy claim that, despite the lofty rhetoric, the United States has pursued an anemic strategy in Asia. Chinese critics of the pivot to Asia assert that it is a bellicose strategy aimed at containing China's rise. These two conflicting criticisms are addressed in a detailed historical narrative that traces the development and implementation of U.S. strategy, based on declassified documents, some of which have never before been made public, and extensive in-depth interviews with senior policymakers. Neither American nor Chinese critics of the pivot to Asia are correct. If this policy is properly dated and measured, the United States undertook a substantive military, diplomatic, and later economic reorientation toward Asia. That reorientation started in the mid-2000s, well before the pivot announcement. The aim of the reorientation was not to contain China's rise. Rather, the United States sought to manage China's growth through a blend of internal and external balancing combined with expanded engagement with China. These means were intended to work symbiotically to expand the combined power of the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, and to dissuade China from bidding for hegemony. The ultimate effect of the reorientation strategy—if successful—would be to preserve the existing power balance in the region, in which the United States has held the superior position.

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Engagement policy and formation of allied relations: India in the US foreign policy strategy under George W. Bush and B. Obama

Historia provinciae – the journal of regional history(rus ) ◽

10.23859/2587-8344-2021-5-2-7 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 5 (2) ◽

pp. 571-602

Author(s):

Elizaveta A. Shur

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Foreign Policy ◽

Public Diplomacy ◽

American Foreign Policy ◽

Geographical Location ◽

The United States ◽

Central Place ◽

Barack Obama ◽

Global Campaign ◽

The Us

The article presents an analysis of the engagement policy and the formation of allied relations which hold a central place in the foreign policy of the United States. It is noted that the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks demonstrated the ideological insecurity of the United States and forced Washington to join the global campaign against terrorism. Despite the untenable willingness to bear the burden of war alone, the American political establishment began to look for allies and partners. The purpose of this article is to identify India’s place in the system of American foreign policy strategies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. When studying this topic, the author relied on the methods of analysis, synthesis, comparison and generalization. The phenomenon of using public diplomacy and the engagement policy for strengthening allied relations with India has been studied very little by domestic and foreign science. The article concludes that the White House showed considerable interest in India due to its favorable geographical location, experience in counterterrorism, tense relations with China (a potential competitor of the United States), and the status of the world’s largest democracy, which indicates the country’s commitment to democratic values which are actively promoted by Washington. The article reveals the obstacles in the way of India’s involvement in this cooperation: despite its interest in establishing a dialogue with the United States, the republic did not show any desire to move away from the traditional policy of equidistance in international relations for fear of becoming an American puppet. During the administration of Barack Obama, U.S.–India relations received a new impetus as part of the US Pivot to Asia. The scope of cooperation between the two countries was significantly expanded. The relations reached a new level after Narendra Modi took office as Prime Minister of India. The scientific significance of this study lies in the fact that previously this topic has been considered exclusively through the prism of Chinese politics and nuclear problems.

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