scholarly journals Wprowadzenie dyktatury wojskowej w wyniku zamachu stanu a kwestia międzynarodowego uznania rządu na przykładzie przewrotu wojskowego w Mjanmie z 1 lutego 2021 roku

2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 259-275
Author(s):  
Maciej Gajos

The article reflects on the question of recognizing a government in international law in relation to the coup that took place in Myanmar on 1 February 2021. First, the author defines the recognition of a government, emphasizing that the institution of recognition applies exclusively to unconstitutional changes of governments. The circumstances of the coup in Myanmar are recounted, exhibiting that the authoritarian regime of the junta has been established in a manifest violation of provisions established in the Constitution adopted in 2008. Second, the competing criteria for recognition of a government in international law are discussed with reference to Tobar (favoring legitimacy) and Estrada doctrines (according to which effectiveness shall prevail). The author presents the evolution of opinions in scholarship and in the practice of states that occurred over the course of decades and led to the dominance of the latter concept. It is demonstrated that upon the application of the criterium of effectiveness with regard to the junta in Myanmar, it should be recognized as a body entitled to represent the state. Finally, acknowledging the tendency that originated in the 1990s to take into account the democratic norm as an alternative basis for recognition of a government or its denial, the author claims that in the lack of coherent and uniform state practice in that field, such a norm cannot create a normative obligation as a norm of customary international law, and therefore does not justify nonrecognition of junta. 

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Brian Sang YK

Despite criticism of targeted killing of suspected terrorists, states continue to justify extensive bases for lethal-force responses to terrorism by arguing that rigid adherence to prescriptive law cannot always be observed in the context of clear and present danger. But, while seemingly cogent, this view wrongly presumes the mutual exclusivity of security considerations and the imperatives of law. It risks exceeding the limits of permissible use of lethal force prescribed in conventional and customary international law. A contrary and more balanced view is advanced in this article. It argues that current international law protecting individuals against intentional killing offers sufficient and practicable guidance for states confronting terrorism. Systematic legal criteria are thus expounded to clarify the legality and admissible limits of targeted killing of suspected terrorists in three contexts: law enforcement, self-defence and armed conflict. With reference to treaties, policy documents and state practice, the article critically examines the preconditions for lawful state-sanctioned killings in counter-terrorist operations. It also identifies the legal challenges and policy implications of resorting to targeted killing. Using comparative case law and operational practice, a legal basis is offered on which Kenya and other nations can effectively tackle the spectre of terrorism within the fair strictures of the law. Every struggle of the state – against terrorism or any other enemy – is conducted according to rules and law. There is always law which the state must comply with.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 209-225
Author(s):  
Raffaella Nigro

The dispute between Italy and India on the Enrica Lexie incident has finally been decided by the Award handed down on 21 May 2020 by the Arbitral Tribunal to which the Parties had referred the case. After having concluded that it had jurisdiction on the issue of the immunity of the two Italian marines involved in the case at hand, the majority judgment (by three votes to two) affirmed that under customary international law the latter enjoyed functional immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of India. This article will argue that the Arbitral Tribunal’s conclusions are unconvincing, first and foremost, considering that, based on State practice, it is not possible to affirm without reservations that a settled customary rule exists under international law conferring immunity to all State officials, and regardless of the type of functions they perform. In fact, immunity has often been recognized as applying only to certain categories of State officials, and on the basis of the governmental nature of the functions they perform on behalf of the State. Given the doubtful existence under customary international law of a clear rule establishing the functional immunity of all State officials, for all the acts performed in the exercise of their functions, this article argues that the Arbitral Tribunal should have firstly ascertained the existence of a specific customary rule on the immunity of the military abroad, together with the exact content of such rule and, secondly, whether this was applicable in the case of the Enrica Lexie. As current practice stands, military forces abroad are entitled to immunity only under specific circumstances, which do not seem to occur in the present case. In particular, this article maintains that the Italian marines were not entitled to functional immunity. While the acts they performed did indeed fall within their typical functions, they were exercised on behalf of a private subject and not on behalf of the Italian State.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 199-200
Author(s):  
James Gathii

In the lead essay in this symposium, Professor Erika de Wet contends that notwithstanding all of the post-Cold War enthusiasm for a right to democratic governance and the non-recognition of governments resulting from coups and unconstitutional changes of government, a customary international law norm on the nonrecognition of governments established anti-democratically has not emerged. De Wet’s position, primarily based on state practice in Africa, is vigorously debated by six commentators.Jure Vidmar agrees with de Wet that the representative legitimacy of governments still lies primarily in effective control over the territory of the state. Vidmar, in his contribution, examines recent collective practice when neither the incumbent government nor the insurgents control the territory exclusively, arguing that in such cases states may apply human rights considerations. Like de Wet, however, Vidmar regards state practice as ambivalent and unamenable to ideal-type distinctions between coups (against a democratically legitimate government) and regime changes (to a democratically legitimate government).


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-188
Author(s):  
James A. Green

The persistent objector rule is a well-known but controversial mechanism for a state to exempt itself from norms of customary international law. This article examines the rule with a specific focus on the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the Identification of Customary International Law, through a consideration of Conclusion 15 and the commentary to it that have been adopted, as well as the ILC plenary debates on the topic. The state usage and, indeed, very existence of the rule will be considered, given that this has been so controversial in the ILC and wider literature. The article further examines whether the rule rightly formed an aspect of the Commission’s work, and looks at the terminology employed in Conclusion 15. Finally, it assesses the requirements for the operation of the persistent objector rule as expressed by the ILC, through comparison to the manner in which the criteria have been employed in state practice.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-131
Author(s):  
Anthony Carty

Abstract Customary international law as a source of general law is given a primary place in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. However, it is historically a concept created by legal doctrine. The very idea of custom supposes legal persons are natural persons living in a dynamic, evolving community. This was the assumption of the historical school of law in the 19th century when the concept of custom was developed. Now the dominant notion of legal personality is the State as an impersonal corporation and international legal theory (Brierly and D’Amato) can see well that the death of the historical school of law has to mean the death of the concept of custom. What should replace it? Two steps need to be taken in sequence. Firstly, following the Swedish realist philosopher Haegerstrom, we have to ascertain the precise constellations of the conflictual attitudes the populations of States have to the patterns of normativity which they project onto international society. Secondly, we should follow the virtue ethics jurisprudence of Paul Ricoeur and others, who develop a theory of critical legal doctrinal judgement, along the classical lines of Aristotle and Confucius, to challenge and sort out the prejudices of peoples into some reasonable shape, whereby these can be encouraged to understand and respect one another. Then one will not have to endure so many silly interpretations of international law such as the one declaring that there are only rocks in the South China Sea and not islands. Such interpretations have nothing to do with the supposedly ordinary legal language analysis of a convention and the State practice surrounding it. They have to do entirely with a continued lack of respect by Western jurists for non-Western societies and nations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-76
Author(s):  
Marco Longobardo

Abstract This article explores the role of counsel before the International Court of Justice, taking into account their tasks under the Statute of the Court and the legal value of their pleadings in international law. Pleadings of counsel constitute State practice for the formation of customary international law and treaty interpretation, and they are attributable to the litigating State under the law on State responsibility. Accordingly, in principle, counsel present the views of the litigating State, which in practice approves in advance the pleadings. This consideration is relevant in discussing the role of counsel assisting States in politically sensitive cases, where there is no necessary correspondence between the views of the States and those of their counsel. Especially when less powerful States are parties to the relevant disputes, the availability of competent counsel in politically sensitive cases should not be discouraged since it advances the legitimacy of the international judicial function.


Author(s):  
Duško Glodić

This article explores the role and importance accorded to customary international law in contemporary international law. First of all, the author has explored a number of issues related to this topic. Particluarly, the manner in which norms of customary international law are being established through the relevant State practice and the formation of opinio juris, as well as how the changes in contemporary international relations generated some chages in custromary international law were examined from both theretical and practical point of view. Than, the article elaborated, in a more concrete manner, different ways of impact of changes in international relations and subjects of international law to the formation of customary international rules. It has also paid attention to the evolution in international law and its reflection to the creation of international legal norms, including customary rules. The article concluded that, despite an ever increasing number of treaties, customary rules are still present in international law and are important for regulation of international relations, thus ensuring that dynamics and developments within the international community are followed by the development of legal framework.


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