Trademarks in Entrepreneurial Firm Success: Empirical Evidence from Venture Backed Private Firms and Initial Public Offerings

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Chemmanur ◽  
Harshit Rajaiya ◽  
Xuan Tian ◽  
Qianqian Yu
2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatang Ary Gumanti

This paper reviews and summarizes previous works and the rationale for the proposition that accounting information is in fact value relevant in the determination of an initial public offering IPO).Theoretical and empirical evidence has indicated that certain accounting measures can he used as proxies for total firm risk, that is, they could determine the riskiness of a corporation. The literature also advocates that accounting information is relevant in determining the value and thus the riskiness of a corporation through the use of accounting analysis. Since most of the information available in the prospectus is accounting information, it is arguable that this information represents a potential source for assessing the issuing firm. Some scholars have also advocated the possibility of using accounting information in assessing the value of firm making an IPO. Numerous papers have provided analytical and empirical evidence of the association between accounting numbers and the value of IPOs. The conclusion generally comes to show that information in the prospectus is value relevant concerning the IPO. The paper shows that it is indeed an arguable to use accounting information in the valuation of an IPO. Accordingly, it is an empirical issue whether accounting information has the property in explaining the ex-ante uncertainty of an IPO.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shenghui Tong ◽  
Eddy Junarsin

This study examines the characteristics of board structure that affect Chinese public firm’s financial performance. Using a sample of 871 firms with 699 observations of previously private firms and 1,914 observations of previously state-owned enterprise (SOE) firms, we investigate the differences in corporate governance between publicly listed firms that used to be pure private firms before going public and listed firms that used to be SOEs before their initial public offerings (IPOs). Our main finding is that previously private firms outperform previously SOE firms in China after IPOs. In the wake of becoming listed firms, previously SOE firms might be faced with difficulties adjusting to professional business practices to build and extend competitive advantages. In addition, favorable policies and assistance from the government to the SOE firms might have triggered complacency, especially in early years after getting listed. On the other hand, professional savvy and acumen, combined with efficiency and favorable business climate created by the government have probably led the previously private firms to improve their values stronger and faster.          


2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tzong-Huei Lin

To enhance the corporate governance of listed firms, Taiwan prescribes that the initial public offerings (IPOs) after February 19, 2002, have to set up at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor who posses financial or accounting expertise. The corporate governance reform of Taiwan offers an opportunity to investigate the effect of corporate governance on IPOs market. Using data from Taiwan’s initial public offerings (IPOs), this study documents evidence that the magnitudes of under-pricings of IPOs after 2002 are significantly smaller than those of before. This shows that the corporate governance can reduce the investors’ uncertainty about the IPOs. The empirical evidence also indicates that the percentage of shares holdings owned by directors/supervisors is demonstrated to have negative relationship with the underpricing of the IPOs. This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, as Ritter and Welch (2002) suggest that future progress in the IPO underpricing literature will mainly come from agency conflict explanation, this study provides evidence about the effect of corporate governance on IPOs market. Second, as for the issue about the policy implication of the SFB 2002’ rules, this study provides the empirical evidence. Third, whether the government should prescribe the firms to set up independent directors? This study offers a direction for future discussion.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 162-179
Author(s):  
Maximus Leonardo Taolin ◽  
Julia Safitri

The research aims to find the impact of ownership retention, managerial ownership, and boards on value IPO premium and underpricing. We investigate by using hand collect data 202 IPO prospectuses during 2008-2017 and using Warp PLS 5.0 to compute the data. Our finding suggests that may use to guide the investor in making informed decisions to see the level of the proportion of sharehold by old ownership and management. When the high level of ownership retention and managerial ownership, make the value IPO premium and underpricing will be high. On the other hand duality of the managerial role in firms making the value will be achieved. This paper contributes to the value of IPO premium and underpricing literature when influence by ownership share on initial public offerings  context of emerging markets.Keywords: Ownership retention; Managerial Ownership; Boards; IPO premium; underpricing


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
Dario Salerno

Using a unique sample of privately held and firms that went public on the European and Asian Stock Exchanges between 2007 and 2011, we investigate the IPO’s impact on the firms’ performance after correcting for endogenous selection and by disentangling equity issues effects from other effects. We find that companies that are going public are more profitable than their matched private firms, while they experience a decrease in profitability over the post-IPO period. These results are resilient to different empirical strategies that address selection bias. Second, after disentangling equity issues effects from other effects, we observe a continuous decline in firms’ profitability in each individual year following the IPO year. JEL classification numbers: G10, G30, G32, L25. Keywords: IPOs, Private firms, Profitability, Selection bias.


Author(s):  
Nihat Aktas ◽  
Christian Andres ◽  
Ali Ozdakak

This chapter examines the interactions of initial public offerings (IPOs) and mergers and acquisitions (M&As), in contrast with the common approach of studying them in isolation. Of the many motivations to conduct an IPO (e.g., fundraising, access to capital, increased liquidity, publicity), several of them clearly relate to takeover activities. This chapter analyzes three key forms of interaction: (1) IPO and M&A markets interact when entrepreneurs and early investors from private firms decide to liquidate and cash out their investments. They can exit through an IPO, or they might seek an acquisition by another firm (e.g., sellout to a strategic acquirer, private equity fund, or another financial investor); (2) after a being listed, some firms become takeover targets, and some IPO firms also participate actively in the M&A market as acquirers; (3) between the IPO and M&A markets, one can be used to exert pressure on the other.


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