scholarly journals United States-Vietnam relations in light of geopolitics of the usa in Asia-Pacific region in 1945-1975

Author(s):  
Ivan Desiatnikov ◽  

The article focuses on the analysis of US-Vietnam relations during the period from 1945 to 1975. The aim of the article is to trace the changes that took place in the US-Vietnam relationship over that period, to identify the factors that influenced them, as well as the approaches used by the heads of the countries to tackle their foreign policy objectives in the region. The author traces the evolution of US policy in Vietnam pursued by Presidents H. Truman, D. Eisenhower, J. Kennedy, L. Johnson and R. Nixon. The United States had diametrically opposed position on relations with the Vietnamese governments, namely, confrontation and military conflict with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and cooperation, military and economic aid to the Republic of Vietnam. The author concludes that the US attitude towards Vietnam was determined by the international situation at that time, including the beginning of the Cold War. The policies of Presidents D. Eisenhower and J. Kennedy were to restrain the expansion of the Communist bloc's sphere of influence. The direct involvement of the US military in the Vietnam conflict, initiated by L. Johnson, pursued the goal of enhancing the prestige of the United States in the global confrontation with the USSR. The split between the Soviet Union and China was used by the US to get out of the Vietnam War and mend relations with China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region. Instead, the Republic of Vietnam, which had been the "junior partner" of the United States, was left to its fate.

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-96
Author(s):  
Thong Dinh Nguyen

The complicated issues the East Sea relate to the strategies of major powers. The process of establishing Sino - U.S. in the 1970s and the failure of the U.S. in Vietnam War could be seen as an opportunity for China to expand its power in the East Sea. The crisis of the Soviet Union in the 1980s and the U.S. bogged down in the War on Terrorin later years created a favorable condition for China to enhance its status and foster conflicts in the East Sea. The Asia - Pacific region, with the increasingly and dynamic development, has attracted concerns of all major powers. The success of China’s economic reform and opening-up policy, along with the arms race and its publicdeclaration to monopolize the East Sea have driven China to be the central concern of the countries in the Asia – Pacific region. Thus, major powers have been forced to adjust their strategies for this region. Fully understanding the great powers’ strategic adjustmentswill help Vietnam response appropriately, combine internal strength with diplomatic struggle to build East Sea into a sea of peace, security and cooperation.


Author(s):  
Vladimir Kulikov

The following article attempts, from the viewpoint of Russian interests, to confirm the thesis of the continuity of long-term approaches of the military-political establishment of the United States to security problems in the Asia – Pacific region, formulated or confirmed in early 1980’s by Ronald Reagan administration, based on the analysis of one of the most significant American collective monographs of that period. Special attention to this well-known work is due to the fact that it, in the author’s opinion, for the first time in a rather concise form reflected the then completed process of understanding of the experience of American participation in the Vietnam war (or in the broader sense of “deep involvement in Asia”), as well as the new role of the so-called “Chinese factor” and traditional allies of the United States by influential representatives of the intellectual military establishment at that time. Despite the inadequacy of this approach to the analysis of deeper socio-economic processes in Northeast Asia (by the way, in the historiography of that time the region was often called the Far East), which determine the main directions and specifics of the situation, the continuity of the scale of priorities of American policy in the AsiaPacific region and commitment to transregional and transit strategies are still significant today. The author suggests that at the present time there is a process of reformulation and bringing in line with the slogans of the “New Americanism” of the agenda of American power policy, which will take into account the tools specified in the work of its implementation in the sphere of “vital interests” of Russia.


Author(s):  
James Cameron

This chapter shows how Lyndon Baines Johnson and Robert McNamara attempted to reconcile the US emphasis on nuclear superiority with the administration’s new Great Society program and the consequent need to limit military spending. McNamara’s strategy of assured destruction tried to balance these imperatives by positing that the Soviet Union would not attempt to gain nuclear parity with the United States because it had forces sufficient to assure America’s destruction if it attacked the USSR. Assured destruction also left the United States’ antiballistic missile program in a state of perpetual research and development. This was partly due to its ineffectiveness, but also because the expense of deployment would endanger the administration’s budgetary priorities, particularly after the escalation of the Vietnam War. An unexpected Soviet nuclear buildup upset this balance between budgetary control and strategic coherence, necessitating an American diplomatic approach to the Soviet Union for talks on limiting strategic armaments.


Author(s):  
Kateryna Kasatkina

The article is an attempt to analyze the peculiarities of the US Policy towards Cuba under conditions of break off diplomatic relations in the 1960s. The article focuses on factors which influenced on the formation of the US policy towards Cuba and determined the nature of its qualitative changes in the given period. The author analyzed definite political and economic steps made by President John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson against Fidel Castro’s regime. There is also described the work of the Special Group Augmented that prepared for the new phase of the «Cuban project» – Operation «Mongoose». As a result of the research the author comes to the conclusion, that peculiarities of the US Policy towards Cuba under conditions of break off diplomatic relations in the 1960’s had changed. President Kennedy’s policies were characterized by different methods and approaches. It included both covert operations and sabotage against F. Castro’s regime, as well as political and economic pressure on Cuba. However, such US policy had the opposite effect. Cuba had established relations with the Soviet Union. The confrontation between the United States, the Soviet Union and Cuba led to The Cuban missile crisis. After the crisis was resolved the USA was forced to suspend operation «Mongoose». In addition, John F. Kennedy had attempted to establish a secret back channel of communication with F. Castro. After his death, preliminary for negotiations between Washington and Havana were discontinued. The new President Lyndon Johnson did not allow the normalization of relations with Cuba on Castro’s terms and while he was in power. He made an effort to destabilize the Castro’s regime by making an engaging immigration policy for Cubans who lived in the United States or desired come to the country and got a permanent residence. At the end of Johnson’s presidency, the United States took part in the Vietnam war, but the problem of U.S.-Cuban relations remained unresolved.


1994 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 475-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael M. Sheng

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Sino-Soviet conflict intensified and at the same time the Sino-American rapprochement was well under way. When the Americans began to search for an answer to the question of ‘Why Vietnam’, some US foreign relation documents in the later 1940s were released, which indicated that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had made certain friendly overtures toward the United States. Since then, it has become a widely-accepted interpretation among scholars that Washington ‘lost a chance’ to win over the CCP from Moscow in the late 1940s. The fundamental premise of this interpretation is that the CCP earnestly bid for American friendship and support as a counterweight to pressure from the Soviet Union. It is argued that the CCP sincerely sought the US recognition right up to the middle of and that it was only after their bids for American support were rejected by Washington that the Communists had to choose the ‘lean-to-one-side’ policy. In short, Washington's shortsighted policy in 1949 ‘forced Beijing into Moscow's embrace’, and therefore set in motion a train of disastrous events: the Korean War and the Vietnam War. A promising postwar Asian balance in favour of the US was ruined.


2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph A. Cossa ◽  
Brad Glosserman ◽  
Michael A. McDevitt ◽  
Nirav Patel ◽  
James Przystup ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Bipin K. Tiwary ◽  
Anubhav Roy

Having fought its third war and staring at food shortages, independent India needed to get its act together both militarily and economically by the mid-1960s. With the United States revoking its military assistance and delaying its food aid despite New Delhi’s devaluation of the rupee, India’s newly elected Indira Gandhi government turned to deepen its ties with the Soviet Union in 1966 with the aim of balancing the United States internally through a rearmament campaign and externally through a formal alliance with Moscow. The US formation of a triumvirate with Pakistan and China in India’s neighbourhood only bolstered its intent. Yet India consciously limited the extent of both its balancing strategies and allowed adequate space to simultaneously adopt the contradictory sustenance of its complex interdependence with the United States economically. Did this contrasting choice of strategies constitute India’s recourse to hedging after 1966 until 1971, when it liberated Bangladesh by militarily defeating a US-aligned Pakistan? Utilising a historical-evaluative study of archival data and the contents of a few Bollywood films from the period, this paper seeks to address the question by empirically establishing the extents of India’s balancing of, and complex interdependence with, the United States.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 22-40
Author(s):  
Lasha Tchantouridze

The two-decade-long U.S.-led military mission in Afghanistan ended in August 2021 after a chaotic departure of the NATO troops. Power in Kabul transferred back to the Taliban, the political force the United States and its allies tried to defeat. In its failure to achieve a lasting change, the Western mission in Afghanistan is similar to that of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. These two missions in Afghanistan had many things in common, specifically their unsuccessful counterinsurgency efforts. However, both managed to achieve limited success in their attempts to impose their style of governance on Afghanistan as well. The current study compares and contrasts some of the crucial aspects of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Soviet and Western forces during their respective missions, such as special forces actions, propaganda activities, and dealing with crucial social issues. Interestingly, when the Soviets withdrew in 1988, they left Afghanistan worse off, but the US-backed opposition forces subsequently made the situation even worse. On the other hand, the Western mission left the country better off in 2021, and violence subsided when power in the country was captured by the Taliban, which the United States has opposed.


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