scholarly journals Influence of Information Asymmetry and Self-Efficacy on Budgetary Slack: An Experimental Study

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 62
Author(s):  
Zaenal Fanani ◽  
Georgina Elizabeth K. Saudale

Participation in the budgetary process does not only comes with a positive effect(s) but could also lead to negative behavior(s) of employees, one of which is the creation of budgetary slack. Previous studies said that information asymmetry is rated as one of the causes of the creation of budgetary slack. The purposes of this 3x2 factorial experimental study and between subject designs are to see the effect of information asymmetry on the budgetary slack and see whether information asymmetry and self-efficacy leads to the creation of budgetary slack. This study involved 65 undergraduate and postgraduate students from the accounting department of Economics and Business Faculty in Universitas Airlangga Sura­baya as participants. One way ANOVA and two- way ANOVA is used to test and analyze the proposed hypothesis. Results show that information asymmetry influences the creation of budgetary slack. However, production managers with high or low self-efficacy are still taking advantage of asymmetric information that happened to do budgetary slack.

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 513
Author(s):  
Putu Novia Hapsari Ardianti ◽  
Ni Nyoman Sri Rahayu Damayanti ◽  
I Made Surya Prayoga

A budget is an organizational plan stated in a monetary unit and drawn up for a period of time. The process of budgeting can trigger the behavior of budget implementers to conduct budgetary slack due to negative subjective attitudes and norms owned by budget executives. This makes research on the factors that affect the budgeting slack important to be carried out. This study used data collection techniques with questionnaires. All research instruments are valid and reliable. This research has also been freed from the problem of classical assumptions. The results were tested with multiple linear regression analysis. The results showed self-efficacy, budget participation, information asymmetry, and budgetary emphasis influenced the budgetary slack. On the other side emotional stability has no significant effect on the budgetary slack. Keywords: Self-efficacy; Budget Participation; Information Asymmetry; Emotional stability; Budgetary Emphasis; Budgetary Slack.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (9) ◽  
pp. 2323
Author(s):  
Devia Galuh Palupi ◽  
Maria Mediatrix Ratna Sari

The purpose of this study was to obtain empirical evidence about the effect of budgetary participation, organizational commitment, transformational leadership style, and information asymmetry on budgetary slack in the 5-Star Hotel in the Nusa Dua Region. The population used was as many as 18 5-star hotels in the Nusa Dua area with a sample of 73 lower and middle level managers using purposive sampling methods and data analysis techniques used were multiple linear regression. Based on the results of this study, it was found that budgetary participation and information asymmetry had a positive effect on budgetary slack, while organizational commitment and transformational leadership style negatively affected budgetary slack in the 5-Star Hotel in the Nusa Dua Region. Keywords: Participation; Commitment; Transformational; Asymmetry; Slack.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (7) ◽  
pp. 1780
Author(s):  
Putu Ayu Pramesti ◽  
I Ketut Sujana

This study purposed to figure out the effect of budgeting participation, information asymmetry, and self esteem on budgetary slack with organizational commitment as moderated variable in the Regional Organization of Badung Regency. The population in this study consisted by Head of Regional Organization, Head of Planning and Reporting and Head of Financial from the Regional Organization Unit of Badung Regency. Total number of respondents were 102 respondents by using saturated sampling method. Data analysis technique processed using Moderation Regression Analysis (MRA). The results showed that budgeting participation has a positive effect on budgetary slack, while information asymmetry and self esteem have a negative effect on budgetary slack. Organizational commitment proved to weaken the relationship between of budgeting participation, information asymmetry and self esteem on budgetary slack. Keywords: Budgetary Slack; Budgeting Participation; Information Asymmetry; Self Esteem; Organizational Commitment.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aryani Rahmawati ◽  
◽  
Supriyadi , ◽  

This study aimed to examine the effect of positive and negative feedback on budgetary slack and the interaction between feedback and self-efficacy on budgetary slack under a condition of information asymmetry. Preliminary researches have tested various ways of mitigating budgetary slack practices, which did not separate the effects of positive and negative feedback. This study hypothesized that positive feedback minimizes the potential for budgetary slack under conditions of information asymmetry—and vice versa. Additionally, high self-efficacy reinforces positive feedback in reducing budgetary slack under conditions of information asymmetry—and vice versa. By employing experimental data, this study documented the results that positive feedback significantly minimizes (the potential for budgetary slacking under conditions of information asymmetry—and vice versa. However, there is no difference in the average budget slack on managers with high or low self-efficacy, who get positive feedback.


2002 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas E. Stevens

This experimental study tests the effects on budgetary slack of two potential controls for opportunistic self-interest—reputation and ethics. I manipulate the level of information asymmetry between the subordinate and the superior regarding productive capability and measure the subordinate's reputation and ethical concerns regarding budgetary slack. In this setting, I examine how information asymmetry affects reputation and ethical concerns, and test the effects of these concerns on budgetary slack. Consistent with prior findings, subordinates restrict the slack in their budgets to well below the maximum under a slack-inducing pay scheme, even after five periods of experience. Budgetary slack is negatively associated with a measure of ethical responsibility from a pre-experiment personality questionnaire as well as reputation and ethical concerns expressed in an exit questionnaire. Subordinates express lower reputation concerns as information asymmetry regarding productive capability increases, thereby reducing the superior's ability to monitor the slack in their budget. Ethical concerns, however, are not diminished with increases in information asymmetry. These results suggest that reputation is a socially mediated control, whereas ethics is an internally mediated control for opportunistic self-interest.


Author(s):  
Hayu Pikukuhing Tyas ◽  
Nurkholis ◽  
Endang Mardiati

Budgetary slack occurs because of the potential difference with the revenue budget target. the difference in potential revenue with the revenue budget target indicates the occurrence of individual behavior lowering the income target to facilitate the achievement of the government budget. The purpose of this study is to empirically prove the effect of budget participation, information asymmetry, and job insecurity that trigger budgetary slack. The population of this research is officials of the Indonesian: Regional Working Unit in the province of East Java, Indonesia. The sampling technique used is proportional sampling, the research respondents were 84 people. The results show that budget participation, information asymmetry, and job insecurity have a positive effect on budgetary slack. The high budget participation of public sector employees can trigger budgetary slack. Information asymmetry motivates budget implementers to take action to reduce revenue targets and increase government spending. High job insecurity in the work environment creates pressure on employees so that budgetary slack is created.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 15-28
Author(s):  
Quang-Huy Ngo ◽  
Thi-Nam-Ninh Doan ◽  
Thanh-Nha Huynh

Although the budgeting literature well documents managers' creation of budgetary slack in developed economies, lack of attention has been paid to this behaviour in emerging economies. It is doubtful that some unique characteristics, only existing in emerging economies, cause this behaviour to be different than the budgeting literature predicts. Since there is no study examining managers' creation of budgetary slack in emerging economies, such as Vietnam, to get insight into whether or not these characteristics cause the differences, the aim of this study is to replicate prior budgeting studies by using Vietnamese samples. Particularly, we investigated the impact of budgetary participation, budget emphasis, information asymmetry, and the interactions between these variables on managers' creation of budgetary slack. Data obtained from the questionnaire sent to 99 Vietnamese managers shows that the last two variables and the interaction between them induce managers' creation of budgetary slack. However, the results also indicate that the first variable and the interaction between this variable and the other two variables respectively have no impact on managers' creation of budgetary slack. These results provide some insight into the creation of budgetary slack of Vietnamese managers for future studies to extend the line of research.


2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
Kadek Diviariesty ◽  
IGAM Asri Dwija Putri

This study aims to determine the effect of budgetary participation, information asymmetry and organizational commitment to budgetary slack with the Tri Hita Karana culture as a moderating variable. The analysis technique used is Moderated Regression Analysis. The results showed that budgetary participation and organizational commitment had no significant effect on budgetary slack. Information asymmetry has a positive effect on budgetary slack. The interaction between budgeting participation and the Tri Hita Karana culture is unable to moderate budgetary participation against budgetary slack. The interaction of information asymmetry with the Tri Hita Karana culture is able to weaken the positive influence of information asymmetry on budgetary slack. The interaction between organizational commitment and the Tri Hita Karana culture is unable to moderate organizational commitment to budgetary slack. Keywords: Tri Hita Karana; Budgetary Participation; Information Asymmetry; Organizational Commitment; Budgetary Slack.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (12) ◽  
pp. 3010
Author(s):  
I Dewa Gde Nanda Narotama ◽  
I Ketut Sujana

The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the effect of budgetary participation, information asymmetry, organizational culture and organizational commitment on budgetary slack. This research was conducted in all OPDs in Tabanan Regency. The number of OPDs used was 40 OPDs and the number of sample used by 120 peoples. The data analysis technique used is multiple linear regression analysis. The results of this analysis indicate that budgetary participation and information asymmetry have a positive effect on budgetary slack while organizational culture and organizational commitment have a negative effect on budgetary slack. This shows that the higher budgetary participation and information asymmetry results in higher budgetary slack, while higher organizational culture and organizational commitment results in lower budgetary slack rates. Keywords: Budgeting Participation; Information Asymmetry; Organizational Culture; Organizational Commitment; Budgetary Slack. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 547
Author(s):  
Kadek Ayu Mika Dwi Riantari ◽  
Maria Mediatrix Ratna Sari

This study aims to determine the effect of budgeting, budget emphasis and information asymmetry on budgetary slack and to find out locus of control as moderating participatory budgeting, budget emphasis and information asymmetry on BPR budgetary slack in Tabanan Regency. This research was carried out by rural banks spread across Tabanan Regency. The population were budget compilers in 22 BPRs. The technique of determining the sample purposive sampling with criteria of selected informants who had occupied the position / part of at least 2 years and contributed to the preparation of the budget. Data collection by distributing questionnaire. Data analysis technique used is MRA. The results indicate that budgetary, empahasis budget, information asyimmetry has a positive effect on budgetary slack. Locus of control moderates the influence of participatory budgeting, budget empahasis and information asymmetry on budgetary slack. Keywords : Budgeting; Budget Empahasis; Information Asymmetry; Budgetary Slack; Locus Of Control.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document