Virtue Ethics and Moral Relativism

2011 ◽  
pp. 391-410
Author(s):  
Christopher W. Gowans
Author(s):  
Rebecca L. Stangl

Descriptive moral relativism is often thought to present a challenge for the justification of any non-skeptical normative theory of ethics. But does it present a special challenge for the justification of virtue ethics, more serious than the challenge it presents for deontological or consequentialist theories of ethics? On the one hand, and especially given its emphasis on concrete forms of life rather than abstract or universal norms, some have argued that it does. On the other hand, important strains of neo-Aristotelianism seek to ground virtue ethics in an objective account of human nature. This might suggest that virtue ethics has special resources for responding to the challenge posed by descriptive moral relativism. This chapter argues that neither of these claims is correct. Virtue ethics faces no special challenge from descriptive moral relativism, but neither does neo-Aristotelian naturalism provide any special resources for answering that challenge.


Dialogue ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-150
Author(s):  
ÉTIENNE BROWN

Aristotelian virtue theorists are currently engaged in a discussion with philosophers who use psychological findings to question some of their main assumptions. In this article, I present and argue against one of these psychological challenges—Jesse Prinz’s Normativity Challenge—which rests on the claim that findings in cultural psychology contradict the Aristotelian thesis that the normativity of virtues derives from nature. First, I demonstrate that the Normativity Challenge is based on three problematic assumptions about contemporary Aristotelianism. Second, I argue that it presupposes the truth of a metaethical framework that Aristotelians reject: moral relativism.


Author(s):  
Justin Farrell

This chapter examines the bitter, long-lasting, and sometimes violent dispute over the Yellowstone bison herd—America's only remaining genetically pure and free-roaming herd, which once numbered more than 30 million but was exterminated down to a mere 23 single animals. This intractable issue hinges on current scientific disagreements about the biology and ecology of the disease brucellosis (Brucella abortus). But in recent years, a more radical, grassroots, and direct action activist group called the Buffalo Field Campaign (BFC) has found success by shifting the focus of the debate away from science, toward the deeper religious dimensions of the issue. The chapter shows how the infusion of the conflict with moral and spiritual feeling has brought to the fore deeper questions that ultimately needed to be answered, thus making this a public religious conflict as much as a scientific one, sidestepping rabbit holes of intractability. It observes the ways in which BFC activists engaged in a phenomenon called moral and religious “muting.” This has theoretical implications for understanding how certain elements of culture (e.g., individualism and moral relativism) can organize and pattern others—especially in post hoc explanations of religiously motivated activism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-164
Author(s):  
Angelo Nicolaides ◽  
Stella Vettori
Keyword(s):  

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