Trends in drug revenue among major pharmaceutical companies: A 2010‐2019 cohort study

Cancer ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel E. Meyers ◽  
Benjamin S. Meyers ◽  
Timothy M. Chisamore ◽  
Kristin Wright ◽  
Bishal Gyawali ◽  
...  
BMJ Open ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. e037395
Author(s):  
Marlene Stoll ◽  
Lara Hubenschmid ◽  
Cora Koch ◽  
Klaus Lieb

ObjectiveTo analyse voluntary payment reports of pharmaceutical companies to German healthcare professionals (HCPs) in 2015 and 2016 based on an industry-self-regulating transparency codex.Design and participantsCohort study of all German HCPs who voluntarily agreed that at least one payment they received in 2015 and 2016 from pharmaceutical companies is disclosed.Main outcome measuresNumber of HCPs who disclosed at least one payment in the database; separated by year of disclosure and whether they disclosed once or repeatedly. Amount of disclosed payments and distribution parameters of disclosed annual payment sums per person; separated by year of disclosure und whether they disclosed once or repeatedly.Results28 230 HCPs agreed to the disclosure of at least one payment in the database. In 2015, 19 905 HCPs agreed to the disclosure, decreasing to 15 782 HCPs in 2016. Whereas 7457 disclosed payments in both years, 12 448 disclosed only in 2015 and 8325 only in 2016. Payments of €32 426 721 in 2015 and €23 289 343 in 2016 were disclosed, that is, 27% and 23% of the total amounts spent on HCPs, respectively. Distribution of annual payments was skewed: the top 1% of HCPs disclosed annual payment sums between €17 049 and €200 194, while the median disclosed annual payment sum per person was €536 (IQR €1092). Disclosed payments were higher in male physicians and in physicians with higher academic degree.ConclusionsIf voluntary, disclosure rates of payments are low and therefore only provide a fragmented picture of interactions between HCPs and pharmaceutical companies. Efforts must be intensified to ensure obligatory disclosure of all payments worldwide.


2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (15_suppl) ◽  
pp. 6505-6505
Author(s):  
Daniel E. Meyers ◽  
Benjamin S. Meyers ◽  
Timothy M. Chisamore ◽  
Kristin Wright ◽  
Bishal Gyawali ◽  
...  

6505 Background: In the past decade there has been a 70% increase in the number of clinical trials for cancer drugs. During this time, there has also been a substantial increase in the price of cancer drugs. It is unclear how these trends have changed the revenue landscape of major pharmaceutical companies. In this study we characterize temporal trends in cancer drug revenue relative to non-cancer drugs. Methods: This retrospective cohort study used publicly available global sales data from the 10 pharmaceutical companies with the highest annual revenue in 2019; Abbvie (AB), AstraZeneca (AZ), Bristol Myers Squibb (BMS), GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), Johnson & Johnson (JJ), Merck (M), Novartis (N), Pfizer (P), Roche (R) and Sanofi (S). We quantified the contribution of cancer drugs to net revenue for each company from 2010 – 2019 using consolidated annual financial reports (i.e. 10-K or 20-F forms). Cancer drugs were defined as those with an FDA-approved indication for anti-cancer effect or supportive care. All sales data were converted to USD and adjusted for global inflation. Trends in the percentage of company revenues accounted for by cancer drugs were assessed with the Kendall-Mann test. P-values were adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing using the Benjamini-Hochberg method. Results: During 2010-2019, cumulative annual revenue generated from cancer drugs in our cohort of companies (n = 10) increased by 96%, from $52.8 billion to $103.5 billion. The cumulative revenue from non-oncology drugs decreased by 19%, from $342.5 billion to $276.9 billion. The proportion of total revenue generated from cancer drugs grew over time; from 13% in 2010 to 27% in 2019 (p < 0.001). During 2015-2019, annual revenue for the study cohort grew by 12%: from $339.7 billion to $380.4 billion. During this period non-oncology revenues remained stagnant (mean $278.9 billion, range 276.9 – 281.9), while oncology revenues grew by 66%; from $61.4 billion to $103.5 billion. Six companies (AB, AZ, BMS, JJ, N, and P) saw substantial increases in the proportion of revenue attributable to cancer drugs. R had both the highest net revenue ($23.9 billion), and highest proportion of revenue (57%) from cancer drugs in 2010 among the cohort, similar to 2019 ($27.7 billion, 57%; p = 0.37). While not reaching significance over the total study period, M saw increases in oncology revenue from $1.5 billion in 2015 to $12.3 billion in 2019 (4% to 30% of total revenue); driven almost exclusively by sales of Pembrolizumab. Conclusions: Amongst the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies, sales revenue from cancer drugs have increased by 96% over the past decade, while revenues from non-cancer drugs have decreased by 19%. Revenues from cancer drugs accounted for 27% of company revenues in 2019. Further work is needed to understand if this massive increase in sales revenues has translated into proportional improvements in patient and population outcomes.


2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-184
Author(s):  
Amy Garrigues

On September 15, 2003, the US. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that agreements between pharmaceutical and generic companies not to compete are not per se unlawful if these agreements do not expand the existing exclusionary right of a patent. The Valley DrugCo.v.Geneva Pharmaceuticals decision emphasizes that the nature of a patent gives the patent holder exclusive rights, and if an agreement merely confirms that exclusivity, then it is not per se unlawful. With this holding, the appeals court reversed the decision of the trial court, which held that agreements under which competitors are paid to stay out of the market are per se violations of the antitrust laws. An examination of the Valley Drugtrial and appeals court decisions sheds light on the two sides of an emerging legal debate concerning the validity of pay-not-to-compete agreements, and more broadly, on the appropriate balance between the seemingly competing interests of patent and antitrust laws.


2001 ◽  
Vol 120 (5) ◽  
pp. A128-A128 ◽  
Author(s):  
H MALATY ◽  
D GRAHAM ◽  
A ELKASABANY ◽  
S REDDY ◽  
S SRINIVASAN ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 158 (6) ◽  
pp. S-1161
Author(s):  
Amrit K. Kamboj ◽  
Amandeep Gujral ◽  
Elida Voth ◽  
Daniel Penrice ◽  
Jessica McGoldrick ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Mika Kivimaki ◽  
Marko Elovainio ◽  
Jussi Vahtera ◽  
Marianna Virtanen ◽  
Jane E. Ferrie

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ute Bultmann ◽  
Anna J. H. M. Beurskens ◽  
IJmert Kant ◽  
Gerard M. H. Swaen

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