Corporate Liability and Compliance Programs in France

2014 ◽  
pp. 477-490 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juliette Tricot
2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 180
Author(s):  
Achmad Ardiansyah Akbar

<p>Immunization is a mandatory program by government for every child in Indonesia. In 2016, however, the vaccine used for children’s immunization was found under standardized or unqualified. It was mixed with particular substances which might lead the users into some allergies, minor or severe injuries, trauma, and even danger their lives. Parents certainly fully entrusted their children’s immunization to the competent. The crime of producing, distributing, and using non-standard vaccines involved many parties both individuals and corporations, ranging from the task of producing, distributing, and up to injecting the vaccines into children. With the enormous profits of the crime, however, only private parties were sued while the corporations were still free from any accusation and thus, it made them have potential chances to redo such crime, violating medical laws, consumer protection laws, Money laundering legislation, and up to brand and geographical indications.</p><p>This study was a legal research with statute and conceptual approaches. It aimed to investigate the provisions of producing and distributing non-standard vaccines by corporations and to analyze their liability on such crime. The results, conclusions, suggestions, and recommendations for the problem were discussed.</p>


Author(s):  
Nick Friedman

Abstract In this article, I critically review the economic theory of corporate liability design, focusing on the allocation of liability between a corporation and its individual human agents. I apply this theory to transnational commercial contexts where human rights abuses occur and assess the likely efficacy of some putative liability regimes, including regimes requiring corporations to undertake human rights due diligence throughout their global supply chains. I advance a set of general considerations justifying the efficacy of due diligence in relation to alternative liability regimes. I argue, however, that due diligence regimes will likely under-deter severe human rights abuses unless they are supported by substantial entity-level sanctions and, in at least some cases, by supplementary liability for individual executives. The analysis has significant policy implications for current national and international efforts to enforce human rights norms against corporations.


Author(s):  
Christian Hauser

AbstractIn recent years, trade-control laws and regulations such as embargoes and sanctions have gained importance. However, there is limited empirical research on the ways in which small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) respond to such coercive economic measures. Building on the literature on organizational responses to external demands and behavioral ethics, this study addresses this issue to better understand how external pressures and managerial decision-making are associated with the scope of trade-control compliance programs. Based on a sample of 289 SMEs, the findings show that the organizational responses of SMEs reflect proportionate adjustments to regulatory pressures but only if decision-makers are well informed and aware of the prevailing rules and regulations. Conversely, uninformed decision-making leads to a disproportionate response resulting in an inadequately reduced scope of the compliance program. In addition, the results indicate that SMEs that are highly integrated into supply chains are susceptible to passing-the-buck behavior.


2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 989-1007
Author(s):  
DANIELE AMOROSO

AbstractAccording to the agency paradigm enshrined by the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, private conducts are attributed to a state when they are carried out on the state's behalf or under its tight control. On closer look, this legal framework proves to be unable to deal with state involvement in human-rights violations perpetrated by powerful non-state actors, such as terrorist groups or transnational corporations. These wrongs, indeed, are often put in place with the fundamental contribution of – but not on behalf of (or under the control of) – a state, with the consequence that, under the traditional paradigm, they could not be attributed to the latter. Against this backdrop, the present paper argues that a new secondary norm has been developing that provides that private wrongs are to be imputed to a state if the latter knowingly facilitated (or otherwise co-operated in) their commission. Although international practice will be duly taken into account, the analysis will be focused mainly on US case law concerning corporate liability for international human-rights violations.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document