Power Analysis Based Reverse Engineering on the Secret Round Function of Block Ciphers

2012 ◽  
pp. 175-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming Tang ◽  
Zhenlong Qiu ◽  
Weijie Li ◽  
Shubo Liu ◽  
Huanguo Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Reverse Engineering ◽  
Power Analysis ◽  
Block Ciphers ◽  
Round Function

Power analysis based reverse engineering on the secret round function of block ciphers

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (8) ◽  
pp. 1531-1545 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming Tang ◽  
Zhenlong Qiu ◽  
Weijie Li ◽  
Weijin Sun ◽  
Xiaobo Hu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Reverse Engineering ◽  
Power Analysis ◽  
Block Ciphers ◽  
Round Function

scholarly journals Comparing the Cost of Protecting Selected Lightweight Block Ciphers against Differential Power Analysis in Low-Cost FPGAs

Computers ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 28 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Diehl ◽  
Abubakr Abdulgadir ◽  
Jens-Peter Kaps ◽  
Kris Gaj
Keyword(s):  
Power Analysis ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Block Ciphers ◽  
Differential Power Analysis ◽  
The Cost

scholarly journals Correlation Distribution Analysis of a Two-Round Key-Alternating Block Cipher

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-130
Author(s):  
Liliya Kraleva ◽  
Vincent Rijmen ◽  
Nikolai L. Manev
Keyword(s):  
Block Cipher ◽  
Block Ciphers ◽  
Distribution Analysis ◽  
Correlation Distribution ◽  
Input And Output ◽  
Round Function ◽  
Positive Integers

Abstract In this paper we study two-round key-alternating block ciphers with round function f (x)= x(2t+1)2s, where t, s are positive integers. An algorithm to compute the distribution weight in respect to input and output masks is described. Also, in the case t = 1 the correlation distributions depending on input and output masks are completely determined for arbitrary pairs of masks.

scholarly journals Diffusional Side-Channel Leakage From Unrolled Lightweight Block Ciphers: A Case Study of Power Analysis on PRINCE

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 1351-1364
Author(s):  
Ville Yli-Mayry ◽  
Rei Ueno ◽  
Noriyuki Miura ◽  
Makoto Nagata ◽  
Shivam Bhasin ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Power Analysis ◽  
Block Ciphers ◽  
Side Channel

The distinguishing attack on ARX-based lightweight block ciphers

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
А.С. Сосков ◽  
Б.Я. Рябко
Keyword(s):  
Block Size ◽  
Block Ciphers ◽  
Statistical Test ◽  
Encrypted Data ◽  
Plain Text ◽  
Distinguishing Attack ◽  
Cipher Text ◽  
Round Function ◽  
Low Degree ◽  
Symmetric Key

Рассмотрено применение атаки различения на ряд легковесных блочных шифров, основанных на ARX-операциях (сложение по модулю, циклический сдвиг и исключающее ИЛИ). Представлены экспериментальные результаты и теоретические оценки устойчивости легковесных шифров Speck, Simon, Simeck, HIGHT, LEA к атаке различения. Вывод, что семейство шифров Simeck не выдерживает эту атаку, сделан на основе прогнозов, полученных путем экстраполяции экспериментальных данных. The distinguishing attack on modern lightweight ARX-based block ciphers was applied. Distinguishing attack is any form of cryptanalysis on data encrypted by a cipher that allows an attacker distinguishing the encrypted data from random data. Purpose. Modern symmetric-key ciphers must be designed to be immune to such an attack. The purpose of the work was to estimate the resistance of lightweight ciphers Speck, Simon, Simeck, HIGHT, and LEA to a distinguishing attack. Methodology. We note that these ciphers are iterated block ciphers. It is means that they transform blocks of plain text into blocks of cipher text by using the cyclically repeated invertible function known as the round function where each iteration is to be referred as a round. We have experimentally found a maximum number of rounds where encrypted data looked like random bit-sequence by using statistical test “Book Stack”. Then we extrapolated the theoretical length required for a successful distinguishing attack on cipher with full-number rounds by a polynomial of a low degree. Note that cryptography attack is considered as successful if the length of the encrypted sequence is less than the length 2K (K — key size). Originality/value. Our experiments and estimations show, that Simeck with 48bit block size and 96-bit key size is not immune to distinguishing attack. We recommended increasing the number of rounds by 15–20% in order to improve the reliability of the Simeck 48/96.

Toward reverse engineering on secret S-boxes in block ciphers

2014 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Ming Tang ◽  
ZhenLong Qiu ◽  
HongBo Peng ◽  
XiaoBo Hu ◽  
Mu Yi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Reverse Engineering ◽  
Block Ciphers
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