The International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing its Rôle in the International Legal Order

Author(s):  
Leo Gross
2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 573-588
Author(s):  
Mohammad Khalil al-Mousa

In a study which proceeds along the lines of both philosophy and international law and established precedents of various international organizations and conventions, the author deals with the thorny issue of ‘human rights intervention’ and demonstrates that what may be a simple or self-reflexive concept in the abstract is, from the standpoint of actual historical implementation, problematic and extremely political. The article deals with cases from the Congo to Kosovo and examines these in light of the UN Charter as well as the International Court of Justice in order to demonstrate asymmetry and the ambiguities and contradictions as well as the political expedience inherent in both interpretation of law and in the actual cases of ‘humanitarian intervention’. The legal basis and efficacy of unilateral ‘humanitarian intervention’ are challenged in depth.


Author(s):  
Martin Dixon ◽  
Robert McCorquodale ◽  
Sarah Williams

An international legal order must have rules in regard to the settlement of disputes. These rules are particularly necessary in an international community where States are not equal in terms of diplomatic power, access to weapons or access to resources, and where there is the potential for massive harm to people and to territory. This chapter discusses the general obligation on States; non-judicial settlement procedures; arbitration; specific international tribunals; the International Court of Justice and its interaction with the Security Council.


1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariano J. Aznar-Gomez

Following extensive debate by the great theoreticians of public international law earlier in this century,1 it might seem that the completeness of the international legal order is now a banal issue, which should be remembered only as an academic dispute.2It might have been so had the International Court of Justice not intervened, perhaps unintentionally, in its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons3 In her dissenting opinion, Judge Rosalyn Higgins argues that “the Court effectively pronounces a non liquet on the key issue on the grounds of uncertainty in the present state of law, and of facts”.4 In her view, the Court thus interrupted a line of case law which, in theory, had endorsed the idea of the completeness of international law and which, in practice, made it unthinkable that an international judge or arbitrator should actually pronounce a non liquet.5


2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 471-506
Author(s):  
Alessandro Chechi

On October 22, 2014, the Italian Constitutional Court rendered a decision on the constitutional legitimacy of certain domestic norms that required Italy’s compliance with the rule on state immunity sanctioned by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with the Judgment Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening). The Constitutional Court declared that the international customary obligations on state immunity from jurisdiction can be applied automatically within the Italian legal order only as long as they are in conformity with the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution.


Author(s):  
Mubarak A Waseem

This chapter explores, through a survey of individual Separate and Dissenting Opinions, the treatment of religious texts within the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and provides an argument for their continued usage. In order to maintain its legitimacy, the ICJ is under an obligation to serve the international community and its principles, in all their variety. International law is already, at least in part, based on natural law as reflected in religious texts. The answer to the central question, whether the Court’s judges should be more willing or more hesitant to express their own identity through citing religious texts, depends on one’s view of the role of the Court. If we view the ICJ as a quasi-arbitral forum for the clinical resolution of disputes, the answer to this question is probably negative. But this chapter argues that the Court ought to be viewed as an apex forum for a truly international legal order, one that is geographically, religiously, and culturally diverse, and whose legal concepts are the result of long and storied histories, and as such, the expression of religious identity has a place in the corpus of the living law.


1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred P. Rubin

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and its judgments are usually considered highly persuasive as to propositions of international law. Thus, when the ICJ formulates a rule of international law giving binding force to a unilateral declaration of a state’s future intentions, statesmen may be expected to refer to that formulation for guidance whenever they consider the possibility of issuing a declaration of future policy. Moreover, the ability of the ICJ to support its formulation of a rule of international law in terms of the international legal order and legal logic affects the perceptions of statesmen as to the probity of the Court, as well as the willingness of states to refer real cases to it. The Judgment of the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests cases raised both these issues in a particularly pointed way.


2021 ◽  
Vol 37 ◽  
pp. 251-277
Author(s):  
Ángela Trujillo-del-Arco

In commemoration of the fifty-year anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, it is fitting to assess the current relevance of this document in the international legal order. An indepth study of the contentious cases and the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice allows to demonstrate that this instrument is not a mere declaration. On the contrary, it will be shown that, in the present day, it is a key instrument in the resolution of disputes between States.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-481
Author(s):  
Stephen Tully

Abstract The International Court of Justice (the Court) can formulate appropriate orders whilst being sufficiently attune to the domestic constraints confronted by States. In the Consular Notification cases, the United States was ordered, ‘by means of its own choosing’, to undertake a ‘review and reconsideration’ of the convictions and sentences of certain named individuals whose rights to consular notification were denied. The Court revived a distinction between obligations of conduct and obligations of result but refrained from indicating when a violation of an international obligation occurred, in this case, potential non-compliance with its earlier judgment in Avena. This article argues that the Court need not attempt to remodel the doctrine of State responsibility in order to provide an adequate and effective remedy. Juridical restitution, as evidenced in its prior jurisprudence, contemplates intrusion into the municipal legal order of States. This article also considers the free choice of means principle and the appropriate judicial function in these circumstances. It concludes that the remedial orders declared by the Court can be made by reference to the particular obligation at issue and the circumstances of each case. Furthermore, the litigation context and the claims made by the disputants cannot be overlooked by the Court when determining the degree of specificity required by those orders.


Author(s):  
Pierre d’Argent

This chapter argues that, from the perspective of a theory about the sources of international law, what matters is not so much to determine whether international law is really law, but, rather, what makes law ‘international’. It first recalls the structural reasons inherent to international law that explain the specificity and the crucial character of the issue of sources—understood as a process of legal identification—in that legal order, as opposed to sources in domestic law. The chapter then contextualizes Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute by recalling its specific purpose; that is, determining and delimiting international legality. Finally, the chapter questions whether and to what extent a theory of sources really achieves its objective of determining what unequivocally counts as international law. The chapter thus brings to light the awkward fact that international legality is not necessarily normatively exclusive.


2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 305-315
Author(s):  
Gail Lythgoe

The ongoing relationship between the UK and the Chagos Archipelago raises a number of important questions about international law’s relationship with imperialism, more specifically, the ability of the international legal order to influence the fact and the manner of decolonisation. In this contribution, I explore some aspects of this problem. I begin by providing a brief overview of the proceedings of the International Court of Justice, summarising the basic legal consequences of the court’s Advisory Opinion, before discussing its implications from the standpoint of what it reveals about international law’s relationship with the residual British Empire. My argument is that, for all its apparent attempts to promote decolonisation and self-determination, the international legal order has been and continues to remain complicit in the maintenance of exactly the kind of asymmetrical legal relations that constitute empires. Thus, although the Chagos Advisory Opinion may well have long-term significance for the development of the international legal doctrine and the teachings of international law, given the UK’s current position, it will not have any immediate impact on the plight of the Chagossian people.


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