scholarly journals Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee for or Threat to Strategic Stability?

Author(s):  
Alexey Arbatov

AbstractIn recent literature, much attention has been paid to factors that affect nuclear deterrence and stability from the outside: new missile defence systems, non-nuclear (conventional) high-precision long-range weapons, the influence of third and threshold nuclear states, space weapons, and—more recently—cyber threats. These new factors have pushed the core of nuclear deterrence—strategic relations between Russia and the United States—to the background in the public consciousness. Yet dangerous changes are taking place. This chapter examines the real and imaginary causes of the current situation and suggests potential ways to reduce tensions that could benefit international security. It concludes that nuclear deterrence can serve as a pillar of international security with one crucial reservation: namely, that it can only work in conjunction with negotiations and agreements on the limitation, reduction, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Without such checks, nuclear deterrence goes berserk. It endlessly fuels the arms race, brings the great powers to the brink of nuclear war in any serious crisis, and sometimes the very dynamics of nuclear deterrence can instigate a confrontation.

Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

What kind of nuclear strategy and posture does the United States need to defend itself and its allies? According to conventional wisdom, the answer to this question is straightforward: the United States needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating nuclear counterattack. These arguments are logical and persuasive, but, when compared to the empirical record, they raise an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has consistently maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. How do we make sense of this contradiction? Scholarly deterrence theory, including Robert Jervis’s seminal book, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, argues that the explanation is simple—policymakers are wrong. This book takes a different approach. Rather than dismiss it as illogical, it explains the logic of American nuclear strategy. It argues that military nuclear advantages above and beyond a secure, second-strike capability can contribute to a state’s national security goals. This is primarily because nuclear advantages reduce a state’s expected cost of nuclear war, increasing its resolve, providing it with coercive bargaining leverage, and enhancing nuclear deterrence. This book provides the first theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the most intractable puzzles in international security studies. The book also explains why, in a world of growing dangers, the United States must possess, as President Donald J. Trump declared, a nuclear arsenal “at the top of the pack.”


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
D. V. Stefanovich

“Strategic stability” as a characteristic of military and political relations with a low possibility of large-scale armed confl ict between great powers remains one of the basic notions of international security, especially in its nuclear missile dimension. At the same time, this notion also sets forth tangible state of strategic forces of two (or potentially more) nations and the framework of risk reduction and arms control measures preventing a nuclear war. The purpose of this study is to identify the main trends in this area and how strategic stability can be maintained and enhanced. To this end, I review the main offi cial doctrinal documents and statements in this area, international arms control treaties, trends in the development of the armed forces, and academic and expert publications. It is concluded that strategic stability can be preserved under increasing infl uence of a growing number of new factors, both political (including degradation of arms control regimes) and technological. Among the latter are modernization and development of means for delivery of nuclear warheads, growth of long-range precision-guided non-nuclear weapons potential, increase of antagonism in new environments. The experts point out the need for active work of the academic community and diplomats to fi nd new solutions ensuring maintenance of strategic stability in the future. Negative scenarios are outlined in the absence of such solutions.


Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-55
Author(s):  
Anya Loukianova Fink ◽  
Olga Oliker

At a time of technological and political change in the international security environment, Russia continues to view nuclear weapons as guarantors of peace and security among great powers. Nuclear weapons also assure Russia's own great-power status and mitigate uncertainty in an emerging multipolar order. In a world where the United States pursues improved missile defense capabilities and appears to reject mutual vulnerability as a stabilizing factor, Moscow views its modernized nuclear arsenal as essential to deter Washington from a possible attack on Russia or coercive threats against it. Some elites in Russia would like to preserve existing arms control arrangements or negotiate new ones to mitigate a weakening infrastructure of strategic stability. At the same time, however, they seem skeptical that the United States is willing to compromise or deal with Russia as an equal. Meanwhile, multilateral arms control appears to be too complex a proposition for the time being.


Author(s):  
Halyna Shchyhelska

2018 marks the 100th anniversary of the proclamation of Ukrainian independence. OnJanuary 22, 1918, the Ukrainian People’s Republic proclaimed its independence by adopting the IV Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada, although this significant event was «wiped out» from the public consciousness on the territory of Ukraine during the years of the Soviet totalitarian regime. At the same time, January 22 was a crucial event for the Ukrainian diaspora in the USA. This article examines how American Ukrainians interacted with the USA Government institutions regarding the celebration and recognition of the Ukrainian Independence day on January 22. The attention is focused on the activities of ethnic Ukrainians in the United States, directed at the organization of the special celebration of the Ukrainian Independence anniversaries in the US Congress and cities. Drawing from the diaspora press and Congressional Records, this article argues that many members of Congress participated in the observed celebration and expressed kind feelings to the Ukrainian people, recognised their fight for freedom, during the House of Representatives and Senate sessions. Several Congressmen submitted the resolutions in the US Congress urging the President of United States to designate January 22 as «Ukrainian lndependence Day». January 22 was proclaimed Ukrainian Day by the governors of fifteen States and mayors of many cities. Keywords: January 22, Ukrainian independence day, Ukrainian diaspora, USA, interaction, Congress


Author(s):  
Kathleen Jeffs

This chapter asks the questions: ‘what is the Spanish Golden Age and why should we stage its plays now?’ The Royal Shakespeare Company (RSC) Spanish season of 2004–5 came at a particularly ripe time for Golden Age plays to enter the public consciousness. This chapter introduces the Golden Age period and authors whose works were chosen for the season, and the performance traditions from the corrales of Spain to festivals in the United States. The chapter then treats the decision taken by the RSC to initiate a Golden Age season, delves into the play-selection process, and discusses the role of the literal translator in this first step towards a season. Then the chapter looks at ‘the ones that got away’, the plays that almost made the cut for production, and other worthy scripts from this period that deserve consideration for future productions.


2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 345-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suzanne Mettler

The G.I. Bill of Rights, formally known as the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944, remains in the public consciousness as one of the most significant social policies ever enacted in the United States. Established for returning veterans of World War II, its terms of coverage were strikingly broad and generous. Fifty-one percent of veterans used the educational provisions: 2.2 million pursued a college education or graduate degree, and 5.6 million attained vocational or on-the-job training. The law also offered extensive unemployment benefits, which were used to the full by 14 percent of veterans. It also offered low-interest loans for the purchase of homes, farms, and businesses, which were used by 29 percent of veterans.


1986 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 129-159
Author(s):  
Alan Gewirth

The nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union has reached a stage of unparalleled destructive potential. Fueling the race are not only an immense series of mighty technological developments but also each side's unremitting quest for both security and power. Thus, each side is animated by intense competitiveness with and deep distrust of the other.My primary purpose in this essay is not to examine the historical background or the current status of this murderous competition but rather to inquire into what can and should be done to avoid its dangers. For this purpose, we must make the most intensive possible use of reason. For reason gives us the surest way to attain truth, including practical truth about what ought to be done in the various predicaments that confront human beings.


Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

This chapter examines the relationship between nuclear superiority and strategic stability. Many nuclear deterrence theorists and policy advocates have argued for decades that nuclear superiority has a glaring downside: it increases the risk of nuclear war. This chapter analyzes this question in detail and finds that this conventional wisdom is incorrect. It argues that nuclear superiority likely contributes to greater levels of strategic stability. Moreover, it maintains that traditional arguments about strategic stability fail to differentiate between good instability, that which favors US interests, and bad instability, which works to the disadvantage of Washington and its allies. When this distinction is taken into account, we see that US superiority enhances positive instability and dampens negative instability. In short, strategic stability should be listed among the benefits, not the possible costs, of an American nuclear advantage.


2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fiona S. Cunningham ◽  
M. Taylor Fravel

Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in future U.S.-China strategic stability. In the past decade, advances in U.S. strategic capabilities, especially missile defenses and enhanced long-range conventional strike capacity, could undermine China's nuclear retaliatory capability, which is based on a relatively small force and second-strike posture. An exhaustive review of Chinese writings on military affairs indicates, however, that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy of assured retaliation. Instead, China will modestly expand its arsenal, increase the sophistication of its forces, and allow limited ambiguity regarding its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. This limited ambiguity allows China to use the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter a conventional attack on its nuclear arsenal, without significantly increasing the size of its nuclear forces and triggering a costly arms race. Nevertheless, China's effort to maintain its strategy of assured retaliation while avoiding an arms race could backfire. Those efforts increase the risk that nuclear weapons could be used in a crisis between the United States and China, even though China views this possibility as much less likely than the United States does.


Author(s):  
Poeliu Dai

Among the Middle Powers, Canada has the unique opportunity and great potential for achieving nuclear status in view of her immense natural resources (being the leading producer of uranium), industrial capacity, and advanced technology. For a number of reasons, including the arrangement for joint continental defence with the United States, however, Canada has deliberately refrained from embarking on the development of a nuclear armoury and has become an ardent supporter of international disarmament. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the negotiating processes for a nonproliferation treaty in the council of nations, the unequivocal position of Canada aroused interest and commanded attention.The concept of non-proliferation can be simply stated. It is based on the belief that a spread of the weapons of mass destruction enhances international tensions, accelerates the arms race, and increases the likelihood, or at least the possibility, of a general nuclear war. The larger the number of states possessing these weapons, the greater the risk of a nuclear conflict breaking out through accident, or miscalculation, or sheer adventurism. Nuclear dissemination thus adds a new and dangerous dimension to the maintenance of international equilibrium and affects the very foundation of the world public order.


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