Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: Price Competition

2007 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Endogenous Timing

ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY: WEIGHTED WELFARE AND PRICE COMPETITION*

2011 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUAN CARLOS BÁRCENA-RUIZ ◽  
MÁXIMO SEDANO
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Endogenous Timing

Endogenous Timing in Vertically-Related Markets

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong-Ren Din ◽  
Chia-Hung Sun
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
The Other ◽  
Endogenous Timing ◽  
Price Strategy ◽  
Quantity Competition ◽  
Sequential Game ◽  
Product Substitutability

Abstract This paper investigates the theory of endogenous timing by taking into account a vertically-related market where an integrated firm competes with a downstream firm. Contrary to the standard results in the literature, we find that both firms play a sequential game in quantity competition and play a simultaneous game in price competition. Under mixed quantity-price competition, the firm choosing a price strategy moves first and the other firm choosing a quantity strategy moves later in equilibrium. Given that the timing of choosing actions is determined endogenously, aggregate profit (consumer surplus) is higher (lower) under price competition than under quantity competition. Lastly, social welfare is higher under quantity competition than under price competition when the degree of product substitutability is relatively low.

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