scholarly journals Erratum to: Research on closed loop supply chain with reference price effect

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Xu ◽  
Nan Liu
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1685
Author(s):  
Deqing Ma ◽  
Jinsong Hu

This paper integrates the Internet service platform with big-data marketing into the dynamic closed-loop supply chain system as an independent game subject. Considering the reference price effect of consumers, this work constructs differential games among manufacturer, retailer and Internet service platform under three business models of independent, collaborative production and collaborative marketing. Using Bellman’s continuous dynamic programming theory, this work obtains the optimal feedback strategies of price and big-data marketing effort, brand goodwill, return rate of used products and corporate profits under the three business models. Comparing the three scenarios and analyzing the sensitivity of key exogenous parameters, it can be found that the involvement of Internet service platform has a crucial impact on the sustainable profitability of supply chain enterprises. Considering the reference price effect of consumers, enterprises should adopt different strategic alliances in different periods, which can also gain new development momentum in the context of data-driven marketing, achieve the improvement of the triple-bottom line of closed-loop supply chain and even reach a win-win situation for supply chain enterprises.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (04) ◽  
pp. 2050052
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Fang Zhang ◽  
Hui Jiang

The importance of closed-loop supply chains has been widely recognized both in academic communities and in industrial sectors. This paper starts from the traditional supply chains and the new self-supply chain of GREE to extract realistic problems, to mainly investigating two noncooperative dynamic pricing policies in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. Then, it studies the influence of different channel power structures on dynamic decisions and their complexities. Furthermore, the reference price affects the purchase decisions of consumers. Therefore, the model takes into account the influence of reference price of the market demands. Results show that the manufacturer who opens up a direct channel can make a huge profit in the game. In the dynamic game evolution process, the game leader is in a more advantageous position when the system is in a stable region; once entering into the bifurcating region or chaotic region, the game follower needs to adjust his price to follow the leader’s decision in order to make a profit. In addition, the system’s stable region becomes smaller when the market demand becomes more sensitive to the difference between the reference price and the actual price. In this model, if the manufacturer acts as a leader, he is in a more advantageous position when the market is sensitive to channel competition in the stable stage while the result is opposite in the unstable stage.


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