A Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution with Emission Permits Trading

2013 ◽  
Vol 163 (2) ◽  
pp. 642-659 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shoude Li
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Chuansheng Wang ◽  
Fulei Shi ◽  
Cuiyou Yao

In recent years, with the rapid development of economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. In this paper, a differential game model is proposed for industrial pollution management, in which public participation is taken into consideration. Then, a feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) solution is obtained among the government, enterprises, and the public. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the results. The results show that the public participation will take a positive part in forcing enterprises to reduce emissions. Furthermore, with the increase of the probability of the public reporting the illegal discharge of pollutants by enterprises, the probability of enterprises' active emission reduction will also greatly increase


2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 842-854 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ke Wang ◽  
Yujiao Xian ◽  
Jieming Zhang ◽  
Yi Li ◽  
Linan Che

Purpose This study aims to provide an estimation of carbon dioxide (CO2) emission abatement costs in China’s industry sector during the period of 2006-2010, and additionally provide an ex-post estimation of CO2 abatement cost savings that would be realized if carbon emission permits trading among different industry sectors of 30 provinces in China during the same period were allowed, to answer the question that whether the industrial carbon emission abatement cost can (partially) be recovered from carbon emission trading in China. Design/methodology/approach The joint production framework associated with the environmental technology is utilized for formulating the models for estimating abatement costs and simulating emission permits trading scheme. Several data envelopment analysis-based models that could deal with both the desirable and undesirable outputs within the above framework are utilized for abatement cost saving estimation. The weak disposability assumption and variable returns to scale assumption are applied in the modelling. Findings In China’s industry sector, during 2006-2010, the estimated CO2 emission abatement cost was 1,842 billion yuan, which accounts for 2.45 per cent of China’s total industrial output value; the emission abatement cost saving from emission permits trading would be 315 billion yuan, which accounts for 17.12 per cent of the emission opportunity abatement cost; and additional 1,065.95 million tonnes of CO2 emission reductions would be realized from emission permits trading, and this accounts for 4.75 per cent of the total industrial CO2 emissions. Research limitations/implications The estimation is implemented at the regional level, i.e. the emission permits trading subjects are the whole industry sectors in different Chinese provinces, because of the data limitation in this study. Further estimation could be implemented at the enterprise level to provide a deeper insight into the abatement cost recovery from emission permits trading. Practical implications The estimation models and calculation process introduced in this study could be applied for evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of pollutant emission permits trading schemes from the perspective that whether these market-based abatement policy instruments help to realize the potential abatement cost savings. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no study has provided the estimation of CO2 emission abatement cost and the estimation of CO2 abatement cost saving effect from emission permits trading for China’s industry sector. This study provides the first attempt to fill this research gap.


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