scholarly journals Politeness and reputation in cultural evolution

Author(s):  
Roland Mühlenbernd ◽  
Sławomir Wacewicz ◽  
Przemysław Żywiczyński

AbstractPoliteness in conversation is a fascinating aspect of human interaction that directly interfaces language use and human social behavior more generally. We show how game theory, as a higher-order theory of behavior, can provide the tools to understand and model polite behavior. The recently proposed responsibility exchange theory (Chaudhry and Loewenstein in Psychol Rev 126(3):313–344, 2019) describes how the polite communications of thanking and apologizing impact two different types of an agent’s social image: (perceived) warmth and (perceived) competence. Here, we extend this approach in several ways, most importantly by adding a cultural-evolutionary dynamics that makes it possible to investigate the evolutionary stability of politeness strategies. Our analysis shows that in a society of agents who value status-related traits (such as competence) over reciprocity-related traits (such as warmth), both the less and the more polite strategies are maintained in cycles of cultural-evolutionary change.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hakwan Lau

I introduce an empirically-grounded version of a higher-order theory of conscious perception. Traditionally, theories of consciousness either focus on the global availability of conscious information, or take conscious phenomenology as a brute fact due to some biological or basic representational properties. Here I argue instead that the key to characterizing the consciousness lies in its connections to belief formation and epistemic justification on a subjective level.


Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney

Carruthers proposes a subtle dispositionalist rendition of higher order theory regarding phenomenal character. The theory would distinguish unconscious movement management from conscious attitude management as perceptual processes. Each process takes perceptual representations as inputs. A representation subject to attitude management is apt to induce a higher order representation of itself that secures a self-referential aspect of its content supposedly determinative of phenomenal character. Unfortunately, the account requires a problematic cognitive ambiguity while failing to explain why attitude, but not movement, management, determines character. Moreover, normal variation in attitudinal management conflicts with the constancy typical of phenomenal character. And although an agent denied perceptual access to a scene about which she is otherwise well informed would suffer no phenomenal character, dispositionalist theory entails otherwise. Such problems, together with the results of the previous chapters, suggest that, whether cloaked under intentionalism or higher order theory, representationalism mistakes content for character.


Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney

Rosenthal's rendition of representationalism denies intentionalism. His higher order theory instead asserts that a perceptual state's phenomenal character is set by that state's being related to, because represented by, another, but higher order, cognitive state. The theory arises from the doubtful supposition of unconscious perception and mistakenly construes intrinsic phenomenal character extrinsically, as one state's serving as the content of another. Yet it remains mysterious how and why a higher order state might be so potent as to determine phenomenal character at all. Better to resist higher order theory’s embrace of dubious unconscious perceptual states and account for states so-called simply in terms of humdrum mnemonic malfeasance. Moreover, since the suspect theory allows higher order misrepresentation, it implies sufferance of impossible phenomenal character. Equally problematic, representationalism pitched at the higher order entails the existence of bogus phenomenal character when upstairs states represent downstairs nonperceptual states.


Author(s):  
David Rosenthal

Dennett’s account of consciousness starts from third-person considerations. I argue this is wise, since beginning with first-person access precludes accommodating the third-person access we have to others’ mental states. But Dennett’s first-person operationalism, which seeks to save the first person in third-person, operationalist terms, denies the occurrence of folk-psychological states that one doesn’t believe oneself to be in, and so the occurrence of folk-psychological states that aren’t conscious. This conflicts with Dennett’s intentional-stance approach to the mental, on which we discern others’ mental states independently of those states’ being conscious. We can avoid this conflict with a higher-order theory of consciousness, which saves the spirit of Dennett’s approach, but enables us to distinguish conscious folk-psychological states from nonconscious ones. The intentional stance by itself can’t do this, since it can’t discern a higher-order awareness of a psychological state. But we can supplement the intentional stance with the higher-order theoretical apparatus.


2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (11) ◽  
pp. 111-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pengcheng Li ◽  
Hao Luo ◽  
Chen Ding

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-296
Author(s):  
Diana Bravo

ResumenEn este trabajo se aborda la problemática de la universalidad de los actos de habla (Searle, ([1969]1980. Actos de habla. Madrid: Cátedra Visor.) y de su relación con las amenazas a la imagen social (cf. Placencia y Bravo, 2002. Actos de habla y cortesía en español. London: LINCOM; ; Bravo y Briz, 2004. Pragmática sociocultural: estudios del discurso de cortesía en español. Barcelona: Ariel). Dentro de los estudios de orientación pragmática de mayor difusión entre los académicos, encontramos dos posiciones, por un lado la de autores como Leech (([1983] 1988). Principles of Pragmatics. London: Longman.) y Brown y Levinson ([1978] 1987. Politeness. Some Universals in Language Use. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.), que asumen que determinados actos de habla serían inherentemente amenazantes para la mantención de la imagen social (face); por otro, la de Thomas ((1983). Cross-cultural pragmatic failure. Applied Linguistics, 4 (2), pp. 91–112.), Wierzbicka ((1991). Cross-cultural pragmatics. The Semantics of Human Interaction. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.) y Blum-Kulka, S. y Olshtain, E. ((1984). Request and apologies: a cross-cultural study of speech act realization patterns (CCSARP). Applied Linguistics, (5), pp. 196–213.), entre otros, para quienes la percepción de los mismos actos en distintas culturas estaría influida por factores socioculturales, de manera que los actos de habla no serían per se amenazantes, sino que esta condición dependería de su interpretación en contexto. Creemos que los actos se describen de modo distinto dependiendo de cuál sea el contexto del usuario ideal, término que refiere al uso habitual de la lengua en su contexto situacional y sociocultural. Por ello sostenemos que no basta con interpretar los actos con la sola ayuda de la bibliografía y de las propias intuiciones, sino que es necesario consultar al usuario de la lengua. En este artículo nos enfocaremos en justificar una metodología de recogida de datos socio-pragmáticos que establece relaciones directas entre los actos y los hábitos sociales de sus usuarios. Nos basaremos en un método de consulta usado por varios autores, el cuestionario de hábitos sociales (cf. Hernández Flores, (2002). La cortesía en la conversación española de familiares y amigos. La búsqueda de equilibrio entre la imagen del hablante y la imagen del destinatario. Tesis doctoral. Aalborg: Aalborg Universitet. Recuperado de http://edice.asice.se/?page_id=305, y Bernal y Hernández Flores, (2016). Variación socio-pragmática en la enseñanza del español: aplicación didáctica de un cuestionario de hábitos sociales. Journal of Spanish Language Teaching, 3 (2), pp. 114–126.).


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-147
Author(s):  
Ryutaro Uchiyama ◽  
Rachel Spicer ◽  
Michael Muthukrishna

Abstract Behavioral genetics and cultural evolution have both revolutionized our understanding of human behavior—largely independent of each other. Here we reconcile these two fields under a dual inheritance framework, offering a more nuanced understanding of the interaction between genes and culture. Going beyond typical analyses of gene–environment interactions, we describe the cultural dynamics that shape these interactions by shaping the environment and population structure. A cultural evolutionary approach can explain, for example, how factors such as rates of innovation and diffusion, density of cultural sub-groups, and tolerance for behavioral diversity impact heritability estimates, thus yielding predictions for different social contexts. Moreover, when cumulative culture functionally overlaps with genes, genetic effects become masked, unmasked, or even reversed, and the causal effects of an identified gene become confounded with features of the cultural environment. The manner of confounding is specific to a particular society at a particular time, but a WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, democratic) sampling problem obscures this boundedness. Cultural evolutionary dynamics are typically missing from models of gene-to-phenotype causality, hindering generalizability of genetic effects across societies and across time. We lay out a reconciled framework and use it to predict the ways in which heritability should differ between societies, between socioeconomic levels and other groupings within some societies but not others, and over the life course. An integrated cultural evolutionary behavioral genetic approach cuts through the nature–nurture debate and helps resolve controversies in topics such as IQ.


1994 ◽  
pp. 261-297
Author(s):  
O. E. Barndorff-Nielsen ◽  
D. R. Cox

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