scholarly journals Choice-Driven Counterfactuals

Author(s):  
Ilaria Canavotto ◽  
Eric Pacuit

AbstractIn this paper, we investigate the semantics and logic of choice-driven counterfactuals, that is, of counterfactuals whose evaluation relies on auxiliary premises about how agents are expected to act, i.e., about their default choice behavior. To do this, we merge one of the most prominent logics of agency in the philosophical literature, namely stit logic (Belnap et al. 2001; Horty 2001), with the well-known logic of counterfactuals due to Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973). A key component of our semantics for counterfactuals is to distinguish between deviant and non-deviant actions at a moment, where an action available to an agent at a moment is deviant when its performance does not agree with the agent’s default choice behavior at that moment. After developing and axiomatizing a stit logic with action types, instants, and deviant actions, we study the philosophical implications and logical properties of two candidate semantics for choice-driven counterfactuals, one called rewind models inspired by Lewis (Nous13(4), 455–476 1979) and the other called independence models motivated by well-known counterexamples to Lewis’s proposal Slote (Philos. Rev.87(1), 3–27 1978). In the last part of the paper we consider how to evaluate choice-driven counterfactuals at moments arrived at by some agents performing a deviant action.

Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey

Players have different skills, which has implications for the degree to which they make errors. Low-skill hitters in baseball often swing at bad pitches, beginning skiers frequently fall for no apparent reason, and children often lose at tic-tac-toe. At the other extreme, there are brilliant chess players, bargainers, and litigators who seem to know exactly what move to make or offer to decline. From a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) perspective, these skill levels can be modeled in terms of variation in error rates or in responsiveness of quantal response functions. This chapter explores issues related to individual heterogeneity with respect to player error rates. It also describes some extensions of QRE that relax the assumption that player expectations about the choice behavior of other players are correct. For example, in games that are played only once, players are not able to learn from others' prior decisions, and expectations must be based on introspection. The chapter develops the implications of noisy introspection embedded in a model of iterated thinking.


Author(s):  
John A. Taber

Two principal strains of ethical thought are evident in Indian religious and philosophical literature: one, central to Hinduism, emphasizes adherence to the established norms of ancient Indian culture, which are stated in the literature known as the Dharmaśāstras; another, found in texts of Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism alike, stresses the renunciation of one’s familial and social obligations for the sake of attaining enlightenment or liberation from the cycle of rebirth. The Dharmaśāstras define in elaborate detail a way of life based on a division of society into four ‘orders’ (varṇas) – priests, warriors, tradesmen and servants or labourers – and, for the three highest orders, four ‘stages of life’ (āśramas). Renunciation is valid only in the final two stages of life, after one has fulfilled one’s responsibilities as a student of scripture and as a householder. The various traditions that stress liberation, on the other hand, advocate total, immediate commitment to the goal of liberation, for which the householder life presents insuperable distractions. Here, the duties of the householder are replaced by the practice of yoga and asceticism. Nevertheless, specific ethical observances are also recommended as prerequisites for the achievement of higher knowledge through yoga, in particular, nonviolence, truthfulness, not stealing, celibacy and poverty. The liberation traditions criticized the system of the Dharmaśāstras for being overly concerned with ritual and external forms of purity and condoning – indeed, prescribing – the killing of living beings in Vedic sacrifices; but it was only in the Dharmaśāstras that the notion of action solely for duty’s sake was appreciated. The Hindu scripture the Bhagavad Gītā (Song of God) represents an effort to synthesize the two ideals of renunciation and the fulfilment of obligation. It teaches that one should integrate yoga and action in the world. Only when acting out of the state of inner peace and detachment that is the culmination of the practice of yoga can one execute one’s duty without regard for the consequences of one’s actions. On the other hand, without the cultivation of inner yoga, the external forms of renunciation – celibacy, mendicancy, asceticism – are without significance. It is inner yoga that is the essence of renunciation, yet yoga is quite compatible with carrying out one’s obligations in the world.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-532
Author(s):  
Michael Wheeler

AbstractThe Turing Test is routinely understood as a behaviourist test for machine intelligence. Diane Proudfoot (Rethinking Turing’s Test, Journal of Philosophy, 2013) has argued for an alternative interpretation. According to Proudfoot, Turing’s claim that intelligence is what he calls ‘an emotional concept’ indicates that he conceived of intelligence in response-dependence terms. As she puts it: ‘Turing’s criterion for “thinking” is…: x is intelligent (or thinks) if in the actual world, in an unrestricted computer-imitates-human game, x appears intelligent to an average interrogator’. The role of the famous test is thus to provide the conditions in which to examine the average interrogator’s responses. I shall argue that Proudfoot’s analysis falls short. The philosophical literature contains two main models of response-dependence, what I shall call the transparency model and the reference-fixing model. Proudfoot resists the thought that Turing might have endorsed one of these models to the exclusion of the other. But the details of her own analysis indicate that she is, in fact, committed to the claim that Turing’s account of intelligence is grounded in a transparency model, rather than a reference-fixing one. By contrast, I shall argue that while Turing did indeed conceive of intelligence in response-dependence terms, his account is grounded in a reference-fixing model, rather than a transparency one. This is fortunate (for Turing), because, as an account of intelligence, the transparency model is arguably problematic in a way that the reference-fixing model isn’t.


1974 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 887-894 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven P. McNeel ◽  
James D. Sweeney ◽  
Peter C. Bohlin

Ss' choice behavior in two types of mixed-motive games was used to classify them according to their predominant goal orientation. Ss with competitive (Relative Gain) goals and those with individualistic (Own Gain) goals were then presented with 50 decomposed Prisoner's Dilemma games in which they interacted with a conditionally cooperative other. Some Ss saw their own and the other person's outcomes displayed on each trial, while others also saw a bogus Average outcome. The latter outcome was constructed such that comparison with it made the mutually competitive outcomes “look bad” and the mutually cooperative outcomes “look good.” On the basis of social-comparisons, it was predicted that Relative-gain Ss would learn to cooperate in the “Average” condition but not in the Other condition. Own-gain Ss were expected to show high levels of cooperation over-all and to cooperate sooner in the Average condition than in the Other condition. Predictions were significant only for Own-gain Ss, though they were also in the expected direction for Relative-gain Ss. The discussion focused on problems with using social-comparison processes as a basis for training Ss to be cooperative, with special emphasis placed on the issue of the relevance of the available comparisons.


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-142
Author(s):  
Alonso Villarán ◽  

What is a conflict of interest? What is morally problematic about one? Beginning with the definition, this paper organizes the core (philosophical) literature and creates two continuums—one devoted to the more specific definition of ‘interest,’ and the other to that of ‘duty’ (two elements that belong to the definition of conflicts of interest and over which the debate revolves). Each continuum places the authors according to the narrowness or broadness of their positions, which facilitates the understanding of the debate as well as what is at stake when defining conflicts of interest. The paper then develops a moral analysis that leads to the sought-for definition and to an explanation of why we should treat conflicts of interest carefully. While doing so, the paper discloses the criterion to judge whether a definition is right and presents the duties that makes conflicts of interest special as ‘tertiary’ duties of morality.


Author(s):  
Antony Eagle

Early work on the frequency theory of probability made extensive use of the notion of randomness, conceived of as a property possessed by disorderly collections of outcomes. Growing out of this work, a rich mathematical literature on algorithmic randomness and Kolmogorov complexity developed through the twentieth century, but largely lost contact with the philosophical literature on physical probability. The present chapter begins with a clarification of the notions of randomness and probability, conceiving of the former as a property of a sequence of outcomes, and the latter as a property of the process generating those outcomes. A discussion follows of the nature and limits of the relationship between the two notions, with largely negative verdicts on the prospects for any reduction of one to the other, although the existence of an apparently random sequence of outcomes is good evidence for the involvement of a genuinely chancy process.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ting Dai ◽  
Decheng Wen ◽  
Xiao Chen

Through dividing the entire shopping process into three stages: pre-purchase, purchase and post-purchase, this study analyzed the customers' channel choice behavior in each, from perspectives of product quality, Customers and channels. Based on a survey answered by 395 multi-channel shoppers, the findings show that the products' perceptibility and security, is positively associated with the online channel (vs. offline) during the pre-purchase and purchase stages and no significant association in the post-purchase stage. The customers' shopping motivations and network involvements are positively associated with the online channel in the pre-purchase and purchase stages, but the perceived risks are negatively associated with the online channel throughout the entire shopping experience. The channel's usefulness has a significant and positive correlation with the online channel in all three stages of shopping, but the channels' ease-of-use only has a significant and positive impact in the pre-purchase stage and weaker in the other two. The findings provide some useful suggestions for multichannel retailers.


Early China ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 301-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Riegel

The dispute over whether burial rites should be frugal or lavish is a prominent feature of late Zhou philosophical literature. It originated with Mozi's attack on ritual and then continued unabated as the Ru and Mo schools argued the issue and hurled epithets at each other. The two Lüshi chunqiu chapters “Jiesang” and “Ansi” represent the arguments in favor of moderation in the middle of the third century B.C. While the chapters clearly owe their overall position to their Mohist forebears, they nonetheless ignore or reject several arguments that are central to the Mozi. Nowhere in them do we see, for example, Mozi's urgent call for the conservation of resources. On the other hand, they embrace Ruist concepts, most prominently the innate feeling of loyalty and concern that the Mengzi claims mourners have for their deceased relatives. The Lüshi chunqiu justifies its arguments by pointing to changing social realities, most notably an uncontrollable epidemic of grave robbery. Other features of style of disputation in the Lüshi chunqiu can be traced to the text7s attempts to blend together harmoniously what were originally conflicting points of view. None of the sources in the debate provides much insight into ancient conceptions of death and the afterlife. The elaborate architecture and rich furnishings of tombs excavated in the last several decades are not so much a contradiction of arguments in favor of moderation as they are testimony of a system of religious belief not at all reflected in philosophical literature.


Author(s):  
Jesús Adrián Escudero

La idea de que la fenomenología de Husserl representa una suerte de filosofía reflexiva, basada en una metodología que desarrolla la tradición cartesiana, se ha convertido en una creencia ampliamente difundida en la literatura filosófica. Este énfasis puesto por Husserl en la reflexión fue arduamente criticado por Heidegger. Desde entonces resulta frecuente encontrarse con la afirmación de que Husserl y Heidegger desarrollan dos conceptos de fe-nomenología diferentes, incluso antagónicos. No se trata de seguir alimentando esta discusión historiográfica. Aquí, por una parte, se muestra el núcleo de la temprana crítica heideggeriana en el transcurso de sus primeras lecciones de Friburgo (1919-1923) y Marburgo (1924-1928) y, por otra, se sopesan algunas de las observaciones críticas de Heidegger a Husserl a la luz de evidencias textuales de la fenomenología husserliana, ignoradas no sólo por Heidegger, sino también por un sorprendente número de reconocidos especialistas en el campo de la filosofía, de las ciencias cognitivas y de la filosofía de la mente.The idea that Husserl’s phenomenology is a kind of reflective philosophy inspired by the Cartesian tradition has become a common-place in the philosophical literature. Heidegger was one of the first thinkers who criticized the Husserlian emphasis on reflection. Since then it is easy to find the affirmation that Husserl and Heidegger developed two different, even antagonistic concepts of phenomenology. Here is not the place to continue embracing this discussion. One the one hand, the present article shows Heidegger’s early criticism developed in the course of his first lectures in Freiburg (1919-1923) and Marburg (1924-1928). On the other hand, it weighs up some of Heidegger’s critical remarks regarding the reflective nature of Husserlian phenomenology in the light of important textual evidences ignored not only by Heidegger, but also by a surprising number of specialists in the fields of philosophy, cognitive sciences, and philosophy of mind.


Author(s):  
Krista K. Thomason

The introduction surveys the philosophical literature about shame. Philosophers have long been troubled by the dual nature of shame. On the one hand, it seems to be an emotion that is central to the development of virtue. On the other hand, it arises in cases that have no obvious moral import and it can hinder rather than help moral progress. Much of the philosophical literature has aimed to find a way to reconcile these two sides of shame by explaining away or de-emphasizing one of the two sides. This introduction raises questions about the viability of those strategies and provides an outline for the rest of the book.


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