Complex system and influence of delayed decision on the stability of a triopoly price game model

2013 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 1741-1751 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Kefei Wu
Keyword(s):  
Complex System ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Price Game ◽  
The Stability

scholarly journals Dynamic Analysis and Chaos Control of Bertrand Triopoly Based on Differentiated Products and Heterogeneous Expectations

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Liuwei Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Dynamical System ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Economic System ◽  
Dynamic Behavior ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Complex Dynamic ◽  
Heterogeneous Expectations ◽  
Price Game ◽  
The Stability

Price competition has become a universal commercial phenomenon nowadays. This paper considers a dynamic Bertrand price game model, in which enterprises have heterogeneous expectations. By the stability theory of the dynamic behavior of the Bertrand price game model, the instability of the boundary equilibrium point and the stability condition of the internal equilibrium point are obtained. Furthermore, bifurcation diagram, basin of attraction, and critical curve are introduced to investigate the dynamic behavior of this game. Numerical analysis shows that the change of model parameters in a dynamic system has a significant impact on the stability of the system and can even lead to complex dynamic behaviors in the evolution of the entire economic system. This kind of complex dynamic behavior will cause certain damage to the stability of the whole economic system, causing the market to fall into a chaotic state, which is manifested as a kind of market disorder competition, which is very unfavorable to the stability of the economic system. Therefore, the chaotic behavior of the dynamical system is controlled by time-delay feedback control and the numerical analysis shows that the effective control of the dynamical system can be unstable behavior and the rapid recovery of the market can be stable and orderly.

scholarly journals Stability Analysis and Chaos Control of Recycling Price Game Model for Manufacturers and Retailers

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ting Li ◽  
Dongyun Yan ◽  
Xiaogang Ma
Keyword(s):  
Chaos Control ◽  
Stable Region ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Parameter Adaptation ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
Price Game ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Adaptation Method ◽  
Bifurcation Chaos

With application of nonlinear theory, this paper makes study on the long-term competition in a recycling price game model by manufacturers and retailers. The paper makes analysis on the local stability of the Nash equilibrium point and gives the corresponding stable region. It has been found that the stability of the whole system would be significantly impacted by the following factors which include adjustment speed of the recycling price, the proportion of recycled products by channels, the sensitivity of consumers for the recycling price, and the price cross-elasticity between two channels. By means of the simulation technology, the complexity of the recycling price in the system in the long-term competition has been demonstrated. Owing to the change of parameters, bifurcation, chaos, and other phenomena would appear in the system. When the system is becoming chaotic, the profit of the whole system decreased. All these show that the operational efficiency for the whole system will be impaired by the chaos. Effective chaotic control of the system will be realized by the use of the parameter adaptation method.

scholarly journals Computation of the Stability and Complexity about Triopoly Price Game Model with Delay Decision

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuling Wang ◽  
Shubing Guo ◽  
Shide Duan
Keyword(s):  
Chaos Theory ◽  
Resource Constraints ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Entropy Theory ◽  
Yield Increase ◽  
Bifurcation Stability ◽  
Price Game ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Delay Decision

We develop the price game model based on the entropy theory and chaos theory, considering the three enterprises are bounded rationality and using the cost function under the resource constraints; that is, the yield increase will bring increased costs. The enterprises of new model adopt the delay decision with the delay parameters τ1 and τ2, respectively. According to the change of delay parameters τ1 and τ2, the bifurcation, stability, and chaos of the system are discussed, and the change of entropy when the system is far away from equilibrium is considered. Prices and profits are found to lose stability and the evolution of the system tends to the equilibrium state of maximum entropy. And it has a big fluctuation with the increase of τ1 and τ2. In the end, the chaos is controlled effectively. The entropy of the system decreases, and the interior reverts to order. The results of this study are of great significance for avoiding the chaos when the enterprises make price decisions.

Study on the Soil Slope Stability Based on the Support Vector Machine

2011 ◽  
Vol 291-294 ◽  
pp. 2746-2749
Author(s):  
Yun Fei Wang ◽  
Li Ping Wang ◽  
Fu Ping Zhong ◽  
Huai Bao Chu
Keyword(s):  
Complex System ◽  
Support Vector Machine ◽  
Slope Stability ◽  
Easy Access ◽  
Support Vector ◽  
Soil Slope ◽  
Multiple Factors ◽  
Project Construction ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Important Basis

The stability of the slope is a complex system affected by many factors, with the characteristics of randomness and fuzziness. In the paper established the model of the support vector machine, which make use of the support vector machine considering the multiple factors affected the slope stability, and select the indicators with the characteristic of common and easy access. Through the actual inspection verified the validity of the model, shows that the model can be well applied to the analysis of slope stability with similarity, it may provide an important basis for the slope project construction.

scholarly journals Dynamic Analysis of Duopoly Price Game Based on Low-Carbon Technology Sharing

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Fengshan Si ◽  
Zhengkun Yan ◽  
Jing Wang ◽  
Daoming Dai
Keyword(s):  
Research And Development ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Technology Research ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Price Game ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Technology Level

Taking the carbon emissions per unit product as the standard to measure the low-carbon technology level of the enterprise, this article analyzed how the technology supplier enterprises realize low-carbon production and achieve a win-win situation for both supply and demand through technology sharing through technology research and development. Based on the positive effect of low-carbon technology level on product demand, we studied the optimal pricing strategy and the optimal low-carbon technology level in the technology supply enterprises under the Stackelberg game in 3 conditions (i.e., without technology research and development or technology sharing, with technology research and development but no technology sharing, and with both technology research and development and technology sharing). We also drew a comparative analysis of the optimal product price, the optimal low-carbon technology level, and the optimal profit in the three scenarios. Besides, by constructing a delayed differential price game model, we studied the equilibrium strategy of price competition between technology supply and demand companies and the local asymptotic stability of the game system at the equilibrium point. In addition, the effects of delay strategy on game equilibrium strategy, the influence of the degree of adjustment of decision variables on the stability of the game system, and the stability of the game system on the evolution trend of the game are also explored. By comparing and analyzing the game results of the oligopoly enterprises in the stable system and the unstable system, it confirmed that the system instability usually causes serious harm to the enterprise.

scholarly journals Evaluation of the Quality Supervision System for Construction Projects in China Considering the Quality Behavior Risk Transmission

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1660
Author(s):  
Jingchun Feng ◽  
Yuting Wang ◽  
Ke Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Construction Projects ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionary System ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Supervision System ◽  
System A ◽  
Low Efficiency ◽  
The Stability

In construction projects, improper quality behavior of a participant results in quality behavior risks, which can transmit to the downstream participants and may cause detrimental effects on the quality of the entity finally constructed. Controlling the transmission of quality behavior risks is the key to effectively supervising and ensuring the quality of construction projects. In this study, the effectiveness of the quality supervision system of construction projects in China was investigated by considering the transmission of quality behavior risks. A multi-player evolutionary game model consisting of the players of quality supervision of a government department, upstream participant (UP), and downstream participant (DP) was generated. By using the system dynamics theory, the game model was simulated to determine the stability of the evolutionary system and to evaluate the effectiveness of China’s current quality supervision system under different scenarios. The results showed that there is no evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the evolutionary system of the current quality supervision system in China and there are fluctuations in the evolution process. It revealed that high risk exists in the current quality supervision system in China. To resolve the problem of the low efficiency of the current Chinese supervision system, a dynamic penalty and incentive method is developed, which has been proven to be able to effectively control the quality behavior risks in construction projects and hence ensuring the quality of the entity finally constructed.

Anti-Synchronization Control of the Complex Lu System

2014 ◽  
Vol 721 ◽  
pp. 269-272
Author(s):  
Fan Di Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Complex System ◽  
Fractional Order ◽  
Control Strategy ◽  
Stability Theorem ◽  
Projective Synchronization ◽  
Synchronization Control ◽  
Fractional Order Systems ◽  
Lü System ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Lu System

This paper propose fractional-order Lu complex system. Moreover, projective synchronization control of the fractional-order hyper-chaotic complex Lu system is studied based on feedback technique and the stability theorem of fractional-order systems, the scheme of anti-synchronization for the fractional-order hyper-chaotic complex Lu system is presented. Numerical simulations on examples are presented to show the effectiveness of the proposed control strategy.

scholarly journals Research on the Complex Dynamic Characteristics and RLS Estimation’s Influence Based on Price and Service Game

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Zhanbing Guo
Keyword(s):  
Least Squares ◽  
Fixed Points ◽  
Dynamic Characteristics ◽  
Complex Dynamics ◽  
Recursive Least Squares ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Complex Dynamic ◽  
Service Market ◽  
The Real ◽  
Price Game

Considering that the real competitions in service market contain two important factors, price and service, we build a dynamical price and service game model and study the complex dynamics of this bivariate game. Some special properties about the adjustment of service are noted by comparing our innovative bivariate game model with previous univariate game model. Besides, we discuss the stabilities of fixed points and compare the price and service game with price game. What is more, the recursive least-squares (RLS) estimation is introduced to substitute naive estimation; then the impacts of RLS estimation are studied by comparing it with naive estimation.

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