scholarly journals Is there introspective evidence for phenomenal intentionality?

2016 ◽  
Vol 174 (5) ◽  
pp. 1105-1126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Bordini
2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 606-627
Author(s):  
Philip Woodward

AbstractThis paper explores the relationship between phenomenal properties and intentional properties. In recent years a number of philosophers have argued that intentional properties are sometimes necessitated by phenomenal properties, but have not explained why or how. Exceptions can be found in the work of Katalin Farkas and Farid Masrour, who develop versions of reductionism regarding phenomenally-necessitated intentionality (or ‘phenomenal intentionality’). I raise two objections to reductive theories of the sort they develop. Then I propose a version of primitivism regarding phenomenal intentionality. I argue that primitivism avoids the pitfalls of reductionism while promising broad explanatory payoffs.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 924-928
Author(s):  
Ben Sheredos

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