scholarly journals Environmental Interest Groups and Authoritarian Regime Diversity

Author(s):  
Tobias Böhmelt
Author(s):  
Andrea Lenschow

This chapter focuses on the European Union’s environmental policy, the development of which was characterized by institutional deepening and the substantial expansion of environmental issues covered by EU decisions and regulations. Environmental policy presents a host of challenges for policy-makers, including the choice of appropriate instruments, improvement of implementation performance, and better policy coordination at all levels of policy-making. The chapter points to the continuing adaptations that have been made in these areas. It first considers the historical evolution of environmental policy in the EU before discussing the main actors in EU environmental policy-making, namely: the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and environmental interest groups. The chapter also looks at the EU as an international actor.


Author(s):  
Ray Rivers

The author is an environmental economist who provides consulting services to a wide range of clients from private industry, environmental interest groups and the federal and provincial governments. He has worked with the federal departments of Environment, Agriculture and Fisheries and Oceans and the Ontario Ministry of the Environment; lectured at Concordia, the University of Ottawa and Wilfred Laurier University in Public Administration and Sustainable Development; and written widely on a range of environmental topics. Ray Rivers was the Canadian co-author of the Land Use sections in the 1996/1998 State of the Lake Ecosystem Conferences. The text that follows is an edited and revised version of a paper presented at the international symposion on "The Natural City," Toronto, 23-25 June, 2004, sponsored by the University of Toronto's Division of the Environment, Institute for Environmental Studies, and the World Society for Ekistics.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 120-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Bromley-Trujillo ◽  
James W. Stoutenborough ◽  
Kellee J. Kirkpatrick ◽  
Arnold Vedlitz

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (01) ◽  
pp. 45-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew B. Whitford

This paper addresses the intersection of coalition formation, judicial strategies, and regulatory politics. Coalitions are a low-cost means for assembling minority interests into more powerful blocs. However, in most cases in regulatory politics, judicial strategies are high cost efforts. I argue that coalitions among interests form one basis for judicial participation, but that participation manifests in an array of coalition “microstructures.” For any one event, the microstructure of the interest group coalition varies, but across events the coalitions take on general forms. The paper offers evidence for a variety of coalition microstructures in interest group participation as amici curiae (“friends of the court”) in cases before the United States Supreme Court. The evidence is drawn from the case of the Group of Ten, a stable, long-term coalition of environmental interest groups that operated from 1981 to 1991.


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