An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments

1985 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bezalel Peleg
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Side Payments

scholarly journals The core and superdifferential of a fuzzy TU-cooperative game

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 20-35
Author(s):  
Валерий Александрович Васильев ◽  
Valery Vasil'ev
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Subdifferential Calculus ◽  
The Core ◽  
Side Payments ◽  
Weak Homogeneity ◽  
Fuzzy Game

In the paper, we consider conditions providing coincidence of the cores and superdifferentials of fuzzy cooperative games with side payments. It turned out that one of the most simple sufficient conditions consists of weak homogeneity. Moreover, by applying so-called S*-representation of a fuzzy game introduced by the author, we show that for any vwith nonempty core C(v) there exists some game u such that C(v) coincides with the superdifferential of u. By applying subdifferential calculus we describe a structure of the core forboth classic fuzzy extensions of the ordinary cooperative game (e.g., Aubin and Owen extensions) and for some new continuations, like Harsanyi extensions and generalized Airport game.

On the core, nucleolus and bargaining sets of cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 6129-6142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xia Zhang ◽  
Hao Sun ◽  
Genjiu Xu ◽  
Dongshuang Hou
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Bargaining Sets

LINEAR AND INTEGER PROGRAMMING TECHNIQUES FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES

2002 ◽  
Vol 13 (05) ◽  
pp. 653-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qizhi Fang ◽  
Shanfeng Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Integer Programming ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Value Function ◽  
Linear Program ◽  
Grand Coalition ◽  
The Core ◽  
Programming Techniques ◽  
Theoretical Results

Let Γ = (N, v) be a cooperative game with the player set N and value function v : 2N → R. A solution of the game is in the core if no subset of players could gain advantage by breaking away from the grand coalition of all players. This paper surveys theoretical results on the cores for some cooperative game models. These results proved that the linear program duality characterization of the core is a very powerful tool. We will focus on linear and integer programming techniques applied in this area.

scholarly journals Hart–Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bas Dietzenbacher ◽  
Peter Sudhölter
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
Convex Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Scale Covariance

AbstractThis paper formally introduces Hart–Mas-Colell consistency for general (possibly multi-valued) solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility. This notion is used to axiomatically characterize the core on the domain of convex games. Moreover, we characterize all nonempty solutions satisfying individual rationality, anonymity, scale covariance, superadditivity, weak Hart–Mas-Colell consistency, and converse Hart–Mas-Colell consistency. This family consists of (a) the Shapley value, (b) all homothetic images of the core with the Shapley value as center of homothety and with positive ratios of homothety not larger than one, and (c) their relative interiors.

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