Currently, the probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) for the nuclear power plant (NPP) sites are primarily focused on the reactor counterpart. However, evoked by the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident, it has been widely recognized that a complete site risk profile should not be confined to the reactor units, but should cover all the radiological sources in a site, e.g. spent fuel storage facilities. During the operation of the reactor units, the used fuel assemblies will be unloaded from the reactor core to the storage facilities in a continuous or periodical manner. Accident scenarios involving such facilities can occur with non-negligible frequencies and significant consequences, posing threat to public safety. Hence, the risk contributions from such scenarios should be carefully estimated and integrated into the safety goal evaluations.
The spent fuel storage facilities can be categorized as two types: pool storage units and dry cask storage facilities. In the former type, spent fuel assemblies are stored in large pools inside or outside the reactor building, with the residual heat removed by natural or forced water circulation. The latter type, where air or inert gas circulation plays an important role, appear mostly as a complementary method, along with the pool storage units, to expand the plant’s storage capacity. For instance, at the Daiichi plant, there are several fuel pool units holding some fresh fuel and some used fuel, the latter awaiting for its transfer to the dry cask storage facilities on site. Note that, as well as in a joint manner, both storage facilities can be designed to serve the NPPs independently.
As a fully developed method to identify potential risk in a logical and quantitative way, the framework of PRA can be generally applied to the spent fuel storage facilities with some special considerations. This paper is aimed at giving recommendations for the spent fuel storage facility PRAs, including (1) clarifying the analysis scope of risk from spent fuel storage facilities; (2) illustrating four key issues that determines such risk; (3) presenting three essential considerations when conducting PRAs to evaluate such risk. Also, this paper integrates the insights obtained from two representative case studies involving two NPP sites with different types of both fuel elements and storage facilities.
Evaluation and Demonstration of Intrusion Detection for Spent Fuel Storage Facilities