A revision algorithm for invalid encodings in concurrent formation of overlapping coalitions

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 2164-2172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guofu Zhang ◽  
Jianguo Jiang ◽  
Changhua Lu ◽  
Zhaopin Su ◽  
Hua Fang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Overlapping Coalitions

scholarly journals Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions: Charting the tractability frontier

2019 ◽  
Vol 271 ◽  
pp. 74-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yair Zick ◽  
Georgios Chalkiadakis ◽  
Edith Elkind ◽  
Evangelos Markakis
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Overlapping Coalitions

Searching for overlapping coalitions in multiple virtual organizations

2010 ◽  
Vol 180 (17) ◽  
pp. 3140-3156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guofu Zhang ◽  
Jianguo Jiang ◽  
Zhaopin Su ◽  
Meibin Qi ◽  
Hua Fang
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Organizations ◽  
Overlapping Coalitions

The First ‘General Chapter’ of Benedictine Abbots (1131) Reconsidered

2015 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 715-734 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEVEN VANDERPUTTEN
Keyword(s):  
General Chapter ◽  
Previous Scholarship ◽  
Overlapping Coalitions

This paper reconsiders the first ‘General Chapter’ of Benedictine abbots (late 1131). To explain the timing and circumstances of this event, previous scholarship mostly referred to the influence of the Cistercians on reformist groups within ‘traditional’ monasticism. A closer look at the primary evidence reveals how the first General Chapter needs to be framed against the activities of overlapping coalitions of ecclesiastical and secular agents pursuing various political, ideological and institutional interests. It also allows the causes of the ensuing dispute with the Cluniacs to be established more securely, and provides new insights into contemporary usages of statutes and the semantics of the word ‘ordo’.

scholarly journals Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions

2010 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 179-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Chalkiadakis ◽  
E. Elkind ◽  
E. Markakis ◽  
M. Polukarov ◽  
N. R. Jennings
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Coalition Structure ◽  
Coalitional Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Coalition Structures ◽  
Coalition Formation Process ◽  
The Social ◽  
Overlapping Coalitions

In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are associated with tasks, an agent may be involved in executing more than one task, and thus may distribute his resources among several coalitions. To tackle such scenarios, we introduce a model for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions—or overlapping coalition formation (OCF) games. We then explore the issue of stability in this setting. In particular, we introduce a notion of the core, which generalizes the corresponding notion in the traditional (non-overlapping) scenario. Then, under some quite general conditions, we characterize the elements of the core, and show that any element of the core maximizes the social welfare. We also introduce a concept of balancedness for overlapping coalitional games, and use it to characterize coalition structures that can be extended to elements of the core. Finally, we generalize the notion of convexity to our setting, and show that under some natural assumptions convex games have a non-empty core. Moreover, we introduce two alternative notions of stability in OCF that allow a wider range of deviations, and explore the relationships among the corresponding definitions of the core, as well as the classic (non-overlapping) core and the Aubin core. We illustrate the general properties of the three cores, and also study them from a computational perspective, thus obtaining additional insights into their fundamental structure.

DynaMOC: A Multiagent System for Coordination of Mobile Teams Based on Dynamic Overlapping Coalitions

2011 ◽  
pp. 303-308
Author(s):  
Vitor A. dos Santos ◽  
Giovanni C. Barroso ◽  
Mario F. Aguilar ◽  
Antonio B. Serra ◽  
Jose M. Soares
Keyword(s):  
Multiagent System ◽  
Overlapping Coalitions

Stability of overlapping coalitions

2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgios Chalkiadakis ◽  
Edith Elkind ◽  
Evangelos Markakis ◽  
Maria Polukarov ◽  
Nicholas R. Jennings
Keyword(s):  
Overlapping Coalitions

scholarly journals Probability Bounds for Overlapping Coalition Formation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michail Mamakos ◽  
Georgios Chalkiadakis
Keyword(s):  
Social Network ◽  
Real World ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Confidence Levels ◽  
Probability Bounds ◽  
Resource Investment ◽  
The Third ◽  
Potential Resource ◽  
Hoeffding’S Inequality ◽  
Overlapping Coalitions

In this work, we provide novel methods which benefit from obtained probability bounds for assessing the ability of teams of agents to accomplish coalitional tasks. To this end, our first method is based on an improvement of the Paley-Zygmund inequality, while the second and the third ones are devised based on manipulations of the two-sided Chebyshev’s inequality and the Hoeffding’s inequality, respectively. Agents have no knowledge of the amount of resources others possess; and hold private Bayesian beliefs regarding the potential resource investment of every other agent. Our methods allow agents to demand that certain confidence levels are reached, regarding the resource contributions of the various coalitions. In order to tackle real-world scenarios, we allow agents to form overlapping coalitions, so that one can simultaneously be part of a number of coalitions. We thus present a protocol for iterated overlapping coalition formation (OCF), through which agents can complete tasks that grant them utility. Agents lie on a social network and their distance affects their likelihood of cooperation towards the completion of a task. We confirm our methods’ effectiveness by testing them on both a random graph of 300 nodes and a real-world social network of 4039 nodes.

USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (01) ◽  
pp. 1250004 ◽  
Author(s):  
CAMELIA BEJAN ◽  
JUAN CAMILO GÓMEZ
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
Tu Game ◽  
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium ◽  
The Core ◽  
Core Solution ◽  
Aspiration Core ◽  
Overlapping Coalitions

This work uses the defining principles of the core solution concept to determine not only payoffs but also coalition formation. Given a cooperative transferable utility (TU) game, we propose two noncooperative procedures that in equilibrium deliver a natural and nonempty core extension, the aspiration core, together with the supporting coalitions it implies. As expected, if the cooperative game is balanced, the grand coalition forms. However, if the core is empty, other coalitions arise. Following the aspiration literature, not only partitions but also overlapping coalition configurations are allowed. Our procedures interpret this fact in different ways. The first game allows players to participate with a fraction of their time in more than one coalition, while the second assigns probabilities to the formation of potentially overlapping coalitions. We use the strong Nash and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concepts.

scholarly journals Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks

2016 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 435-459
Author(s):  
Messan Agbaglah
Keyword(s):  
Overlapping Coalitions
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