A sequential game analysis on carbon tax policy choices in open economies: From the perspective of carbon emission responsibilities

Through the establishment of the leading manufacturer Stackelberg game model under asymmetric carbon information, this paper investigates the misreporting behaviors of the supply chain members and their influences on supply chain performance. Based on “Benchmarking” allocation mechanism, three policies are considered: carbon emission trading, carbon tax, and a new policy which combined carbon quota and carbon tax mechanism. The results show that, in the three models, the leader in the supply chain, even if he has advantages of carbon information, will not lie about his information. That is because the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior has no effect on supply chain members’ performance. But the retailer will lie about the information when he has carbon information advantage. The high-carbon-emission retailers under the carbon trading policy, all the retailers under the carbon tax policy, and the high-carbon-emission retailers under combined quotas and tax policy would like to understate their carbon emissions. Coordination of revenue sharing contract is studied in supply chain to induce the retailer to declare his real carbon information. Optimal contractual parameters are deduced in the three models, under which the profit of the supply chain can be maximized.

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The Impact of Carbon Tax Policy on the Carbon Emission Reduction and Profit

International Journal of Smart Home ◽

10.14257/ijsh.2014.8.5.16 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 8 (5) ◽

pp. 175-184 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Hongyan Hu ◽

Wenlong Zhou

Keyword(s):

Tax Policy ◽

Emission Reduction ◽

Carbon Emission ◽

Carbon Tax ◽

Carbon Emission Reduction ◽

The Impact

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Pricing and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions in a Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer under Carbon Tax Regulation

Mathematical Problems in Engineering ◽

10.1155/2020/5351867 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 2020 ◽

pp. 1-9 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Yangang Feng ◽

Jiaxin Shen ◽

Xiaomei Li

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Risk Aversion ◽

Tax Policy ◽

Emission Reduction ◽

Carbon Emission ◽

Carbon Tax ◽

Wholesale Price ◽

Optimal Decision ◽

Risk Averse ◽

Carbon Emission Reduction

Carbon tax is an emission regulation, which widely used to curb the carbon emissions generated from firms. In the context of carbon tax policy, firms need to determine an optimal carbon reduction level and optimal product prices. To address firms’ decision-making challenges, this paper considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer under carbon tax policy; it establishes a Stackelberg game model with a risk-averse retailer and a risk-neutral manufacturer who is the leader of the game. The paper studies the influence of the government’s carbon tax policy and retailer’s risk-averse attitude on the optimal decision of the supply chain. The result shows that when the retailer is risk aversion, the degree of risk aversion of the retailer is positively correlated with the wholesale price of the manufacturer and unit carbon emission reduction, and within a certain range of carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, it is positively correlated with the price of products; with the increase of the carbon tax rate imposed by the government, the retail price of unit products, the wholesale price of the manufacturer, and the carbon emission reduction of unit products also increase. Finally, the results are verified by numerical examples.

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Effect of carbon tax policy on agricultural land use change and its carbon emission

Acta Ecologica Sinica ◽

10.5846/stxb201709231715 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 39 (5) ◽

Author(s):

马晓哲 MA Xiaozhe ◽

王雅晴 WANG Yaqing ◽

刘昌新 LIU Changxin ◽

朱永彬 ZHU Yongbin ◽

王铮 WANG Zheng ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Land Use ◽

Land Use Change ◽

Tax Policy ◽

Carbon Emission ◽

Agricultural Land ◽

Carbon Tax ◽

Agricultural Land Use

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The Impact of Government's Carbon Tax Policy on Enterprise's Carbon Emission

2011 Fourth International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization ◽

10.1109/cso.2011.15 ◽

2011 ◽

Author(s):

Guoxing Zhang ◽

Jianpeng Zhou ◽

Peng Liu ◽

Hua Zhang

Keyword(s):

Tax Policy ◽

Carbon Emission ◽

Carbon Tax ◽

The Impact

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Low-carbonization game analysis and optimization in a two-echelon supply chain under the carbon-tax policy

Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies ◽

10.1108/jcefts-11-2015-0029 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 9 (2) ◽

pp. 113-130 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Shihui Yang ◽

Jun Yu

Keyword(s):

Tax Policy ◽

Design Methodology ◽

Carbon Tax ◽

Nash Bargaining ◽

Stackelberg Games ◽

Low Carbon ◽

Content Type ◽

Tax Rate ◽

Game Analysis ◽

The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this study is to help governments make carbon-tax policy and help enterprises make decisions under that policy. Design/methodology/approach Based on the carbon-tax policy, with the consideration of consumers’ low-carbon preferences, this paper compares the pricing, emission reduction and advertising decisions in three different games (one centralized game and two decentralized Stackelberg games). Findings This paper concludes that, through centralized game, namely, cooperation game, manufacturers, retailers and consumers can reach their optimal situation. In the numerical simulation, this paper analyzes the impact of carbon-tax rate to the decisions of manufacturer and retailer, as well as their profit. Originality/value Using the Nash Bargaining Model, the introduction of the bargaining power and the degree of risk aversion of the parties, this study provides some solution for the distribution of the additional profit when they cooperate, in which way they can reach their Pareto optimality.

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