Bias as an epistemic notion

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anke Bueter
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Notion

Epistemic set theory is a conservative extension of intuitionistic set theory

1985 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 895-902 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. C. Flagg
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Affirmative Answer ◽  
Conservative Extension ◽  
Successful Program ◽  
Power Set ◽  
Epistemic Notion ◽  
Intuitionistic Mathematics ◽  
Topological Boolean Algebra ◽  
Faithful Interpretation ◽  
Intuitionistic Set Theory

In [6] Gödel observed that intuitionistic propositional logic can be interpreted in Lewis's modal logic (S4). The idea behind this interpretation is to regard the modal operator □ as expressing the epistemic notion of “informal provability”. With the work of Shapiro [12], Myhill [10], Goodman [7], [8], and Ščedrov [11] this simple idea has developed into a successful program of integrating classical and intuitionistic mathematics.There is one question quite central to the above program that has remained open. Namely:Does Ščedrov's extension of the Gödel translation to set theory provide a faithful interpretation of intuitionistic set theory into epistemic set theory?In the present paper we give an affirmative answer to this question.The main ingredient in our proof is the construction of an interpretation of epistemic set theory into intuitionistic set theory which is inverse to the Gödel translation. This is accomplished in two steps. First we observe that Funayama's theorem is constructively provable and apply it to the power set of 1. This provides an embedding of the set of propositions into a complete topological Boolean algebra . Second, in a fashion completely analogous to the construction of Boolean-valued models of classical set theory, we define the -valued universe V(). V() gives a model of epistemic set theory and, since we use a constructive metatheory, this provides an interpretation of epistemic set theory into intuitionistic set theory.

On Non-Propositional Aspects in Modelling Complex Systems

2010 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafaela Hillerbrand
Keyword(s):  
Complex System ◽  
Complex Systems ◽  
Climate Modeling ◽  
Climate System ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Political Decision ◽  
Model Predictions ◽  
Epistemic Notion ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Political Decision Making

AbstractThis paper aims to show that modeling complex systems inevitably involves non-propositional knowledge and thus the uncertainties associated with the corresponding model predictions cannot be fully quantified. This is exemplified by means of the climate system and climate modeling. The climate system is considered as a paradigm for a complex system, whereby the notion of complexity adopted in this paper is epistemic in nature and does not equate with the technical definition of a complex system as for example used within physics or complexity theory. The epistemic notion of complexity allows to view the climate system as complex with respect to some features, while simple with respect to others. This distinction is of practical significance for political decision making as it allows to treat some climate predictions as (fairly) certain, while acknowledging high uncertainties with others.

The Verisimilitudinarian approach to ‘the Truth’

Perspectives ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-39
Author(s):  
Andrea Roselli
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
The World ◽  
Epistemic Notion ◽  
The One ◽  
The Way

AbstractThe Verisimilitudinarian approach to scientific progress (VS, for short) is traditionally considered a realist-correspondist model to explain the proximity of our best scientific theories to the way things really are in the world out there (ʻthe Truthʻ, with the capital ʻtʻ). However, VS is based on notions, such as ʻestimated verisimilitudeʻ or ʻapproximate truthʻ, that dilute the model in a functionalist-like theory. My thesis, then, is that VS tries to incorporate notions, such as ʻprogressʻ, in a pre-constituted metaphysical conception of the world, but fails in providing a fitting framework. The main argument that I will develop to support this claim is that the notions that they use to explain scientific progress (ʻestimated verisimilitudeʻ or ʻapproximate truthʻ) have nothing to do with ʻthe Truthʻ. After presenting Cevolani and Tamboloʻs answer (2013) to Birdʻs arguments (2007), I will claim that VS sacrifices the realist-correspondist truth in favor of an epistemic notion of truth, which can obviously be compatible with certain kinds of realism but not with the one the authors have in mind (the correspondence between our theories and the way things really are).

scholarly journals Progreso científico y verdad

1991 ◽  
Vol 23 (69) ◽  
pp. 101-135
Author(s):  
Juan Vázquez
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Scientific Development ◽  
Philosophical Approach ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Internal Realism ◽  
Structure Of Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Epistemic Notion ◽  
Misleading Interpretation ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
The Ideal

The aim of this paper is to make a plea for a new philosophical approach, or a new meta-theoretic account altemative to the ones represented by realism and instrumentalism, in the Philosophy of Science, and that will enable us to be more successful both in dealing with a rational explanation of the process of scientific development as well as with the notion of truth that is implied by the former. This new approach is consistent with the epistemology of Logik der Forschung, goes along with T. Kuhn's contribution, and gets its most explicit formulation in the "internal realism" of the last Putnam. The argument takes the following steps: 1) 1 begin with a very brief mention of the neopositivist approach to scientific development, concluding at his point that if anything has survived in that account of scientific development it can only be the idea of "convergence", linked to the notion of "reduction". 2) The notion of convergence in K. Popper's work is then analysed, showing that this notion can be understood in two quite different senses, depending on whether what we mean is Popper in its Logik der Forschung or the tarskian Popper, i.e., the Popper of verisimilitude. 3) 1 show then that the only notion of convergence that necessarily follows from the Logik der Forschung is consistent with T. Kuhn's approach and will only be slightly qualified by him, in such a way that Kuhn's qualified notion of convergence fits perfectly well within the framework of a falsationist epistemology. The strong controversy historically held between Popper' s and Kuhn' s followers that originated from The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Kuhn, can only be understood when we mean by Popper the tarskian Popper, and hold a misleading interpretation of Kuhn's work. 4) A new meta-theoric approach is reached both in connection with the analysis and explanation of scientific progress and with the not less troublesome concept of truth. This new approach is very akin to the "internal realism" held by Putnam from 1976 onwards. Within the framework of this new approach an epistemic notion of truth is contended for, while the goal of scientific development is now not the search for an "absolute", "objetive" truth, but the concrete achievement of the ideal coherence of the whole of our beliefs between themselves, the coherence of the whole of our beliefs with the whole of our experiences, taking our experiencesin the way they are represented in our system of beliefs.

scholarly journals Premise Acceptability, Deontology, Internalism, Justification

1995 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
James B. Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Epistemic Notion ◽  
Epistemic Duty ◽  
Dual Connection ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

Acceptability is a thoroughly normative epistemic notion. If a statement is acceptable, i.e. it is proper to take it as a premise, then one is justified in accepting it. We also hold that a statement is acceptable just in case there is a presumption of warrant in its favor. We thus see acceptability connected to epistemic normativity on the one hand and to warrant on the other. But there is a distinct tension in this dual connection. The dominant tradition in modern epistemology sees epistemic justification as an internalist notion. We are justified in holding a belief just in case certain conditions are fulfilled of which we have privileged access. Warrant is an externalist notion. We have no privileged access to the conditions of warrant. Is our understanding of acceptability as both normative and definable in terms of presumption of warrant philosophically coherent? We shall argue that it is a philosophically coherent notion. Presumption of warrant, unlike warrant, is an internalist notion. Our position can be characterized as an externalist internal ism. It avoids the charge brought against externalism of allowing one to be justified in accepting some claim even if one has no evidence for it. We meet the classical internalist challenge that acceptance is normatively proper only if one has done one's epistemic duty and thus one is aware of the normative propriety of the acceptance by providing a non-deontological definition of epistemic justification, and arguing that this is still a sufficiently normative notion for acceptability.

scholarly journals Demonstration and the Indemonstrability of the Stoic Indemonstrables

Phronesis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-378
Author(s):  
Susanne Bobzien
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Notion ◽  
Stoic Logic

Abstract Since Mates’ seminal Stoic Logic there has been uncertainty and debate about how to treat the term anapodeiktos when used of Stoic syllogisms. This paper argues that the customary translation of anapodeiktos by ‘indemonstrable’ is accurate, and it explains why this is so. At the heart of the explanation is an argument that, contrary to what is commonly assumed, indemonstrability is rooted in the generic account of the Stoic epistemic notion of demonstration (apodeixis). Some minor insights into Stoic logic ensue.

Speaking like “us”: self- and other-categorization as Norwegian speakers in student interactions

Multilingua ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Valérie Sickinghe
Keyword(s):  
Interpersonal Relations ◽  
Native Speakers ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Student Interactions ◽  
Social Differences ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
Membership Categorization ◽  
Upper Secondary ◽  
Epistemic Notion ◽  
And Performance

AbstractThis article investigates the manner in which students in Norwegian upper secondary schools negotiate “legitimate speaker” category membership in spoken interactions. It is concerned with adolescents’ linguistic identity as Norwegian speakers, and the language ideologies that inform categorization practices. Three collaborative features are distinguished to identify membership categorization practices: the pragmatic notion of scales of time and place; pronouns, in particular the personal pronouns “we”, “us”, and “they”; and the socio-epistemic notion of object-side assessments. The article asks whether the students’ categories correspond to those of education policy and research, and finds that students operate with more complex membership categorizations than the binary Norwegian/non-Norwegian division found in applied linguistic research and policy documents. It also finds that status as “expert” speaker of Norwegian is negotiable in student interactions, where social factors such as interpersonal relations, perceived social differences and performance of category-bound activities are as important as linguistic factors. The article shows how both non-native and native speakers of Norwegian can discursively construct themselves and others as more or less expert speakers of the language. As such, it contributes with insights on how institutionally defined linguistic markets, linguistic capital and legitimate speakers can be contested at the local level of student interactions.

scholarly journals Entropy, Information, and the Updating of Probabilities

Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (7) ◽  
pp. 895
Author(s):  
Ariel Caticha
Keyword(s):  
Posterior Probability ◽  
Prior Information ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Posterior Probability Distribution ◽  
Entropy Information ◽  
Induction Process ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Epistemic Notion ◽  
Universal Applicability ◽  
Selection Of

This paper is a review of a particular approach to the method of maximum entropy as a general framework for inference. The discussion emphasizes pragmatic elements in the derivation. An epistemic notion of information is defined in terms of its relation to the Bayesian beliefs of ideally rational agents. The method of updating from a prior to posterior probability distribution is designed through an eliminative induction process. The logarithmic relative entropy is singled out as a unique tool for updating (a) that is of universal applicability, (b) that recognizes the value of prior information, and (c) that recognizes the privileged role played by the notion of independence in science. The resulting framework—the ME method—can handle arbitrary priors and arbitrary constraints. It includes the MaxEnt and Bayes’ rules as special cases and, therefore, unifies entropic and Bayesian methods into a single general inference scheme. The ME method goes beyond the mere selection of a single posterior, and also addresses the question of how much less probable other distributions might be, which provides a direct bridge to the theories of fluctuations and large deviations.

Luck as an epistemic notion

Synthese ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 176 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Notion

Truthmongering: Less Is True

1989 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 611-616 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Fine
Keyword(s):  
Correspondence Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Correspondence Theory Of Truth ◽  
Epistemic Notion ◽  
History Of

In defending NOA against some contemporary antirealisms I distinguish two antirealist camps: the epistemology inflaters, who come to their antirealism by filling up inquiry and belief formation with various warrants and principles of justification, and the semantic inflaters, or truthmongers, who come to their antirealism by exchanging truth for some epistemic notion, like ideal rational acceptablility. In parity with arguments against the correspondence theory of truth, which I see at the heart of various realisms, I argue against antirealist truthmongering in two ways. One is inductive and hortative. I point to the history of failures of all past attempts at theories of truth, and try to suggest better things for philosophy to do instead. The other way is deconstructive. I examine the attempted explications of truth in the terms set by their own discourses, and try to show that they cannot actually stand on their own there. Lily Knezevich looks at this deconstructive work in her ‘Truthmongering‘ and finds it flawed by what I will call ‘Knezevich’s fallacy.’ (Generously, she refers to it as my fallacy. But surely the rule in these things is to let the name, and therefore the honor, attach to the discoverer, not the alleged perpetrator.)

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