Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games

2004 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 280-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Shachat ◽  
Mark Walker
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Adaptive Learning ◽  
Unobserved Heterogeneity ◽  
Normal Form Games

scholarly journals Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Costa-Gomes ◽  
Vincent P. Crawford ◽  
Bruno Broseta
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Normal Form Games ◽  
And Behavior

scholarly journals Feature-Based Choice and Similarity Perception in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study

Games ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 776-794 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sibilla Di Guida ◽  
Giovanna Devetag
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Normal Form Games ◽  
Feature Based

scholarly journals Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study

Econometrica ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 69 (5) ◽  
pp. 1193-1235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Costa-Gomes ◽  
Vincent P. Crawford ◽  
Bruno Broseta
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Normal Form Games ◽  
And Behavior

scholarly journals Opponent learning awareness and modelling in multi-objective normal form games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roxana Rădulescu ◽  
Timothy Verstraeten ◽  
Yijie Zhang ◽  
Patrick Mannion ◽  
Diederik M. Roijers ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Normal Form Games ◽  
Multi Objective

scholarly journals Representing pure Nash equilibria in argumentation

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Bruno Yun ◽  
Srdjan Vesic ◽  
Nir Oren
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Normal Form Games

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.

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