Intention and Wrongdoing

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Stuchlik

According to the principle of double effect, there is a strict moral constraint against bringing about serious harm to the innocent intentionally, but it is permissible in a wider range of circumstances to act in a way that brings about harm as a foreseen but non-intended side effect. This idea plays an important role in just war theory and international law, and in the twentieth century Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot invoked it as a way of resisting consequentialism. However, many moral philosophers now regard the principle with hostility or suspicion. Challenging the philosophical orthodoxy, Joshua Stuchlik defends the principle of double effect, situating it within a moral framework of human solidarity and responding to philosophical objections to it. His study uncovers links between ethics, philosophy of action, and moral psychology, and will be of interest to anyone seeking to understand the moral relevance of intention.

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-249
Author(s):  
Hanne M. Watkins

What is judged as morally right and wrong in war? I argue that despite many decades of research on moral psychology and the psychology of intergroup conflict, social psychology does not yet have a good answer to this question. However, it is a question of great importance because its answer has implications for decision-making in war, public policy, and international law. I therefore suggest a new way for psychology researchers to study the morality of war that combines the strengths of philosophical just-war theory with experimental techniques and theories developed for the psychological study of morality more generally. This novel approach has already begun to elucidate the moral judgments third-party observers make in war, and I demonstrate that these early findings have important implications for moral psychology, just-war theory, and the understanding of the morality of war.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanne M Watkins

What is judged as morally right and wrong in war? In the present paper I argue that despite many decades of research on moral psychology, and on the psychology of intergroup conflict, social psychology does not yet have a good answer to this question. However, it is a question of great importance, as its answer has implications for decision making in war, public policy, and international law. I therefore suggest a new way for psychology to study the morality of war, which combines the strengths of philosophical just war theory with experimental techniques and theories developed for the psychological study of morality more generally. This novel approach has already begun to elucidate the moral judgments we make in war, and I demonstrate that these early findings have important implications for moral psychology, just war theory, and our understanding of the morality of war.


Author(s):  
Fernando R. Tesón ◽  
Bas van der Vossen

We introduce general concepts of just war theory and describe different kinds of war: national self-defense, collective self-defense, and humanitarian intervention. After laying down the conditions for the justification of humanitarian intervention, we highlight some of our differences. We conclude with an outline of the international law of use of force and some jurisprudential themes that bear on the current humanitarian intervention debate.


2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 571-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRIAN OREND

The introduction explains how this essay articulates the issue of ‘justice after war’ from the point of view of just-war theory, and how such a view can and ought to impact upon international law, for instance by inspiring the eventual development of a new treaty, or Geneva Convention, exclusively concerned with issues of postwar justice. In the body of the essay, attention is first given to explaining why just-war theory has traditionally ignored, or even rejected, jus post bellum. Second, argument is made as to why this ignorance and rejection must be overcome, and replaced with information and inclusion. Third, principles drawing on traditional just-war theory are constructed and defended, for jus post bellum in general and for forcible postwar regime change in particular. Finally, several remaining challenges are addressed, seeking to dissolve doubts and strengthen resolve towards working for progress on this vital and topical issue of jus post bellum.


Author(s):  
Jorge Luis Almeida Estrella

The purpose of this article is to question whether the powers of the United Nations Security Council (SC) are subject to any limitation under international law, especially in the context of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) doctrine. And consequently, which organism will be entitled to hold the SC accountable for its actions, and how that organism should do it. The first chapter of this article deals with the possible limitations of the SC, it considers both legal and legitimacy restraints to the broad powers of the SC. Additionally, we will explain how RtoP presents itself as a new challenge to the legitimacy of the SC. Chapter 2 discusses which organisms within the UN system, may be appropriate to hold the SC responsible for its actions. Finally, in Chapter 3, we will review the legal status of RtoP, and explain how the ICJ could use Just War criteria as a valuable tool for a judicial review process of SC decisions based on RtoP.


Author(s):  
Anna Stilz

Both just war theory and international law recognize the defence of one’s own state and its territory as the core example of just cause for war. Yet just war theorists have done little to explore what might give the state a territorial right of this kind. This chapter argues that a state has a right to territorial integrity when it meets three conditions: (1) its citizens have a right to occupy its territory, (2) its scheme of law is minimally just, and (3) the relationship of political cooperation that supports its institutions is reasonably and widely affirmed. This chapter then considers whether a state that satisfies these conditions may defend its territorial integrity with lethal force. This account does not support the common-sense conviction that defending one’s state against aggression is always morally permitted or even required. But it can establish a defensive privilege in a central range of cases.


Author(s):  
Victor Tadros

This chapter partially defends the significance of intentions to permissibility against critics and explores some different views about their relevance by exploring a range of contexts in just war theory where views about the significance of intentions make a difference in our judgments about the permissibility of military action. It clarifies two components of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) and distinguishes different versions of it. It then compares the DDE with some competing explanations of the intuitive difference between terror bombing and tactical bombing, arguing that the DDE is an important component of the right overall view of the permissibility of killing in war.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 139-156

The article offers a retrospective analysis of the genesis of the just war theory and analyzes the reasons behind controversies over the concept in modern ethical thinking. The author emphasizes that the development of the just war theory throughout its history since Augustine was generally governed by a uniform approach rooted in common ethical concepts through each succeeding era. From the nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth, the theory evolved in close coordination with international law; at the conceptual level the just war theory began to merge with the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions. Just war theory is now the starting point for both the professional military establishment and also for anyone judging the morality of a conflict. Nevertheless, the definitive status of this set of ethical views is increasingly coming into question. These doubts are to a great extent connected with transformations in the practice of war itself. The changing actors in armed conflicts constitute a challenge to the view that states rather than individual combatants are responsible for them. The true subject of just war theory is not law but morality, a fact often overlooked in the practical application of its ideas. Traditional just war theory has only limited application when the increasing inclusion of civilians in armed conflicts is taken into account. The theory papers over a number of contradictions rooted in the desire to create a set of codified rules for management of conflict while excluding the question of the justice of war itself. All these considerations lead ultimately to a revisionist theory of just war, which will be free from the shortcomings exposed by the author.


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