The Prohibition Against Double Jeopardy (Non Bis in Idem)

2021 ◽  
pp. 1322-1330
Keyword(s):  
2018 ◽  
pp. 32-51
Author(s):  
R. Yu. Kochnev ◽  
L. I. Polishchuk ◽  
A. Yu. Rubin

We present the comparative analysis of the impact of centralized and decentralized corruption for private sector. Theory and empirical evidence point out to a “double jeopardy” of decentralized corruption which increases the burden of corruption upon private firms and weakens the incentives of bureaucracy to provide public production inputs, such as infrastructure. These outcomes are produced by simultaneous free-riding and the tragedy of the commons effects. The empirical part of the paper utilizes data of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance project.


CHEST Journal ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 130 (6) ◽  
pp. 1636-1638 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald R. Royall
Keyword(s):  

1981 ◽  
Vol 129 (3) ◽  
pp. 701 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet E. Findlater
Keyword(s):  

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