scholarly journals Party Brands, Partisan Erosion, and Party Breakdown

2018 ◽  
pp. 359-379
Author(s):  
Noam Lupu
Keyword(s):  
Party Brands

Party system erosion: Evidence from Peru

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 581-593
Author(s):  
Christopher L Carter
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Institutional Factors ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Improve Performance ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Weak Party ◽  
Party Brands

Weakly institutionalized party systems are a defining feature of third-wave democracies. Yet, in some countries like Peru, party weakness is not a static equilibrium but rather part of a dynamic process of “party system erosion” in which weak parties become weaker over time as independents come to dominate subnational posts. As I argue, party system erosion is driven by a particular configuration of institutional factors—weak party brands, ease of ballot access, and limited partisan control over resource distribution. These institutional features increase the likelihood that experienced candidates will run as independents. When these candidates are elected, they obtain more intergovernmental discretionary transfers, which are used to improve performance and maintain clientelistic networks. This resource advantage of independent officials further weakens party brands and reduces experienced candidates’ incentives to run with parties in future elections. I test this theory using a data set of 80,000 subnational officials and a regression discontinuity design.

Party Brands and the Democratic and Republican National Committees, 1952–1976

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boris Heersink
Keyword(s):  
Service Providers ◽  
National Minority ◽  
National Committee ◽  
National Party ◽  
White House ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
Minority Party ◽  
Party Brands

Political scientists have traditionally dismissed the Democratic and Republican National Committees as “service providers”—organizations that provide assistance to candidates in the form of campaign funding and expertise but otherwise lack political power. I argue this perspective has missed a crucial role national committees play in American politics, namely that national party organizations publicize their party's policy positions and, in doing so, attempt to create national party brands. These brands are important to party leaders—especially when the party is in the national minority—since they are fundamental to mobilizing voters in elections. In case studies covering the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and Republican National Committee (RNC) in the period 1952–1976, I show that minority party committees prioritize their branding role and invest considerably in their publicity divisions, inaugurate new publicity programs, and create new communication tools to reach out to voting groups. Additionally, I show that in cases where the party is out of the White House, the national committees have considerable leeway in deciding what party image to publicize. Rather than being mere powerless service providers, I show that party committees have played crucial roles in debates concerning questions of ideology and issue positioning in both parties.

Money, Reputation, and Incumbency in U.S. House Elections, or Why Marginals Have Become More Expensive

2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 492-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
HENRY A. KIM ◽  
BRAD L. LEVECK
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
The Way ◽  
Party Brands

Since 1972, campaign spending by House incumbents has skyrocketed, particularly in those districts with marginal support for the incumbent's party. At the same time, parties in the House have become much more cohesive in the way they vote, producing more precise and informative party brands. We argue that these two phenomena are fundamentally linked. As parties have developed more precise reputations, incumbents in these districts must spend much more to attract voters in “marginal” districts, who would be willing to vote for a candidate with the particular incumbent's legislative record, but not the average member of his party. Increasingly precise party reputations provide voters with stronger priors that incumbents are just like the rest of their party, and incumbents in marginal districts must spend more to overcome these beliefs. We demonstrate this using a simple formal model and test it empirically using campaign-spending data from 1972 to 2008.

scholarly journals Party brands and voting

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 153-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sigge Winther Nielsen ◽  
Martin Vinæs Larsen
Keyword(s):  
Party Brands
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