Human dignity in Israeli constitutional law

Human Dignity ◽  
2015 ◽  
pp. 280-307
Author(s):  
Aharon Barak ◽  
Daniel Kayros
2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 19-26
Author(s):  
Izabela Bratiloveanu

 The Object formula („Objecktformel”) has been designed and developed in the mid century XX by Günter Dürig, starting from the second formula of Kant's categorical imperative. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany took the formula and applied it for the first time in the case of the telephone conversations of December 15, 1970. The Object formula („Objecktformel”) was taken from the German constitutional law and applied in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yehiel S. Kaplan

In the State of Israel, Rabbinical courts are granted sole jurisdiction in the adjudication of marriage and divorce of Jews. In these courts, the husband presents the divorce writ of Jews, the get, to his wife on the occasion of their divorce at the end of the adjudication process. When Jews sue for divorce in Rabbinical courts, the courts occasionally determine that the man should grant his wife a get or that the wife should accept the get granted by her husband. Sometimes one spouse disobeys the ruling. Although the Rabbinical courts occasionally impose sanctions in an attempt to enforce divorce judgments, they are generally reluctant to do so. The implementation of inappropriate measures can lead to the conclusion that a given divorce is in fact a legally ineffectual coerced divorce. Consequently, the Jewish courts occasionally delay the imposition of these sanctions out of concern that inappropriate coercive measures invalidate the get, rendering the couple still legally married. The Supreme Court of Israel has ruled, though, that the Rabbinical courts in Israel should act in light of the constitutional principles in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom. However, the Supreme Court of Israel has not clearly or specifically addressed the balance between the rights and obligations of the husband and wife in the process of enforcing divorce judgments, neither before nor after the enactment of the of the two important constitutional Basic Laws enacted in 1992. A detailed policy analysis of the sanctions against recalcitrant spouses in Rabbinical courts in Israel—in light of the principles of Jewish and constitutional law in the country—has not yet been undertaken. The aim of this essay is therefore to present the appropriate formula pertaining to the imposition of sanctions against recalcitrant spouses given the principles of Jewish and constitutional law. The formula is presented in light of constitutional law in Israel. However, it is also applicable in other countries with similar constitutional legislation, such as Canada, where legislation sometimes allows for the civil enforcement of Jewish divorce.


1993 ◽  
Vol 27 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 84-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mordechai Kremnitzer

The enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom marks the beginning of a new era in Israeli law. This is a fitting opportunity to sketch an initial outline for the relationship between the constitution and the substantive criminal law, and the effect of constitutional principles on penal law. The truth be told, the constitutional principles already existed prior to the enactment of the Basic Law. And if, for example, we examine Prof. Feller's approach to criminal law, we cannot but be impressed by the highly developed constitutional element. Nevertheless, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom does provide an excellent excuse for addressing the subject. Moreover, its enactment paves the way for certain interpretive changes in Israeli penal law, and because it allows for judicial review of the legislature of the future, some clarification is called for as to the limits of legislative power in the field of criminal law in light of fundamental constitutional principles.Basic to constitutional law and criminal law is a shared image of human beings. It is a conception of human beings as “morally” autonomous, with the basic faculty to understand reality and distinguish right from wrong, able to contribute to developing social norms and to understand and internalize them, competent to decide how to act and capable of realizing that decision.


2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 416-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Möllers

The Parliamentary Council, the constitutional assembly for the German Basic Law, split over the question whether the guarantee of human dignity should be understood as the result of a democratic decision or as the incorporation of a pre-existing universal principle of Christian origin. The subsequent constitutional practice was dominated by a moral understanding of the norm that stressed the contradiction between democracy and human dignity. This Article rejects this interpretation and attempts to show, using the exemplary German case, that a democracy-oriented interpretation of human dignity is not necessarily less effective than a moralized understanding.


Human Dignity ◽  
2015 ◽  
pp. 243-279
Author(s):  
Aharon Barak ◽  
Daniel Kayros

1996 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kretzmer

In 1992 the Israeli Knesset enacted the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom. These basic laws, as chapters in Israel's emerging formal Constitution, have opened the way for judicial review of parliamentary legislation that violates human rights. Opposition from some political quarters prevented inclusion in the basic laws of some rights protected under modern constitutions and human rights treaties. However, the rights protected include ‘human dignity’, a term that can be broadened by judicial interpretation so as to include violations of rights not specifically mentioned in the basic laws. The basic laws lay down a balancing test for deciding whether restrictions on protected rights are legitimate. All restrictions must be prescribed by a law that befits Israel as a Jewish and democratic State, that was enacted for a worthy purpose and that meets the proportionality test.


2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 199-228
Author(s):  
Thomas Weigend ◽  
Khalid Ghanayim

German constitutional law proclaims to grant human dignity “absolute” protection, whereas Israeli law permits a weighing of human dignity against other important interests. In spite of this difference in principle, German and Israeli law arrive at remarkably similar results with respect to the regulation of “dignity-sensitive” areas of criminal procedure, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, the search of the body and the home of suspects, and secret surveillance of private communications. With regard to privileged conversations, Israeli law provides for even stronger safeguards against state intrusion than German law. The protection against forced self-incrimination, by contrast, goes further under German law. In order to optimize the protection of human dignity in the criminal process, the authors suggest a strict distinction between measures designed to investigate past offenses and those aimed at preventing crime.


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