The Potential of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights for the Development of the Rule of Law Indicators

Author(s):  
Martin Scheinin
2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 552-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Safjan

In some countries of central Europe the rule of law is directly threatened by a new type of legislation based on the zeal of the political majority to establish a completely different political system than the one that was built after the collapse of the communist system. From that perspective, there is little place for the principle of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary is threatened. This contribution discusses the multilevel dimension of the rule of law principle in the EU, issues in the context of the disrespect for the rule of law as a case of systemic deficiencies, followed by a brief discussion of the Copenhagen accession criteria. The article concludes that the rule of law principle as recognised under EU law is by no means of a merely symbolic nature, and that domestic legislation abolishing key safeguards of the rule of law can be scrutinized not only under the EU Charter of fundamental rights, where applicable, but also under the TEU. Without the solidarity of all Europeans, however, the preservation of our basic values and the future of the EU are in serious danger.


Author(s):  
Matthias Schmidt ◽  
Piotr Bogdanowicz

AbstractThis chapter builds on an assessment of infringement proceedings in the EU rule of law crisis that we previously published in the Common Market Law Review. We offer a close reading of two recent prominent infringement cases by the European Commission against Poland (cases C-619/18 and C-192/18). Noteworthy advancements in EU law made with them are in particular a clarification on the parallel use of Articles 7 TEU and 258 TFEU, the use of both interim relief and an expedited procedure prior to the judgment, and, as regards the merits, further substance for the functioning of Articles 19 TEU and 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights regarding the operationalisation of the rule of law in EU law. We offer a critical assessment of the Court’s findings and contextualise in light of two Commission communications on the rule of law published in 2019.


Author(s):  
Aida TORRES PÉREZ

Abstract This contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Bárd ◽  
Wouter van Ballegooij

This article discusses the relationship between judicial independence and intra-European Union (EU) cooperation in criminal matters based on the principle of mutual recognition. It focuses on the recent judgment by the Court of Justice of the EU in Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM. In our view, a lack of judicial independence needs to be addressed primarily as a rule of law problem. This implies that executing judicial authorities should freeze judicial cooperation in the event should doubts arise as to respect for the rule of law in the issuing Member State. Such a measure should stay in place until the matter is resolved in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 7 TEU or a permanent mechanism for monitoring and addressing Member State compliance with democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. The Court, however, constructed the case as a possible violation of the right to a fair trial, the essence of which includes the requirement that tribunals are independent and impartial. This latter aspect could be seen as a positive step forward in the sense that the judicial test developed in the Aranyosi case now includes rule of law considerations with regard to judicial independence. However, the practical hurdles imposed by the Court on the defence in terms of proving such violations and on judicial authorities to accept them in individual cases might amount to two steps back in upholding the rule of law within the EU.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivana Damjanovic ◽  
Nicolas de Sadeleer

In Opinion 1/17 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that the new Investment Court System (ICS) in the Canada–EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is compatible with the EU constitutional framework. This article examines the CJEU’s analysis of the ICS in its Opinion through the prism of EU values and objectives. Given the judicial nature of the ICS, the article unfolds around the concept of the rule of law. The scope and the content of this core EU value are considered under both EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In particular, the ICS is analysed in light of the two core rule-of-law requirements: equal treatment and the independence of courts, enshrined in Articles 20 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). Importantly, in Opinion 1/17 the CJEU for the first time applied Article 47 CFR to a court outside the EU judicial system. While the CJEU ruled that the ICS complies with the CFR rule-of-law criteria, this article argues that it nevertheless falls short of the rule-of-law standards required for judicial bodies under EU law. The article demonstrates that the CJEU prioritises free and fair trade as the CETA’s core objective, rather than the rule of law, and endorses the ICS as the conditio sine qua non of guaranteeing such trade. The Court’s findings have wider consequences for the rule of law in international law as the EU continues to pursue the establishment of a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC).


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (10) ◽  
pp. 1959-1979 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Dawson ◽  
Elise Muir

According to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, the European Union is a political and economic union founded on a respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law, referred to hereafter as EU fundamental values. The central place of this commitment in the EU Treaties suggests a founding assumption: That the EU is a Union of states who themselves see human rights and the rule of law as irrevocable parts of their political and legal order. Reminiscent of the entry of Jorg Haider's far-right Freedom Party into the Austrian government in 2000, the events of 2012 have done much to shake that assumption; questioning both how interwoven the rule of law tradition is across the present-day EU, and the role the EU ought to play in policing potential violations of fundamental rights carried out via the constitutional frameworks of its Member States. Much attention in this field, much like the focus of this paper, has been placed on events in one state in particular: Hungary.


European View ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-104
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Margaritis

The rule of law is one of the founding values of the EU, as indicated in Article 2 TEU. This provision recognises that the rule of law is a core value, inherent to liberal democracy, and one which characterised the Union and its member states long before the formal establishment of the EU by the Maastricht Treaty. However, several member states, most notably Poland and Hungary, seem to have placed this value in jeopardy, leading EU institutions to disagree on how to combat this problem and its political consequences. The aim of this article is to propose a solution that involves a rather neglected, yet certainly competent actor, the Fundamental Rights Agency. The outcome would be twofold: on the one hand, the rule of law would be vitally strengthened; on the other, the role of the Agency would be fortified in line with its scope.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 610-634 ◽  
Author(s):  
Filipe Brito BASTOS ◽  
Anniek DE RUIJTER

In this article, we ask what the impact is of the role of the EU administration in responding to emergencies in terms of (changes to) the rule of law. A response to an emergency in some cases creates exceptions to rule of law guarantees that bind the authorities to procedural rules and fundamental rights. These exceptions can become more permanent and even change the constitutional order of the EU. We articulate the legal framework for health emergencies, and discuss how the EU court has interpreted and developed this framework in two key decisions. We then ask whether this framework offers adequate safeguards for upholding the rule of law in cases of major health emergencies. We conclude that public health emergencies can bend and even break rule of law requirements for the EU administration, and advocate for more legal guidance on proportionality, which may offer better safeguards suited for protecting the rights of affected parties.


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