Immoderate greatness: Is great power restraint a practical grand strategy?

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tudor Onea
Keyword(s):  
Fifteenth Century ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Great Power ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Victorian Britain ◽  
Scaling Down ◽  
Splendid Isolation ◽  
Self Defence

AbstractThe article examines when and how often great powers are likely to follow a grand strategy of restraint and whether there is any evidence that they have ever done so. The question has considerable implications for the ongoing US grand strategy debate. Restraint refers to the practice of self-discipline in the use of force for self-defence or for addressing massive power imbalances; and in extending security commitments to foreign political actors. The first part of the article examines statistics in the last two hundred years on great power involvement in wars and disputes as well as on their commitments to alliances and dependencies. The second part considers whether two seeming cases of the dominant power scaling down its international involvement – Ming China withdrawal from naval mastery in the fifteenth century and Victorian Britain splendid isolation – represent instances of genuine restraint.

The Grand Strategies of Small States

2021 ◽  
pp. 489-505
Author(s):  
Anders Wivel
Keyword(s):  
Political Culture ◽  
National Security ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Great Power ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
Small States ◽  
Small State ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
Grand Strategies

This article discusses the nature, opportunities and limitations of small state grand strategy. It identifies the similarities and differences between the grand strategies of small states and great powers and unpacks the nature of traditional defensive small state grand strategies hiding and shelter-seeking as well as more recent offensive, influence-seeking small state grand strategies under the heading of smart state strategy. The article argues that while small state grand strategy remains tied to national security and is formulated in the shadow of great power interests, a changing security environment creates both the need and opportunity for small states to use their weakness instrumentally for maximizing interests. The likelihood of success depends on a pragmatic political culture and the willingness and ability to prioritize goals and means to utilize their nonthreatening small state status in “smart” or “entrepreneurial” policies.

Alternatives to Grand Strategy

2021 ◽  
pp. 619-636
Author(s):  
Peter Dombrowski
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Great Power ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Potential Conflict ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Grand Strategies

The other contributions in this volume take seriously the proposition that having a universal grand strategy is essential for a great power. This chapter considers three alternative propositions: (1) that in many cases grand strategy in a classic sense is not achievable given bureaucratic and political impediments, (2) that all great powers do not require a grand strategy, and, (3) that under some circumstances, the great power can thrive by pursuing calibrated grand strategies depending on both region and threats. The first proposition will build upon the work of scholars (Jervis 1998; Metz 1997) who have argued that the United States and other countries often “muddle through” both strategic formulation and implementation. The second considers arguments about the process of developing grand strategies, such as those advanced by Ionut Popescu (2017) who advocate focusing on “emergent strategies” as understood by scholars studying business corporations. The final proposal builds upon my own research (Reich and Dombrowski 2018) that argues that it is impossible to implement one coherent grand strategy: there are six variants and the United States has inevitably pursued many if not all of them simultaneously in the post–Cold War era. Inverting top-down formulations, the choice of any one strategy in a theater of (potential) conflict is contingent upon the nature of the threat, the actors, and the potential conflicts as interpreted by senior political and military leaders, and the bureaucratic environment in which they operate. In the end, this chapter offers both conceptual and substantive challenges to traditional understandings of grand strategy.

Making Geoeconomics an IR Research Program

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dong Jung Kim
Keyword(s):  
Research Program ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Great Power ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
Public Attention ◽  
Parsimonious Explanation ◽  
Conceptual Clarity ◽  
The One ◽  
New Research

Abstract In contrast to growing public attention to geoeconomics as the new mode of conducting great power competition, the IR discipline has not actively engaged in conceptual and theoretical analysis from the geoeconomic viewpoint. This article examines issues that geoeconomics needs to solve to become a new theoretical framework in the positivist “American” IR scholarship that dominates research on great power competition. On the one hand, the concept of geoeconomics needs to be redefined and account for a phenomenon that is not already covered in extant IR scholarship. Thus, geoeconomics should be considered as a form of grand strategy and defined as the use of economic instruments to advance mid- to long-term strategic interests in a geographical region of the world. On the other hand, geoeconomics in positivist IR should take into account international economic structure and domestic politics in developing a parsimonious explanation for the conditions to employ geoeconomic grand strategy. In this process, the theorist needs to make an analytical choice to concentrate on certain factors and mechanisms to assure theoretical parsimony. This article concludes that addressing the issues of conceptual clarity and parsimonious theorization would potentially allow geoeconomics to become a new research program in positivist IR.

Population Aging and Grand Strategy

2021 ◽  
pp. 720-736
Author(s):  
Mark L. Haas
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Life ◽  
Population Aging ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
Perceived Threat ◽  
Demographic Trend ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
Grand Strategies ◽  
A Share

This chapter examines the effects of population aging on states’ grand strategies. Due to major reductions in fertility levels and significant increases in life expectancies over the course of the last century, a majority of countries are growing older, many at fantastic rates and extent. The number of seniors, both absolutely and as a share of states’ overall population, is reaching unprecedented levels. This worldwide demographic trend is likely to affect all dimensions of states’ grand strategies, including in the great powers, which are among the world’s oldest countries. Population aging is likely to reduce states’ military capabilities, push leaders to adopt more isolationist and peaceful foreign policies, reshape states’ core international interests to place greater emphasis on the advancement of citizens’ quality of life and the protection of particular ethnocultural identities, and increase the perceived threat posed by immigration and multicultural ideologies.

Use of Armed Force against Suspected Foreign Submarines in the Swedish Internal Waters and Territorial Sea

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-599
Author(s):  
Said Mahmoudi
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Present Article ◽  
National Level ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Armed Force ◽  
National Legislation ◽  
Legal Arguments ◽  
Actual Response ◽  
Self Defence

Abstract Sweden’s territorial sea and internal waters have experienced regular intrusions by submerged foreign submarines since the early 1950s. The response of the country to such intrusions is generally well-documented and mainly public. The present article offers an overview of the development of the relevant national legislation, the actual response of the naval forces, and the legal arguments invoked at national level to justify or dismiss use of force in self-defence or under another title. The article discusses the relevance of the immunity that submarines normally enjoy under international law and Sweden’s human-rights obligations, two issues that have been at the centre of the legal discourse. Particular attention is paid to developments since 2014 when a new round of “submarine hunts” started and led to the adoption of new measures both revising the existing laws and strengthening the defence forces.

United Nations Peace Operations: Reconsidering the Principles, Reforming the Practice

2016 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 16-26
Author(s):  
A. Nikitin
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Republic Of Congo ◽  
New Technology ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Peace Operations ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Practical Guidelines ◽  
National Coalition ◽  
Peace Enforcement ◽  
High Level ◽  
Self Defence

The article describes and debates main points and recommendations of the Report-2015 of the Independent High Level Group on the UN Peace Operations. The author analyses doctrinal innovations and practical guidelines suggested by the Group and debates consequences of the recommended “politicizing” of the UN operations (assuring the leading role for the UN in any political peace process supported by UN peacekeepers, and avoiding operations where the UN role is limited to passive disengagement of conflict sides). Necessity for and limits of reconsidering traditional principles of peacekeeping, such as impartiality, consent of conflict parties, and use of force for self-defence are questioned. Trends in UN operations are compared with trends in operations related to conflicts in the Post-Soviet space (South Ossetia/Georgia, Abkhazia/Georgia, Tajikistan, Transnistria/Moldova, etc.). The author advocates timeliness for an extended interpretation of the “defence of the mandate” formula instead of the classical “self-defence of the contingent”. It is suggested to practically erase the dividing line between operations of the “peacekeeping” type under the UN DPKO, and “political missions” under the UN Political Department. The arsenal of the UN instruments for conflict resolution must be widened from non-intrusive observation missions, conflict prevention and mediation, through support of ceasefire agreements and implementation of peace accords, down to coercive peace enforcement, offensive elements, and UN Charter Chapter VII-based collective operations against aggressive regimes and states. Poorly defined functions and insufficiently clarified use of force limits for the SC-mandated “UN Intervention Brigade” in Democratic Republic of Congo lead to unnecessary involvement of the UN into coercive actions. The experience of the UN “infrastructural hubs” establishing, like the one in Entebbe (Uganda) used for supplying eight African UN operations, is described. New technology for peacekeeping, like the use of unpiloted flying drones, opens new opportunities, but creates legal and practical problems. A distinction of functions between “blue helmets” (specially trained multinational UN contingents) and “green helmets” (regular national armies used by states in foreign conflicts) is recommended, including avoidance of counter-terrorism tasks and strong coercive tasks for the UN peacekeepers. Parallel and interfaced “partnerships” between the limited UN operations and more forceful national/coalition operations in the same areas are suggested instead.

An analysis of stagnation in multilateral law-making – and why the law of the sea has transcended the stagnation trend

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Andreas Motzfeldt Kravik
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Current Trend ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Great Power ◽  
Law Of The Sea ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Making ◽  
Multilateral Treaties

Abstract The article explores the current stagnation in multilateral law-making based on an analysis of recent treaty attempts across various subfields of international law. It further examines why the law of the sea has continued to evolve despite this trend. The article demonstrates that states still regularly seek multilateral treaties to address new challenges. While there is some evidence of general treaty saturation, it is the current inability of traditional great powers to negotiate new binding norms which is the most constraining factor on multilateral law-making. This in turn is related to deeper geopolitical shifts by which traditional great powers, notably the United States and its allies, have seen their relative influence decline. Until the current great power competition ends or settles into a new mode of international co-operation, new multilateral treaties with actual regulatory effect will rarely emerge. The law of the sea has avoided the current trend of stagnation for primarily three reasons (i) a global commitment to the basic tenets of the law of the sea; (ii) a legal framework that affords rights and obligations somewhat evenly disbursed, allowing less powerful states to use their collective leverage to advance multilateral negotiations, despite intermittent great power opposition; and (iii) the avoidance of entrenched multilateral forums where decisions are reached by consensus only.

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