Ruling but not Governing: Tutelary Regimes and the Case of Myanmar

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Marco Bünte
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Civil Liberties ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
The Political ◽  
Electoral Regime ◽  
The Government ◽  
High Degree ◽  
The Military

Abstract The article sheds light on tutelary regimes, which have so far been left out in the discussion of contemporary authoritarian regimes. It uses a configurative approach to conceptualize tutelary regimes according to the three dimensions of tutelary interference, electoral competitiveness and civil liberties. Tutelary interference is conceived of as a spectrum of possible and not mutually exclusive roles which tutelary powers perform – depending on their position in the political system. Empirically, the article uses a case study of Myanmar's tutelary regime to illustrate how the armed forces’ institutionalized powers and prerogatives have helped the country evade substantial democracy. The results show a high degree of regime heterogeneity, with a functioning electoral regime in place but substantial weaknesses in civil liberties. Both are (partly) rooted in the tutelary interference of the military, which is pervasive. The military's position straitjackets the government; the military vetoes certain policies and structural reforms and guards the political system and its prerogatives from a position of strength. Politicians have so far not come up with successful strategies to bring the military under civil control.

scholarly journals The anniversary of the military coup attempt in Turkey, July 15–16, 2016. The evolution of a political system

2017 ◽  
pp. 63-68
Author(s):  
Y. S. Kudryashova
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Authoritarian Regime ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Ruling Party ◽  
Coup Attempt

During the government of AK Party army leaders underprivileged to act as an exclusive guarantor preserving a secular regime in the country. The political balance between Secular and Islamite elites was essentially removed after Erdogan was elected Turkish President. Consistently toughening authoritarian regime of a ruling party deeply accounts for a military coup attempt and earlier periodically occurred disturbance especially among the young. The methods of a coup showed the profundity of a split and the lack of cohesion in Turkish armed forces. Erdogan made the best use of a coup attempt’s opportunities to concentrate all power in his hands and to consolidate a present regime. The mass support of the population during a coup attempt ensured opportunities for a fundamental reorganization of a political system. Revamped Constitution at most increases political powers of the President.

Shintō Shrines and Secularism in Modern Japan, 1890–1945

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 128-156
Author(s):  
Karli Shimizu
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Political System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Nation State ◽  
The West ◽  
Late Eighteenth Century ◽  
Secular Institution ◽  
The Government ◽  
Academic Discourses

From the late eighteenth century to WWII, shrine Shintō came to be seen as a secular institution by the government, academics, and activists in Japan (Isomae 2014; Josephson 2012, Maxey 2014). However, research thus far has largely focused on the political and academic discourses surrounding the development of this idea. This article contributes to this discussion by examining how a prominent modern Shintō shrine, Kashihara Jingū founded in 1890, was conceived of and treated as secular. It also explores how Kashihara Jingū communicated an alternate sense of space and time in line with a new Japanese secularity. This Shintō-based secularity, which located shrines as public, historical, and modern, was formulated in antagonism to the West and had an influence that extended across the Japanese sphere. The shrine also serves as a case study of how the modern political system of secularism functioned in a non-western nation-state.

Lebanon: A Military in Politics in a Divided Society

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oren Barak
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The State ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Role ◽  
Divided Society ◽  
The Military

Since Lebanon’s independence in the mid-1940s, its military—the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)—has played a pivotal role in the country’s politics. The political role of the LAF in Lebanon might seem surprising since the Lebanese state did not militarize, and its political leaders have continuously managed to keep their military relatively weak and small. Indeed, in this respect Lebanon has been markedly different from its close neighbors (Syria and Israel), but also from several other Middle Eastern states (especially Egypt and Iraq), where the military, which was large and powerful, was continuously involved in politics. Additionally, both Lebanon and the LAF have persistently striven to distance themselves from regional conflicts since 1949, particularly in relation to the Palestinian issue, albeit not always successfully. Still, and despite these ostensibly unfavorable factors for the military’s involvement in politics in Lebanon, the LAF has played an important political role in the state since its independence. This role, which has been marked by elements of continuity and change over the years, included mediation and arbitration between rival political factions (in 1945–1958, 2008, 2011, and 2019); attempts to dominate the political system (in 1958–1970 and 1988–1990); intervention in the Lebanese civil war (in 1975–1976 and 1982–1984); attempts to regain its balancing role in politics (in 1979–1982 and 1984–1988); and facilitating the state’s postwar reconstruction (since 1991). The political role of the military in Lebanon can be explained by several factors. First, the weakness of Lebanon’s political system and its inability to resolve crises between its members. Second, Lebanon’s divided society and its members’ general distrust towards its civilian politicians. Third, the basic characteristics of Lebanon’s military, which, in most periods, enjoyed broad public support that cuts across the lines of community, region, and family, and found appeal among domestic and external audiences, which, in their turn, acquiesced to its political role in the state.

Setbacks to Political Institutionalisation by Praetorianism in Africa

1988 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 403-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Opoku Agyeman
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Ruling Class ◽  
Managerial Leadership ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Constitutional Changes

Praetorianism has been authoritatively defined as a situation in which ‘the military class of a given society exercises independent political power within it by virtue of an actual or threatened use of military force’.1 A praetorian state, by elaboration, is one in which the military tends to intervene and potentially could dominate the political system. The political processes of this state favor the development of the military as the core group and the growth of its expectations as a ruling class; its political leadership (as distinguished from bureaucratic, administrative and managerial leadership) is chiefly recruited from the military, or from groups sympathetic, or at least not antagonistic, to the military. Constitutional changes are effected and sustained by the militaty, and the army frequently intervenes in the government.2

On Horseback for How Much Longer?

1994 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 637-651
Author(s):  
Roger Williams
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Force ◽  
Tacit Assumption ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Different Levels

It Was In 1962 In The Man on horseback, A Book which has long since become a classic, that S. E. Finer drew attention to a class of country in which the government was repeatedly subject to the interference of its armed forces: the military, he noted ‘as an independent political force, constitutes a distinct and peculiar political phenomenon’. Beginning from the political strengths and weaknesses of the military, his analysis addressed the disposition of the military to intervene in politics and its opportunities for doing so, and he brought out the different forms such intervention could take and the different levels to which it could be pressed. In effect, he also turned on its head a prevailing if tacit assumption. Given their ‘vastly superior organization’ and their arms, it seemed to him that ‘Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we Ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise’.

scholarly journals Tata Kelola Olah Raga dengan Figur Politik dari Militer: Studi Kasus Pemerintah Indonesia dalam Konteks Sepak Bola

ARISTO ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 225
Author(s):  
Andika Sanjaya ◽  
Hardi Alunaza SD ◽  
Achmad Bayu Chandra Buwono ◽  
Nining Nadya Rukmana Sari
Keyword(s):  
Soft Power ◽  
Political Conflict ◽  
The Political ◽  
Case Study Method ◽  
Political Ambition ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Political Figure

Indonesian football turns to be a “colosseum” of yearly political conflict among political “gladiators”. The government aware that according to the history, there is a closeness between football and politics. The government also aware that football can be used as a soft power to stay existed on the international stage. The problem is, the international football federation prohibit the intervention of the government and give a punishment in the shape of suspension for the violators. This paper used a case study method to explain the phenomenon. The government choose using a political figure to indirectly resolute the conflict and govern the football. The military-political figure tends to have suitable characteristics to help the government. However, the political figure has a personal political ambition. It is reasonable in Indonesia.

Between Scylla and Charybdis

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozan O. Varol
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Transition Process ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Democratic Development ◽  
The Military ◽  
Better Than

Following most democratic coups, the military manages to secure exit benefits, which, depending on their degree, may foster various dysfunctions in the political system and undermine long-term democratic development. The dose determines the toxicity. A democratic regime can mature even with prerogatives for the military, as long as those prerogatives don’t interfere with democratic notions of civilian control of the armed forces. Although these prerogatives are often undesirable from civilians’ perspective, any attempts by civilians to immediately march the military back to the barracks empty-handed can prompt a backlash from the military leaders. They may dig in, rather than give in, and derail the transition process. And from civilians’ perspective, the military’s exit with benefits is often better than no exit at all.

Civil-Military Relations in Developing Countries

1989 ◽  
Vol 45 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 154-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veena Kukreja
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Political System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Other ◽  
Future Research ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The World ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Students of civil-military relations, particularly those in the developing countries, admit having to work on myopic assumptions, meagre data, sloppy conceptualization and inelegant explanations. The relative newness of this area of studies could be one reason for this. The study of civil-military relations in the narrow sense referring mainly to military coups and interventions, has attained importance after World War II. But the study of civil-military relations in the broader perspective of multiplicity of relationships between military men, institutions and interests, on the one hand, and diverse and often conflicting non-military organizations and political personages and interests on the other, has begun to draw academic interest only in the last two decades or so. In the twentieth century, the armed forces, being an universal and integral part of a nation's political system, no longer remain completely aloof from politics in any nation. If politics is concerned, in David Easton's celebrated words, with the authoritative allocation of values and power within a society, the military as a vital institution in the polity can hardly be wished out of participatory bounds, at least for legitimate influence as an institutional interest group with a stake in the political decision-making. The varying roles the military may play in politics range from minimal legitimate influence by means of recognized channels inherent in their position and responsibilities within the political system to the other extreme of total displacement of the civilian government in the forms of illegitimate overt military intervention in politics. This paper seeks to attempt an overview of the existing scholarship on civil-military relations; second, it examines civil-military relations in the world with special reference to major political systems of the world; third, it surveys the literature on civil-military relations in general, and finally, it attempts to develop a general, complex, and hopefully fruitful causal model for analyzing the dynamics of civil-military relations; exploring implications for future research on civil-military relations.

scholarly journals Tata Kelola Olah Raga dengan Figur Politik dari Militer: Studi Kasus Pemerintah Indonesia dalam Konteks Sepak Bola

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jurnal ARISTO ◽  
Andika Sanjaya ◽  
Hardi Alunaza ◽  
Achmad Bayu Chandra Buwono ◽  
Nining Nadya Rukmana Sari
Keyword(s):  
Soft Power ◽  
Political Conflict ◽  
The Political ◽  
Case Study Method ◽  
Political Ambition ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Political Figure

Indonesian football turns to be a “colosseum” of yearly political conflict among political “gladiators”. The government aware that according to the history, there is a closeness between football and politics. The government also aware that football can be used as a soft power to stay existed on the international stage. The problem is, the international football federation prohibit the intervention of the government and give a punishment in the shape of suspension for the violators. This paper used a case study method to explain the phenomenon. The government choose using a political figure to indirectly resolute the conflict and govern the football. The military-political figure tends to have suitable characteristics to help the government. However, the political figure has a personal political ambition. It is reasonable in Indonesia.

Democratiation in Brazil and Argentina: Some Reflections

1984 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-276
Author(s):  
George Philip
Keyword(s):  
South America ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Political System ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
The Political ◽  
Self Confidence ◽  
History Of ◽  
High Degree ◽  
The Military ◽  
Second World

THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF SOUTH AMERICA COULD ALMOST be written in terms of military coups and returns to barracks. In Argentina, to take only the period since the Second world War, the military has relinquished power in 1946,1958, 1963, 1973 and 1983 (launching coups in 1955,1962,1966 and 1976). The military in Brazil, although less hyperactive than in Argentina, has relinquished power to civilians in 1945, 1955 and, incompletely so far, since 1982, while taking over government in 1954 and 1964. It seems therefore – rather paradoxically for some earlier writers on comparative politics (as was noted in the introduction) – that it is possible to speak of a military-civilian political system operating in much of South America. This features periods of military as well as civilian rule and operates largely because of a high degree of military self-confidence and the willingness of many civilians to contemplate military rule, even over a long period, with equanimity. A mere military coup, or return to barracks, need not imply a change in the political system itself. This point is not tautologous; the politica system may undergo genuine change, but only if civilian attitudes to the military (and willingness to accept military intervention) and military attitudes to civilian politics chan e fundamentally. Is there any sign that this has happened or is about to happen in the cases of Brazil and Argentina?

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