Corporal punishment of children: a caning for the united kingdom

1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-293
Author(s):  
Andrew Bainham

THE ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in A v. United Kingdom (Human Rights: Punishment of Child) [1998] 2 F.L.R. 959 that to beat repeatedly a nine-year-old boy with a garden cane, leaving linear bruises on his thighs and buttocks which remained for up to one week, amounted to “torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” contrary to Article 3 of the Convention will occasion little suprise. What will have come as unwelcome news to some is the unanimous decision of the Court that the Government of the United Kingdom could itself be held liable for failing to take measures which could have prevented these beatings by the child's stepfather.

Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Republic of Ireland v United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25, European Court of Human Rights. This case concerned whether interrogation techniques employed by the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland between 1971 and 1975 amounted to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. More generally, the case note considers the differences between absolute, limited, and qualified rights. The case predates the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


Author(s):  
Anne Stanesby

<p>Keenan v The United Kingdom. TLR 3/4/01<br />European Court of Human Rights. Application no. 27229/95<br />(Judgement 3 April 2001).</p>


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Ireland v United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25, European Court of Human Rights. This case concerned whether interrogation techniques employed by the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland between 1971 and 1975 amounted to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. More generally, the case note considers the differences between absolute, limited, and qualified rights. The case predates the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


Author(s):  
Dolores Morondo Taramundi

This chapter analyses arguments regarding conflicts of rights in the field of antidiscrimination law, which is a troublesome and less studied area of the growing literature on conflicts of rights. Through discussion of Ladele and McFarlane v. The United Kingdom, a case before the European Court of Human Rights, the chapter examines how the construction of this kind of controversy in terms of ‘competing rights’ or ‘conflicts of rights’ seems to produce paradoxical results. Assessment of these apparent difficulties leads the discussion in two different directions. On the one hand, some troubles come to light regarding the use of the conflict of rights frame itself in the field of antidiscrimination law, particularly in relation to the main technique (‘balancing of rights’) to solve them. On the other hand, some serious consequences of the conflict of rights frame on the development of the antidiscrimination theory of the ECtHR are unearthed.


Author(s):  
John Vorhaus

Under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, degrading treatment and punishment is absolutely prohibited. This paper examines the nature of and wrong inherent in treatment and punishment of this kind. Cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) as amounting to degrading treatment and punishment under Article 3 include instances of interrogation, conditions of confinement, corporal punishment, strip searches, and a failure to provide adequate health care. The Court acknowledges the degradation inherent in imprisonment generally, and does not consider this to be in violation of Article 3, but it also identifies a threshold at which degradation is so severe as to render impermissible punishments that cross this threshold. I offer an account of the Court’s conception of impermissible degradation as a symbolic dignitary harm. The victims are treated as inferior, as if they do not possess the status owed to human beings, neither treated with dignity nor given the respect owed to dignity. Degradation is a relational concept: the victim is brought down in the eyes of others following treatment motivated by the intention to degrade, or treatment which has a degrading effect. This, so I will argue, is the best account of the concept of degradation as deployed by the Court when determining punishments as in violation of Article 3.


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