National Judges and Judges Ad Hoc of the International Court of Justice

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 889-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Schwebel

When the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice was drafted by an Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920, a paramount question was, should a judge of the nationality of a State party to the case sit?The sensitivity of the issue was encapsulated by a report of a committee of the Court in 1927 on the occasion of a revision of the Rules of Court. It observed that: “In the attempt to establish international courts of justice, the fundamental problem always has been, and probably always will be, that of the representation of the litigants in the constitution of the tribunal. Of all influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more pervasive, or more subtle, than the tie of allegiance that binds them to the land of their homes and kindred and to the great sources of the honours and preferments for which they are so ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives. This fact, known to all the world, the [Court's] Statute frankly recognises and deals with.”1

2016 ◽  
Vol 85 (4) ◽  
pp. 334-347
Author(s):  
Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen

This article was presented at the conference “A Nordic Approach to International Law?” held in Oslo in August 2015 as a part of a panel on “Nordic Judges of International Courts”. It studies the Nordic judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice and its successor the International Court of Justice with a view to assessing whether common traits in their voting practice exist that might support the idea of ‘a Nordic approach to international law’. In light of the relatively limited available material, however, the article has no grander aspiration than to describe the engagement of Nordic judges with the World Court and to provide examples of their respective approaches to treaty interpretation.


Author(s):  
Andrew Yu. Klyuchnikov

The rules on the competence of international courts determine the nature of the cases they resolve and the conditions for their admission to proceedings. The possibility composition of the court considers each case individually following the principle of jurisdiction to decide the jurisdiction due to the lack of a clear regulatory framework. Each international court of justice, relying on the international law, is solely competent to resolve doubts as to its own jurisdiction. This study aims to identify the approach of courts to solving jurisdictional problems in practice. The material for the study includes the cases of international courts, doctrinal comments, and legal positions of prominent researchers of international justice. The author describes the basic interpretative framework procedure, restraint, activism in the justification, and the lack of personal jurisdiction. Thus, if the international court of justice has no confidence in the existence of competence on the subject of the dispute, it will not take measures to justify it. The brevity of the position on the issue will be due to interpretative restraint. Activism arises when the international court of justice seeks to achieve a procedural result, substantiate the rationality of the result of interpretation or the impossibility of achieving it. Science has not resolved the issue of factors that may affect the limits of interpretation by international courts of their own competence.


2021 ◽  
pp. 241-263
Author(s):  
Paula Wojcikiewicz Almeida

By developing international law, international courts – ‘intermediate Global Public Goods (GPG)’ – can also contribute to the protection and promotion of final GPG. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in particular, is capable of promoting GPG by adjudicating inter-state claims. However, one of the main obstacles faced by the World Court relates to the existing tension between the bilateral nature of its own proceedings and the multilateral nature of the conflicting substantive law. Considering that procedure may guide and shape the application of substantive law, it will be argued that it should itself be interpreted and developed in a manner to ensure community interests. This chapter argues that the Court should assume expanded procedural powers in order to ensure the effective application of substantive law whenever GPG are at issue. Most procedural rules can be adjusted and tailored for multiparty aspects with the aim of protecting community interests and enhancing the international court’s legitimacy.


Author(s):  
James Crawford ◽  
Tom Grant

This article explores what is commonly called the ‘World Court’. It examines the slow and steady growth of the global rule of law in detail, starting with the juridical experiment of the League of Nations: the Permanent Court of International Justice. It points out that the Court goes against the grain of contemporary international relations and the proliferation of actors because of Article 34 of its Statute.


1969 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 224-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Il Ro Suh

It has been assumed in international adjudication that each state in the litigation should be permitted to have a judge of its own nationality on the bench. This practice of employing national judges in international courts is deeply rooted in the history of arbitration and judicial settlement. Responding to a demand for it, the Committee of Jurists in 1920–1921 embodied the plan in Article 31 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. This article was transferred intact to the Statute of the present International Court of Justice in 1945. Whether judges of the nationality of the parties, either in arbitration tribunals or in courts of justice, can be counted upon to be as “independent” as the processes of justice require, and as Article 2 of the present Statute stipulates, is a question of some moment to present-day international justice. It has been suggested as an alternative that a judge on the International Court of the nationality of the litigant should abstain; thus a state with no judge of its nationality on the Court would not be at a disadvantage.


1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-862 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shabtai Rosenne

When the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht became a member of the International Court of Justice in February, 1955 (a position he was to fill effectively for barely five years, until the fall of 1959), he went to The Hague with some thirty years of devoted study and practice of international law behind him. As teacher and student of international law, as a most highly qualified publicist (in the words of Article 38(1) (d) of the Statute of the Court) of recognized universal authority, he had devoted himself both to the law in general and in particular to the problems of the judicial settlement of international disputes, whether by the Permanent Court of International Justice and its present-day successor, the International Court of Justice, or by ad hoc arbitration tribunals. Indeed, his writings as a whole display a rare preoccupation with the entire philosophy and the practical problems of the judicial settlement of international disputes, together with a deep understanding of its limitations and a satisfying freedom both from putting forward extravagant claims in its behalf and from purely theoretical speculations.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 96-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent-Joël Proulx

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has mostly emphasized substance over form and developed a pragmatic, flexible, objective, and fact-based analytical approach to jurisdiction. That is until a recent series of judgments veering towards jurisdictional formalism. However, to truly reflect its designation as the “World” Court, the UN's principal judicial organ must surely adjudicate some of the “big cases” with global security implications and involving important obligations erga omnes beyond strictly bilateral dynamics: the Marshall Islands cases were as good contenders as any for the Court to enhance its legitimacy capital.1 As a corollary, accepting this role might entail that the Court interpret its jurisdiction in a flexible and progressive manner, which had always been its mantra up until recently, so that the “big cases” have a chance of getting their foot in the door and being litigated.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 831-854 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Schwebel

The International Court of Justice formed its first Chamber for dealing with a particular case in 1982; its second, in 1985; and, in 1987, its third and fourth ad hoc Chambers. This article examines what appears to be an accelerating trend toward recourse to ad hoc Chambers in the light of the provisions of the Statute and Rules of the Court and of its pertinent practice to date. The discussion seeks to elucidate four principal questions: •What is the subject matter that such a Chamber may properly dispose of?•Must such a Chamber be representative of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world?•How many judges shall constitute an ad hoc Chamber?•Shall the parties to the case have a voice in determining the composition of the Chamber as well as in the number of judges constituting it? Finally, this article appraises the record and potential of recourse to Chambers for dealing with a particular case.


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