Trusteeship Council

1947 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 342-343
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
First Session

The last of the main organs of the United Nations to begin functioning, the Trusteeship Council met for its first session at Lake Success on March 26, 1947. Representatives were present from five powers administering trust territories (Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand and United Kingdom) and four non-administering states (China, Iraq, Mexico, and the United States); the USSR, although automatically a member of the Council by virtue of her permanent membership on the Security Council, did not designate a representative and took no part in the activities of the Council.

Security Council

1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-517
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Peace ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
Foreign Ministers

The question of the threat to Thailand was discussed by the Security Council at its 673d and 674th meetings. After again explaining the reasons for his government's belief that the condition of tension in the general region in which Thailand was located would, if continued, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, the Thai representative, Pote Sarasin, again requested that the Peace Observation Commission establish a sub-commission of from three to five members to dispatch observers to Thailand and to visit Thailand itself if it were deemed necessary. The Thai draft differed from earlier Thai proposals, however, in that the original mandate of the sub-commission applie only to the territory of Thailand; if the sub-commission felt that it could not adequately accomplish its mission without observation or visit in states contiguous to Thailand, the Peace Observation Commission or the Security Council could issue the necessary instructions. Representatives of New Zealand, Turkey, Brazil, China, the United Kingdom, the United States, Denmark, Colombia and France spoke in support of the Thai draft. They denied, as had been alleged by the Soviet representative (Tsarapkin) at an earlier meeting, that Council consideration or action on this question would be detrimental to the success of the negotiations between the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Chinese People's Republic, Soviet Union and other states in Geneva. While agreeing that it would be impropitious for the Council to consider directly the situation in Indochina as long as it was being discussed in Geneva, they argued that the question raised by Thailand was quite separate and that the Council had a duty to comply with the Thai request.

Trusteeship Council

1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-254
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
United Nations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Standing Committee ◽  
Rural Economic Development ◽  
The United Kingdom

The thirteenth session of the Trusteeship Council was held at United Nations headquarters from January 28 to March 25, 1954, with Leslie K. Munro (New Zealand) as president. After adopting an agenda of eighteen items, the Council appointed China, Haiti, New Zealand, and the United States as members of the Standing Committee on Administrative Unions, and China, France, Haiti, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States as members of the Committee on Rural Economic Development of the Trust Territories. The latter committee was not scheduled to meet during this session.

Course Corrections: The Obama Administration at the United Nations

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 335-349
Author(s):  
David Bosco
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Bush Administration ◽  
The United States ◽  
Obama Administration ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Most Significant Change ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Significant Change

Less has changed in US diplomacy at the United Nations than many observers expected when the Obama administration took office in January 2009. In the UN Security Council, the United States has pursued a generally steady course that in many respects builds on the accomplishments of the Bush administration. Unexpectedly, the Security Council’s pace of work diminished considerably during the first few years of the new administration. The most significant change is the atmospherics of US diplomacy, not its substance: the Obama administration has participated in processes that the Bush administration shunned and has toned down US criticism of the United Nations’ perceived shortcomings.

1986 UNAT Elections

1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 720-721
Author(s):  
T. M. F.
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Vice President ◽  
The United States ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Administrative Tribunal

The United Nations Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) has elected Herbert Reis of the United States, a former Counselor at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, as its Second Vice-President for the coming year. Mr. Reis has served on the tribunal for 5 years. Samar Sen of India and Arnold Kean of the United Kingdom were elected President and First Vice-President of the tribunal, respectively.

Voting in the Security Council and the PLO

1976 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 470-491 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Gross
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South Africa ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Member State ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Palestine Liberation Organization ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Right

The United States and some other members of the United Nations have been concerned in recent years about the substance of some resolutions of the General Assembly and the procedures by which they were adopted. Their concern was intensified by certain actions at the twenty-ninth session, when the Assembly sustained a ruling of its President with respect to the representation and participation of South Africa in that and future sessions, when it curbed the right of Israel to participate in the debate on the question of Palestine, when it accorded to the representative of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) a treatment usually reserved to the head of a member state, and when it declared by Resolution 3210 (XXIX) of October 14, 1974, “that the Palestinian people is the principal party to the question of Palestine” and invited the PLO “to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings.”

scholarly journals National Identity and New Zealand’s Actions on the United Nations Security Council: 1993-94 and 2015-16

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kate Breach
Keyword(s):  
National Identity ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
International Relations ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Political Elite ◽  
Material Interests ◽  
The United Nations

<p>To win its seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in both 1993-94 and 2015-16, New Zealand campaigned using the same prime pillar; its ability to act independently on the world’s prime authority for maintenance of international peace and security. With the substantial change in New Zealand’s international relationships between the two UNSC tenures, most particularly with the United States of America and China, many commentators have questioned whether New Zealand still acts independently in international affairs. Employing analytic eclecticism, this thesis applied a combined analytical framework to assess the drive behind New Zealand’s actions during both its 1993-94 and 2015-16 UNSC tenures, allowing both traditional international relations theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism and the constructivist lens of national identity to be combined for greater explanatory power for the state’s actions in the contemporary era of complex international interdependencies. This research determined that most of New Zealand’s actions aligned with pursuit of its interests, as a small state, as ensured through multilateralism under the lens of institutional neo-liberalism. However, a number of actions taken, and strong positions held, by New Zealand on the UNSC in both periods did not align with the state’s pursuit of material interests under traditional international relations theories. By first establishing the popularly internalised national identity characteristics (or content) during each UNSC tenure period, defined as residing in public opinion, this thesis argues that a ‘win-set’ of national identity content relative prioritisation during each period enabled, and arguably drove, New Zealand’s political elite to take actions or hold positions not aligned with those of powerful states on which the small country’s material interests depended. It is argued that New Zealand’s actions on the UNSC in 2015-16 reinforced the social construction of New Zealand’s internationally regarded national identity content as an independent advocate for the global good, which was strongly established during its 1993-94 tenure.</p>

scholarly journals Overcoming Opposition at the UNSC: Regional Multilateralism as a Form of Collective Pressure

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-281
Author(s):  
Stefano Recchia
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Iraq War ◽  
Democratic Republic ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Republic Of The Congo ◽  
The United Nations

Abstract Research suggests that military interveners often seek endorsements from regional international organizations (IOs), in addition to approval from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to reassure international and domestic audiences. Toward that end, interveners should seek the endorsement of continent-wide regional IOs with the broadest and most diverse membership, which are most likely to be independent. In practice, however, interveners often seek endorsements from subregional IOs with narrow membership and aggregate preferences similar to their own. This should weaken the reassurance/legitimation effect significantly. I argue that such narrower regional endorsements are sought not so much to reassure skeptical audiences, as to pressure reluctant UNSC members to approve the intervention by putting those members’ relations with regional partners at stake. To illustrate this argument and probe its plausibility, I reconstruct France's successful efforts to obtain UNSC approval for its interventions in Côte d'Ivoire (2002–2003) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003) at a time when the United States was hesitant to support France because of the two countries’ falling-out over the Iraq War. For evidence I rely on original interviews with senior French and US officials.

scholarly journals The personal is global political: The antifeminist backlash in the United Nations

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 702-714 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jelena Cupać ◽  
Irem Ebetürk
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Gender Ideology ◽  
The United States ◽  
Natural Family ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Arab States ◽  
League Of Arab States ◽  
Definition Of

Antifeminist mobilisation is growing in the United Nations. It is led by a coalition of certain post-Soviet, Catholic, and Islamic states; the United States; the Vatican; conservative nongovernmental organisations, occasionally joined by the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation, the League of Arab States, the UN Africa Group, and the G77. Uniting them is the aim of restoring the ‘natural family’ and opposing ‘gender ideology’. The group has become increasingly strategic, and its impact can already be seen in a number of UN fora, including the Security Council. By surveying feminist notions of backlash and comparing them to Alter and Zürn’s definition of ‘backlash politics’, the article gauges whether the group’s activities can be characterised as such politics. The conclusion is that they can, suggesting that we are looking at a group with the potential to alter not only the global course of women’s rights but also how politics is done within the UN.

Saving Darfur

2019 ◽  
pp. 95-113
Author(s):  
Marina E. Henke
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
African Union ◽  
Peacekeeping Operations ◽  
Building Process ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The United Nations

This chapter assesses how the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, formed one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations ever deployed to stop the bloodshed in Darfur. The operation took the name United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The United States initiated and orchestrated the most important political aspects that made the deployment of UNAMID possible. At the United Nations, the United States was intimately involved in the drafting and negotiation of UN resolutions pertaining to the Darfur issue and prodded various UN Security Council members to support the respective resolutions. Once UNAMID was approved by the UN Security Council, the United States was deeply involved in recruiting UNAMID participants. Some countries—such as Egypt, China, Canada, and Ethiopia—had a political stake in the Darfur conflict and thus volunteered forces to deploy to Darfur. Nevertheless, the large majority of countries did not join UNAMID on their own initiative. Rather, they were wooed into the coalition by the United States. U.S. officials thereby followed specific practices to recruit these troops. Many of these practices exploited diplomatic embeddedness: U.S. officials used preexisting ties to ascertain the deployment preferences of potential recruits and constructed issue linkages and side payments. The United States was assisted in the UNAMID coalition-building process by UN staff, most notably from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).

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