Over a Hundred Years of a National Legal System in Ghana

1987 ◽  
Vol 31 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 70-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel K. B. Asante

On 1976, Ghana celebrated the centenary of the establishment of its Supreme Court. But this was more than a centenary of a supreme court. It was in fact the celebration of a hundred years of a national legal system. During the past century, Ghana has operated a pluralistic legal system encompassing English and other Western juristic ideas and procedures on the one hand, and Ghana's own indigenous laws on the other. The burden of this paper is to undertake an appraisal of the efficacy of this legal heritage and to consider the challenge which this legacy poses. The emphasis is not so much on the historical or analytical description of the nation's legal heritage as on a functional review of the totality of Ghana's legal experience in the light of the prevailing social and economic conditions. More precisely, to what extent have the Ghanaian courts and legislative bodies succeeded in moulding both the received law and the indigenous customary law to respond to the pressing social and economic needs of the country? Is there in fact a peculiarly Ghanaian legal tradition?The first Supreme Court was established in 1853, but its jurisdiction was confined to the coastal settlements and it could not pretend to be a national institution. The modern Ghanaian legal system was inaugurated by the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876, which not only established a national judicial system but also prescribed the law and procedure to be applied in this court system.

Author(s):  
Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler

The Nepali legal tradition is a legal hybrid in many regards. Nepal was not colonised by a Western state, and the Hindu legal tradition therefore dominated all areas of law until the middle of the 20th century. Since the 1950s there has been a strong influence of Indian common law. It is probably for this reason that comparative classifications that include Nepal see the legal system as a mixture of common law and customary law. However, other mixtures mark the Nepali legal tradition. French law inspired the ruler in the 19th century, and that influence can still be found in the formal law. In addition, the plurality of Nepalese society made it necessary to provide space for different customary regimes to coexist with the formal Hindu law. When it comes to innovations within the legal system, including international law, the different ingredients interact.In family-related matters, the case-law of the Nepali Supreme Court illustrates the confrontation between international legal standards and the traditional rules. The Supreme Court has referred to the culturally conditioned discrimination against women and called for a thorough (political) analysis in order to eliminate discrimination without a radical change of culture. In the area of discrimination against homo- and transsexuals the Supreme Court took a more innovative approach. It remains to be seen, however, if such a change is effective beyond the courtroom.In the area of private financial compensation for wrongs, the formal (written) Nepali law does not have a general concept of tort. Compensation is generally integrated within the ambit of criminal law. Field research indicates that it would be possible to resort to existing customary principles of compensation rather than to the relatively complex common law of torts favoured by some Nepali scholars. However, this approach might not be without difficulty, as it might imply admitting the “superiority” of the customary practices of ethnic groups of lower standing in society.The example of Nepal shows that innovation in a hybrid system is often marked by the difficulty of – at least apparently – contradictory elements and layers of the legal system. There might be a tendency towards choosing the dominant or the most easily accessible solution. This paper suggests that the hybrid nature of the legal system offers opportunities that could be taken in order to achieve effective change and appropriate solutions.


Author(s):  
Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler

The Nepali legal tradition is a legal hybrid in many regards. Nepal was not colonised by a Western state, and the Hindu legal tradition therefore dominated all areas of law until the middle of the 20th century. Since the 1950s there has been a strong influence of Indian common law. It is probably for this reason that comparative classifications that include Nepal see the legal system as a mixture of common law and customary law. However, other mixtures mark the Nepali legal tradition. French law inspired the ruler in the 19th century, and that influence can still be found in the formal law. In addition, the plurality of Nepalese society made it necessary to provide space for different customary regimes to coexist with the formal Hindu law. When it comes to innovations within the legal system, including international law, the different ingredients interact. In family-related matters, the case-law of the Nepali Supreme Court illustrates the confrontation between international legal standards and the traditional rules. The Supreme Court has referred to the culturally conditioned discrimination against women and called for a thorough (political) analysis in order to eliminate discrimination without a radical change of culture. In the area of discrimination against homo- and transsexuals the Supreme Court took a more innovative approach. It remains to be seen, however, if such a change is effective beyond the courtroom. In the area of private financial compensation for wrongs, the formal (written) Nepali law does not have a general concept of tort. Compensation is generally integrated within the ambit of criminal law. Field research indicates that it would be possible to resort to existing customary principles of compensation rather than to the relatively complex common law of torts favoured by some Nepali scholars. However, this approach might not be without difficulty, as it might imply admitting the “superiority” of the customary practices of ethnic groups of lower standing in society. The example of Nepal shows that innovation in a hybrid system is often marked by the difficulty of – at least apparently – contradictory elements and layers of the legal system. There might be a tendency towards choosing the dominant or the most easily accessible solution. This paper suggests that the hybrid nature of the legal system offers opportunities that could be taken in order to achieve effective change and appropriate solutions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 426
Author(s):  
Dedy Sumardi ◽  
Ratno Lukito ◽  
Moch Nur Ichwan

This article aims to analyze various legal traditions working within the implementation of Islamic law after special autonomy in Aceh. Although Aceh's legal system follows the national legal system derived from civil law, diverse legal traditions still exist. The scope of this study is limited to the interaction of Aceh's legal traditions by taking the construction of juvenile and immoral criminal law and describing the social authorities who also operate the legal tradition to the parties in the case. This study presents the results using a case study model. Data obtained from interviews and documentation, analyzed using an interlegality approach. Based on the results of data analysis, it was found that the dialectic of legal traditions is determined by the role of actors acting as companions for victims to ensure that the rights of victims are not neglected. The traditions of Islamic law, customary law, and laws for protecting women and children are used interchangeably. The effort to combine these three legal traditions was carried out to obtain justice and guarantee the fulfillment of the victim's civil rights, such as the right to continue education, to relieve the trauma caused by the psychological pressure. The amalgamation of legal traditions in Aceh is an effective way to achieve justice for women and children and the construction of new laws to develop a national legal system that favors the interests of victims.


2006 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurit Tsafrir

AbstractIn this article I describe various aspects of the complex link between the Israeli legal system and the Arab customary institution of sulha (an agreement for peaceful settlement of a dispute). On the basis of contemporary decisions of the Supreme Court and the District Courts in Israel, I argue that a sulha agreement between an accused and his victim (or the victim's family) often influences the judges' decisions during criminal proceedings against the former. This influence tends to work in favor of the accused—mainly in decisions about detention and sentencing—but when a sulha agreement affects the verdict, it tends to work against the accused. The weight attached to the sulha by the court has some problematic aspects: it may cause the accused to force a sulha agreement upon his victim and lead to perversion of the course of justice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Albano Gilabert Gascón

AbstractIn 2017, the majority of the United Kingdom Supreme Court held in its judgment in the Gard Marine and Energy v China National Chartering (The Ocean Victory) case that, in bareboat charters under the ‘BARECON 89’ form, if both the owner and the charterer are jointly insured under a hull policy, the damages caused to the vessel by the charterer cannot be claimed by the insurer by way of subrogation after indemnifying the owner. The interpretation of the charter party leads to the conclusion that the liability between the parties is excluded. Faced with the Supreme Court’s decision, the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) adopted a new standard bareboat charter agreement only a few months later, the ‘BARECON 2017’ form, which amends, among other clauses, the one related to insurance. The present paper analyses (i) the new wording of the clause mentioned above and (ii) its incidence on the relationship between the parties of both the charter agreement and the insurance contract and its consequences for possible third parties. Despite BIMCO’s attempt to change the solution adopted by the Supreme Court and his willingness to allow the insurer to claim in subrogation against the person who causes the loss, the consequences, as it will be seen, do not differ much in practice when the wrongdoer is the co-insured charterer. On the contrary, when the loss is caused by a time charter or a sub-charter, in principle, there will be no impediment for the insurer to sue him.


1978 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-132
Author(s):  
C. O. Olawoye

The judgment of the Supreme Court in Okoiko v. Esedalue brings into prominence once again the question of accountability in the customary law relating to pledge of land. In that case Elias, C.J.N., made the following propositions which call for comment: (1) A pledgee who engages in commercial exploitation of pledged land is liable to account for his use of pledged land.


Author(s):  
Fatahuddin Aziz Siregar

The South Tapanuli community adopts a patrilineal kinship system so that women do not get inheritance, even if there is acquisition of property, women receive it not in their capacity as heirs but in the form of holong ni ate as confirmed in the Supreme Court Jurisprudence number 506K / Sip / 1968 dated January 22, 1969 However, on the other hand the Tapsel community underwent a process of Islamization that was quite deep, so that the customary law of South Tapanuli was also influenced by positive law including Jurisprudence which gave heir to girls later issued by the Supreme Court number 528K / Sip / 1972 dated 17 January 1973. This rule makes the practice of distributing the assets of Tapsel's community inheritance also shifts no longer according to the full provisions of adat law.This paper focuses on answering the factors that cause the shift in Batak customary inheritance in Tapsel, how the form of Batak adat inheritance shifts in Tapsel, and how the role of Islamic law in the shifting Batak customary inheritance in Tapsel. To answer this, use descriptive-analytical field research using data collection techniques in the form of observations and interviews with traditional leaders, religious leaders, judges and the community who carry out the distribution of inheritance.From this search, the authors found that the practice of inheritance in Tapsel society has shifted from adat inheritance caused by two factors, namely, First, the factor of Islamic law because Tapsel people have understood Islam well and run it in various fields of life including in the distribution of inheritance. Given that there are dozens of Islamic education institutions in Tapsel according to the author has given a pretty good understanding of Islamic law. So in general it can be said, that this change is a consequence of the Islamization process experienced by the Tapsel people. Second, is the factor of higher power or positive law because until now the community still believes that only the Religious Courts as a place to solve the problem of inheritance to obtain legal certainty.The shift to adat inheritance occurs in several patterns. The first pattern is a total change from customary form to division according to faraid, this pattern occurs in areas that are fairly Islamic, namely the Mandailing Natal region, although of course there are some people who divide in a way that is not consistent in carrying out Islamic law. The second pattern is to carry out adat law, namely in communities that are relatively strict with adat, namely in the Padang Lawas and Sipirok regions, in this area many cases seem to have carried out faraid formally but the substance still reflects the spirit of adat law. The third pattern, namely the way of division which is a combination of Islamic law and customary law, which is a fairly moderate community in the Angkola region.Islamic law has contributed by shifting the implementation of customary law to Islamic law. People who according to customary law do not receive inheritance become heirs who receive a certain portion. At first the mother did not count as an heir, then given a part 1/3 or 1/6. Istdri initially did not get any portion of the inheritance then received 1/4 or 1/8. Girls initially only have the status of olong ate, then receive a relatively large portion, which is 1/2 or 2/3.


Author(s):  
Richard Clements ◽  
Ademola Abass

Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter discusses the origin of equity and trusts as distinctive aspects of the English legal system and the subsequent merger of equity with the common. It covers the meaning and origin of equity; what became of the chancery jurisdiction after the Earl of Oxford but before the Judicature Act; the reform of the Court of Equity; the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873–5; the modern relevance of equity; the types and nature of trusts; and the recognition of trusts.


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