scholarly journals A proper de jure objection to the epistemic rationality of religious belief

2010 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
TODD R. LONG
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Reformed Epistemology

AbstractI answer Alvin Plantinga's challenge to provide a ‘proper’ de jure objection to religious belief. What I call the ‘sophisticates’ evidential objection' (SEO) concludes that sophisticated Christians lack epistemic justification for believing central Christian propositions. The SEO utilizes a theory of epistemic justification in the spirit of the evidentialism of Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. I defend philosophical interest in the SEO (and its underlying evidentialism) against objections from Reformed epistemology, by addressing Plantinga's criteria for a proper de jure objection, his anti-evidentialist arguments, and the relevance of ‘impulsional evidence’. I argue that no result from Plantinga-style Reformed epistemology precludes the reasons I offer in favour of giving the SEO its due philosophical attention.

The epistemological limits of experience-based exclusive religious belief

2008 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 445-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIK BALDWIN ◽  
MICHAEL THUNE
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Pluralism ◽  
General View ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Salient Features ◽  
Reformed Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Criteria

AbstractAlvin Plantinga and other philosophers have argued that exclusive religious belief can be rationally held in response to certain experiences – independently of inference to other beliefs, evidence, arguments, and the like – and thus can be ‘properly basic’. We think that this is possible only until the believer acquires the defeater we develop in this paper, a defeater which arises from an awareness of certain salient features of religious pluralism. We argue that, as a consequence of this defeater, continued epistemic support for exclusive religious belief will require the satisfaction of non-basic epistemic criteria (such as evidence and/or argumentation). But then such belief will no longer be properly basic. If successful, we will have presented a challenge not only to Plantinga's position, but also to the general view (often referred to as ‘reformed epistemology’) according to which exclusive religious belief can be properly basic.

KNOWLEDGE AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF

Think ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (58) ◽  
pp. 39-53
Author(s):  
Maria Rosa Antognazza
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Epistemology ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
Reformed Epistemology

ABSTRACTIntroductions to epistemology routinely define knowledge as a kind of belief which meets certain criteria. In the first two sections of this article, I discuss this account and its application to religious epistemology by the influential movement known as Reformed Epistemology. In the last section, I argue that the controversial consequences drawn from this account by Reformed Epistemology offer one of the best illustrations of the untenability of a conception of knowledge as a kind of belief. I conclude by sketching an alternative account of cognition which also provides a different framework for religious epistemology.

Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 51-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Religious Commitment ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
John Henry Newman ◽  
Religious Conviction ◽  
Religious Convictions ◽  
Important Sense ◽  
Reformed Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Standing

It is argued that standard accounts of the epistemology of religious commitmentfail to be properly sensitive to certain important features of the nature of religious conviction. Once one takes these features of religious conviction seriously, then it becomes clear that we are not to conceive of the epistemology of religious conviction along completely rational lines.But the moral to extract from this is not fideism, or even a more moderate proposal (such as reformed epistemology) that casts the epistemic standing of basic religious beliefs along nonrational lines. Rather, one needs to recognise that in an important sense religious convictions are not beliefs at all, but that this is compatible with the idea that many other religious commitments are beliefs. This picture of the nature of religious commitment is shown to fit snugly with the Wittgensteinian account of hinge commitments, such that all rational belief essentially presupposes certain basic arational hinge commitments, along lines originally suggested by John Henry Newman. We are thus able to marshal a parity-style argument in defence of religious commitment. Although religious belief presupposes basic arational religious convictions, it is not on this score epistemically amiss since all belief presupposes basic arational convictions, or hinge commitments. The resulting view of the epistemology of religious commitment is a position I call quasi-fideism.

Reformed Epistemology in a Jamesian Perspective

Horizons ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terrence W. Tilley
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
William James ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Religious Epistemology ◽  
William Alston ◽  
Religious Traditions ◽  
Reformed Epistemology

AbstractThis essay argues that the reformed epistemologists (William Alston, Alvin Plantinga) have not (yet) sustained claims in religious epistemology significantly more extensive than William James did in the Varieties. It argues that even if reformed epistemologists show that religious belief can have a positive epistemic status, their approach may finally lead to relativism (given that religious traditions generate contradictory religious beliefs) because it offers no method for finding which, if any, concrete religious beliefs might be preferable to hold or in which religious practices one should engage, if any, and because it fails to distinguish between original and derived religious belief. I suggest that more attention must be paid to “social epistemology” if religious epistemology is to go significantly beyond James's accomplishments.

scholarly journals ¿Puede la intolerancia religiosa ser justificada? Sensus divinitatis, diversidad

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Sierra Merchán
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Knowledge Of God ◽  
Religious Intolerance ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Sensus Divinitatis ◽  
Reformed Epistemology ◽  
Natural Belief

Calvino plantea, a través de la idea de sensus divinitatis (esto es, que hay un conocimiento implantado de Dios), una justificación a favor de la intolerancia religiosa y de la persecución y castigo a los herejes. Pero ¿es válida esta justificación de la intolerancia religiosa, como piensa Calvino? Según Hume, es posible desarrollar argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores en contra de la existencia del sensus divinitatis basados en la explicación naturalista de la creencia en Dios y en la diversidad religiosa. Y según Schellenberg, es posible plantear, además, un argumento basado en el problema del ocultamiento divino. Los argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores establecen que si una creencia es producida por mecanismos no fiables que no rastrean la verdad, entonces dicha creencia carece de justificación epistémica. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar y evaluar los dos argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores de Hume y el argumento de Schellenberg, los cuales intentar socavar la epistemología reformada de Calvino y Plantinga, y su defensa externalista de la racionalidad del teísmo. Mostraré que los tres argumentos son válidos y logran demostrar la falsedad del teísmo externalista. Con ello, espero hacer evidente la importancia de la crítica a la racionalidad del teísmo reformado durante la Ilustración escocesa, pues para Hume, el papel crítico de la filosofía se constituye en un remedio contra el fanatismo religioso, a la vez que promueve la idea de una democracia basada en la tolerancia religiosa y la libertad de conciencia. Palabras clave: sensus divinitatis, epistemología reformada, Calvino, Plantinga, argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores, racionalidad, teísmo, Hume, Schellemberg, Reforma. **************************************************************************************** Can religious intolerance be justified? Sensus divinitatis, religious diversity and the divine occult Hume and Schellenberg against Calvino. AbstractCalvino presents, through the idea of sensus divinitatis (which means, that we have knowledge of God implanted in us), a justification for religious intolerance and persecution and punishment of heretics. But, is religious intolerance a valid justification as Calvino thinks? According to Hume, it is possible to develop evolutionary arguments against the existence of sensus divinitatis based on a natural belief in God and in religious diversification. Additionally, according to Schellenberg, it is possible to state an argument based on the problem of the divine occult. The discrediting evolutionary arguments state that if a believe is produced through unreliable mechanisms that don’t follow reality, then such a believe lacks an epistemic justification. The objective of this work is to analyze and evaluate Hume’s two discrediting evolutionary arguments as well as Schellenberg’s argument, all of which try to undermine the epistemology formulated by Calvino and Plantinga, and their externalist defense of a national theism. I will demonstrate that the three arguments are valid and show how this externalist theism is false. With this, I expect to show the importance of critiquing the theism reasoning as it was reformed during the Scottish Illustration, for Hume the critical role of philosophy constitutes the solution against religious fanaticism, while at the same time, promoting the idea of a democracy based on religious tolerance and freedom of conscience. Key words: Sensus Divinitatis, Reformed Epistemology, Calvino, Plantinga, Discrediting evolutionary Aarguments, reasoning, theism, Hume, Schellenberg, Reformation. **************************************************************************************** Pode a intolerancia religiosa se justificar? Sensus divinitatis, diversidade religiosa e ocultamento divino Hume e Schellenberg contra Calvino ResumoCalvino salienta com a idéia de Sensus Divinitatis, a justificação da intolerância religiosa e a perseguição e castigo dos hereges. Mas é realmente justificada esta ideia? Segundo Hume é possível desenvolver argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores contra a existência do Sensus Divinitatis baseados na explicação naturalista da crença em deus e a diversidade religiosa. Segundo Schellenberg também é possível argumentar o ocultamento divino. Segundo os argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores se uma crença é produzida por mecanismos não fiáveis, ela carece de justificação epistêmica. O objetivo do artigo é analisar e avaliar os argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores de Hume e Schellenberg que tentam detonar a epistemologia de Calvino e Plantinga, baseados na defesa da racionalidade do teísmo. Os três argumentos são validos e conseguem demostrar a falsidade do teísmo externalista, assim no artigo se mostra a importância da crítica à racionalidade do teísmo, pois segundo Hume constitui um remédio contra o fanatismo religioso e promove a ideia democrática da liberdade de consciência. Palavras chave: sensos divinitatis, epistemologia reformada, Calvino, Platinga, argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores, racionalidade, teísmo, Hume, Schellemberg, reforma.

scholarly journals Epistemic Justification: Deontological Aspects

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-84
Author(s):  
Aleksandr A. Shevchenko
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Special Kind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Epistemic Normativity

The article analyzes the problems related to the philosophical analysis of epistemic duties – ranging from doubts about their existence as duties of a special kind to discussing the boundaries of such obligations and the limits of responsibility of the epistemic subject. Special attention is paid to the consideration of epistemic behavior that goes beyond the "call of duty”, supererogatory actions. The paper describes the main characteristics and examples of such behavior and makes a conclusion about the need to block or substantially clarify the imperatives of epistemic rationality, which require actions, although commendable from the point of view of standard epistemic normativity but lying beyond the scope of what is epistemically due.

Foundationalism

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Bergmann
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Natural Theology ◽  
Main Section ◽  
Biblical Criticism ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
The Third ◽  
Reformed Epistemology ◽  
Basic Beliefs

Foundationalism, a theory about the structure of epistemic justification, is often criticized for certain excesses despite the fact that these excesses are actually not a part of foundationalism itself but are, instead, unnecessary additions that have on occasion been combined with it. But when correctly understood, its main tenets (most prominently the claim that there can be properly basic beliefs) are virtually undeniable. The best way to get at the heart of foundationalism is to focus not on Descartes but on Aristotle and his famous regress argument. The chapter’s first main section unpacks that foundationalist argument. Its second main section addresses some objections to foundationalism. The third main section considers how foundationalism bears on topics in the epistemology of theology—topics such as Reformed epistemology, natural theology, biblical criticism, and post-foundationalism.

Seemings

2019 ◽  
pp. 380-418
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Phenomenal Conservatism ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Global Principle ◽  
Support Relation

Chapter 12 concludes the book by contrasting phenomenal accessibilism with Michael Huemer’s phenomenal conservatism. Section 12.1 defines phenomenal conservatism as the global principle that you have epistemic justification to believe a proposition just when it seems strongly enough on balance to be true. Section 12.2 explains the concept of a seeming and outlines an argument that there are no nonperceptual seemings. Section 12.3 argues that phenomenal conservatism imposes implausible restrictions on evidence: all seemings are evidence, but not all evidence is seemings. Section 12.4 argues that phenomenal conservatism gives an overly simplistic account of the evidential support relation: it cannot explain why epistemic rationality requires not only perceptual coherence, but also introspective coherence, logical coherence, and metacoherence. Section 12.5 argues that phenomenal accessibilism is needed to explain these essential characteristics of epistemically rational thinkers. Section 12.6 concludes by summarizing why phenomenal accessibilism is superior to phenomenal conservatism.

The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Bortolotti
Keyword(s):  
Irrational Beliefs ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Irrational Belief ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Psychological Effects ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Epistemic Innocence

Ideally, we would have beliefs that satisfy norms of truth and rationality, as well as fostering the acquisition, retention and use of other relevant information. In reality, we have limited cognitive capacities and are subject to motivational biases on an everyday basis, and may also experience impairments in perception, memory, learning, and reasoning in the course of our lives. Such limitations and impairments give rise to distorted memory beliefs, confabulated explanations, elaborated delusional beliefs, motivated delusional beliefs, and optimistically biased beliefs. In the book, Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs qualify as epistemically innocent, where the notion of epistemic innocence captures the fact that in some contexts the adoption, maintenance or reporting of the beliefs delivers significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. Epistemic innocence is a weaker notion than epistemic justification, as it does not imply that the epistemic benefits of the irrational belief outweigh its epistemic costs. However, it clarifies the relationship between the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency. It is misleading to assume that epistemic rationality and psychological adaptiveness always go hand-in-hand, but also that there is a straight-forward trade off between them. Rather, epistemic irrationality can lead to psychological adaptiveness and psychological adaptiveness in turn can support the attainment of epistemic goals. Recognising the circumstances in which irrational beliefs enhance or restore epistemic performance informs our mutual interactions and enables us to take measures to reduce their irrationality without undermining the conditions for epistemic success.

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