Responsibility of the WTO for Breach of an International Obligation under the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations

Author(s):  
Noemi Gal-Or

SummaryThis article challenges the argument that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is devoid of executive or governing functions and, hence, immune from the regime set out in the International Law Commission’s 2011 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (RIO). A brief drafting history of the RIO, clarification of the terminology associated with matters of international responsibility, and two hypothetical examples illustrating the potential for WTO responsibility set the stage for the article’s main argument. The author examines the WTO’s nature by analyzing its constituent law, its sui generis mandate and functions, its international legal personality, and its own use of terminology in presenting itself to the world. Critical analysis of RIO Articles 64 (on lex specialis) and 10 (on the existence of a breach of an international obligation), and their application to the WTO, completes the argument. The author thus refutes both the notions that (1) the WTO is exclusively member driven and, hence, not an executive, governing organization but a sui generis entity and (2) the WTO is therefore unable to breach an international obligation and thus immune from the RIO regime. The article concludes that, while a breach by the WTO of an international obligation may be exceedingly rare, it nonetheless — as any international organization — comes within the ambit of the RIO regime. The WTO should therefore consider adjusting its internal rules accordingly.

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-233
Author(s):  
Kristina Daugirdas

Abstract This article argues that international organizations ‘as such’ can contribute directly to the creation of customary international law for three independent reasons. First, the states establishing an international organization may subjectively intend for that organization to be able to contribute to the creation of at least some kinds of customary international law. Second, that capacity may be an implied power of the organization. Third, that capacity may be a byproduct of other features or authorities of the international organization – specifically, the combination of international legal personality and the capacity to operate on the international plane. Affirming international organizations’ direct role in making customary international law will not dramatically change the content of customary international law or the processes by which rules of customary international law are ascertained. But recognizing that role is significant because it will reinforce other conclusions about how international organizations fit into the international legal system, including that customary international law binds international organizations. Such recognition may also shift the way lawyers within international organizations carry out their work by affecting the sources they consult when answering legal questions, the materials they make publicly available and the kinds of expertise that are understood to be necessary to discharge their responsibilities. Finally, affirming international organizations’ role in creating customary international law may make international organizations more willing to comply with those rules.


2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean d'Aspremont

AbstractIt is classically contended that when an international organization endowed with international legal personality commits an international wrongful act, the organization is to be held exclusively responsible even though the act would have constituted a violation of its member states' obligations if committed by them. This Article intends to depart from such a rigid interpretation of the responsibility of international organization and makes the argument that when member states abuse the international legal personality of an international organization through the exercise of an excessive control over the decision-making process of the organization, they must be held, together with the organization, responsible for violations of international law by the organization provided that such a wrongful act would also constitute a breach of the member states' international obligations if committed by them. It is posited here that, in this situation, member states can no longer hide behind the screen of the international legal personality of the organization. Failing to take the extent of control exercised by member states over the decision-making process of an international organization into account boils down to ignoring that autonomy is one of the constitutive elements of the legal personality of an international organization, which can bolster the contemporary move away from international institutionalism.


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 997-1016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cedric Ryngaert

It is generally considered that an international organization (‘IO’) has an international legal personality which is distinct from that of its Member States, as a result of which the IO itself, rather than the Member States, is to be held responsible for the IO's internationally wrongful acts.1 It appears to be an accepted principle that Member States cannot generally be held liable for the acts of IOs by virtue of their membership of an IO alone. This view can be found in a 1996 resolution of the Institut de Droit International, which provides that ‘there is no general rule of international law whereby States members are, due solely to their membership, liable, concurrently or subsidiarily, for the obligations of an international organization of which they are members.’2 This is echoed in the International Law Commission's (‘ILC’) Commentary to article 62 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (‘ILC DARIO’): ‘It is clear that … membership does not as such entail for member States international responsibility when the organization commits an internationally wrongful act’.3 The ILC holds the view that only in the case of an intervening act by a Member State that influences the commission of a wrongful act by the IO (aid and assistance, direction and control, coercion, avoidance of compliance, acceptance) could the Member State be held responsible.4


Author(s):  
Carla Ferstman

The chapter considers in what circumstances international organizations have international legal personality and what results from such personality. It also considers whether international legal personality gives rise to rights and obligations and which ones. Central to this analysis, the chapter studies whether an international organization may have human rights and international humanitarian law obligations and whether these derive from its international legal personality, its constituent agreement, as a result of the functions of the organization, or some combination thereof. The chapter concludes that international organizations have obligations to comply with peremptory norms and accepted general principles of international law (which include elements of human rights and international law) that apply to all subjects under international law. There are also additional obligations which apply in particular contexts, and are aligned with organizations’ purposes and their capacities to act and react in any given situation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christiane Ahlborn

AbstractThis paper discusses the role of the so-called 'rules of the organization' in the draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO), as adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) on second reading in 2011. Although the rules of the organization occupy a central place in the ARIO, the ILC has decided not to take a “clear-cut view” on their legal nature as either international law or internal law of the organization. This paper argues that the ILC's indecision has left the ARIO with a fluctuating scope of application concerning various provisions such as the attribution of conduct, the breach of an international obligation, the obligation to make reparation, and countermeasures against an international organization. The term of art 'rules of the organization' was developed by the ILC in its work on the law of treaties but has rarely been addressed in legal scholarship. Part 1 therefore first examines the legal nature of the different components of the so-called 'rules of the organization': the constituent instruments, the acts, and the established practice of the organization. While the constituent instruments are contracts between States at the moment of the creation of an international organization, it will be contended that they also operate as constitutions during the life of the organization, giving it the autonomy to create internal law in force between the subjects of its legal order, including its member States. In analysing the ARIO on second reading, Part 2 accordingly suggests reconceiving the rules of the organization as 'internal law' of the organization as long as it functions effectively, so as to appropriately reflect its constitutional autonomy for purposes of international responsibility.


Author(s):  
Lorenzo Gasbarri

The final consequence of the dual legal nature discussed in the book concerns the international responsibility of international organizations. In particular, this chapter describes how the absence of a common conceptualization affected the work of the International Law Commission, the International Law Institute, and the International Law Association. Afterwards, the chapter focuses on the dual attribution of conduct to an international organization and to its member states. It contends that dual attribution is extremely important in practice and it reviews the cases in which it was at issue. After providing a set of principles on how to apply the dual attribution, it distinguishes between three sets of circumstances: dual attribution via institutional links, dual attribution via factual links, and exclusion of dual attribution when the conduct is attributable to only the organization or its member states. Finally, it discusses the effects of dual attribution in terms of joint responsibility.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-403
Author(s):  
STEVE CHARNOVITZ

John Jackson's long, fruitful association with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was unique in the annals of international organizations. His 1969 book, World Trade and the Law of GATT, became the Baedeker for government officials, practitioners, and academics seeking an overall understanding of the trading system or an explanation of a particular GATT provision. Yet the uniqueness of Jackson's relationship to the GATT was not just his foundational scholarship; every international organization in the twentieth century spawned a scholarly community. The uniqueness came from his role as a teacher attracting graduate law students from around the world who traveled to Ann Arbor to study with him and then returned to their countries to take on leadership roles in international trade. These decades of students inspired by Jackson and educated by his synoptic understanding of trade law enhanced Jackson's influence on the GATT in a way that has no parallel in other agencies.


Author(s):  
Ngoc Minh Trang Pham

After more than 50 years of existence and development, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has established itself as one of the significant players in the international community. This oldest as well as biggest international organization was believed to be the 5th most substantial economy in the world in 2020. Apart from contributing to the economic development of the region, ASEAN has also paid great attention to its political goals, one of which is to maintain and enhance peace, security and stability in the Southeast Asian region. With respect to this function, ASEAN has been excoriated for its ineffective performance and indolent reactions to regional precarious situations such as the Myanmar's Rohingya crisis and the chronic disputes in the East Sea. Hence, most criticisms called for a more compelling and active ASEAN in order to fulfill its role as a guardian of regional peace and security. Simon Chesterman, Dean of the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, posed a question: ``does ASEAN exist?'' In order to answer to such a broad question, this paper analyse the legal personality of ASEAN under the light of international law, which confirms the independence of ASEAN from member states as an actor of international system. Next, the paper examine the legal powers of ASEAN used to respond to regional security related issues. Finally, the paper establishes that ASEAN has legal obligation to settle any disputes that affect the peace and security of the region.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (3(16)) ◽  
pp. 381-408
Author(s):  
Enis Omerović

The first chapter of the paper elaborates the question of whether one of the constitutive elements of the internationally wrongful act and a precondition for responsibility could be embodied in an existence of damage that has to be inflicted upon participants with international legal personality. In this regards legal doctrine, the arbitral awards, international judgments as well as the works of the UN International Law Commission will be examined, particularly the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations from 2001 and 2011, respectively. An interesting question could be raised concerning the terms used in Law on Responsibility and that is whether there is a difference between damage, injury, and unlawful consequence. Punitive or penal damage and its application in Law on Responsibility will be further assessed. The author will begin its research with the definition of punitive damage, and will further take into consideration international legal doctrine, international arbitral awards, judicial decisions of international courts, decisions of various claims commissions as well as norms of general international law in supporting his hypothesis that international law does not entail reparations for punitive damages. One of the aims of this paper is to indicate the question of whether the existence of punitive damages in international law, if any, be linked to a legal nature of State and international organization responsibility, in the sense that application of punitive damages in international law would support the thesis on the very existence of criminal responsibility of the named subjects of international law? It is interesting to note that the criminal responsibility of states has been abandoned by the removal of Article 19 in the final Draft Articles on Responsibility of States.


Author(s):  
Анатолий Капустин ◽  
Anatoliy Kapustin

A few very important features of financial law of international organizations were consider in present article. The author puts forward an idea that funding of international organizations activities is an important element of the international legal personality of international organizations, because it allows them to ensure the necessary independence while executing their international rights and obligations and the exercise of their assigned functions. The main categories of financial law of international organizations were examined in article: the concept and types of incomes and expenses, the concept of budget process of the international organization in accordance with two ways of funding of international organizations settled in the XX century. Special attention was paid to the analysis of the obligations of Member States of an international organization to contribute to the organization’s budget. For these purposes, the analysis of the positions of judges of the International Court of Justice and the opinions of scientists on this issue in the context of the proceedings on certain expenses of the United Nations. The author has come to conclusion about necessity of the further study of the problems of the financial law of international organizations.


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