No First Use of Nuclear Weapons

Worldview ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 19 (11) ◽  
pp. 9-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Russett

As a result of nuclear proliferation, new weapons systems, and new strategic doctrines, the danger of nuclear war is increasing. The very modest "arms control" agreements negotiated or in prospect under SALT are totally inadequate to contain this danger. According to Herbert Scoville, "Arms control negotiations have become a mechanism for promoting the arms race rather than controlling it." Even by a less skeptical evaluation the negotiations can at best slow Soviet and American acquisition of new weapons systems. Disarmament in the realm of strategic nuclear arms is nowhere in sight. Other countries, which have long demanded some degree of Soviet-American nuclear disarmament as the price of an effective nonproliferation agreement, can plainly see that their price will not be met.

1984 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 282-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Markusen ◽  
John Harris

Arguing that education should play a crucial role in reducing the threat of nuclear war, Eric Markusen and John B. Harris turn first to history. They examine the role of education in the Holocaust of Nazi Germany and draw a thought-provoking parallel to the role of education in the nuclear arms race. They then discuss aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons policymaking and factors of psychological resistance that have limited citizen participation in decisionmaking. Finally, they explore the potential of education to help prevent nuclear war and describe ways that educators are rising to that challenge.


2020 ◽  
pp. 27-34
Author(s):  
Vladimir Batiuk

In this article, the ''Cold War'' is understood as a situation where the relationship between the leading States is determined by ideological confrontation and, at the same time, the presence of nuclear weapons precludes the development of this confrontation into a large-scale armed conflict. Such a situation has developed in the years 1945–1989, during the first Cold War. We see that something similar is repeated in our time-with all the new nuances in the ideological struggle and in the nuclear arms race.


Author(s):  
Ramesh Thakur

The very destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes them unusable for ethical and military reasons. The world has placed growing restrictions on the full range of nuclear programs and activities. But with the five NPT nuclear powers failing to eliminate nuclear arsenals, other countries acquiring the bomb, arms control efforts stalled, nuclear risks climbing, and growing awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear war, the United Nations adopted a new treaty to ban the bomb. Some technical anomalies between the 1968 and 2017 treaties will need to be harmonized and the nuclear-armed states’ rejection of the ban treaty means it will not eliminate any nuclear warheads. However, it will have a significant normative impact in stigmatizing the possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and serve as a tool for civil society to mobilize domestic and world public opinion against the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.


1975 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 415-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Redick

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in 1967 and is now in force for eighteen Latin American nations (the important exceptions being Argentina and Brazil). Under the terms of the treaty the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) was established in 1969. With headquarters in Mexico City, OPANAL is a sophisticated control mechanism composed of three principal organs: a General Conference, Council and Secretariat. This article examines the effort to establish regional nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America and analyzes the ability of the Tlatelolco Treaty to provide the legal and political framework for containment of the growing military potential of Latin American nuclear energy programs. Particular attention is given to the positions of key Latin American nations within the region, nuclear weapons states, and those nations retaining territorial interest within the nuclear weapons free zone. In addition several policy options are advanced which could facilitate the more complete implementation of regional nuclear arms control in Latin America.


Author(s):  
Sharon Erickson Nepstad

This chapter explores the pacifism of the early Christian church and how the conversion of Constantine in the fourth century led to the development of the just war doctrine. At the conclusion of World War II, the advent of the nuclear arms race rendered some aspects of the just war doctrine obsolete. Pope John XXIII addressed these concerns in his encyclical Pacem in Terris, released in 1963. Numerous Catholic peace groups thought that the Vatican did not take a strong enough stance on war, militarism, and nuclear weapons. The Catholic Worker movement called for a return to pacifism and introduced the techniques of nonviolent noncooperation with civil defense drills in the 1950s. The chapter covers other Catholic peace movements and organizations, including Pax Christi, the Catholic Left that opposed the Vietnam War through draft card burnings and draft board raids, and the Plowshares movement, whose members damaged nuclear weapons to obstruct the nuclear arms race. Eventually, the US Catholic Bishops released the pastoral letter The Challenge of Peace, which condemned nuclear weapons and called for disarmament.


Author(s):  
Beth A. Fischer

This chapter debunks the triumphalist claim that President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative so as to compel Moscow to surrender the arms race, if not collapse. In fact, the president hoped SDI would protect civilians from nuclear attack and considered the program a key part of his plan to eliminate nuclear weapons. Reagan repeatedly offered to share SDI with the Soviets in the belief that if both sides had defenses nuclear weapons would become obsolete. Thus, they could be eliminated. President Reagan’s revolutionary ideas about nuclear security caused deep rifts within the administration. His advisers rejected the notion that nuclear arms should or could be eliminated, believing instead that the threat of nuclear annihilation had successfully deterred the Soviets from attacking the West. With the exception of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, they opposed the costly SDI. However, they grudgingly came to support it in the belief that they might be able to trade it away in exchange for a Soviet pledge to reduce its arsenals. However, Reagan’s advisers were universally against the idea of sharing SDI with Moscow. If Reagan’s objective had been to compel Moscow to surrender the arms race, he would not have repeatedly offered to share SDI.


Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harald Müller ◽  
Carmen Wunderlich

The 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (tpnw) represents a daring act of self-empowerment: nuclear have-nots produced an international disarmament treaty without the involvement of the nuclear-weapon states or their allies. In this essay, we assess how the new treaty relates to the existing nuclear order and its four central norms: constraints on use, political restraint, non-proliferation, and disarmament. We discuss the tpnw's origin in and impact on this contested order. At the heart of contestation are two security concepts: deterrence versus the immediate ban of nuclear arms, which result in fundamentally different ideas on how to pursue the road to “global zero.” Whether or not the tpnw and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are compatible depends on how the opponents handle their controversies. The key is to overcome the emotionalized polarization and rediscover a common basis in order to prevent damage to the existing nuclear order and bring forward nuclear disarmament in practice.


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