Roe v. Wade and the History of Abortion Regulation

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Linton

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “[the] right of privacy … founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Nevertheless, the Court held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” However, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ … are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabio Persano

Negli Stati Uniti il dibattito sull’aborto è sempre un tema molto caldo. Questo saggio, diviso in due parti (la prima parte è stata pubblicata sul precedente numero della rivista) prova a ripercorrere l’evoluzione della giurisprudenza costituzionale statunitense in materia d’aborto, evidenziando i cambiamenti che ciascuna decisione ha apportato al quadro giuridico precedente. In questa seconda parte, la dissertazione sui singoli casi giurisprudenziali decisi dalla Suprema Corte prosegue con il caso Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Esso è stato una vera occasione mancata nella storia dell’aborto negli Stati Uniti, perchè venne sfiorata la overrule di Roe v. Wade. Ciononostante, venne sostanzialmente confermato l’impianto delle decisioni precedenti, in considerazione del fatto che una decisione contraria all’aborto avrebbe spiazzato un popolo che per decenni aveva organizzato la propria vita in funzione anche della possibilità di abortire. Con questa decisione si distinse la gravidanza in due periodi: quello della pre-viabilità, in cui la donna era completamente libera di abortire in accordo col medico; quello della post-viabilità, in cui gli Stati avrebbero potuto legiferare, pur dovendo consentire l’aborto nel caso di pericolo per la vita o la salute della madre. Inoltre il diritto d’aborto venne radicato nella libertà riconosciuta nel XIV Emendamento della Costituzione. Nel successivo caso Stenberg v. Carhart fu oggetto di giudizio l’aborto a nascita parziale: una legge del Nebraska aveva bandito questa pratica, ma la legge fu annullata dalla Corte Suprema, nonostante il duro dissenso di ben quattro giudici, fra cui Anthony Kennedy. Successivamente a questa decisione, il Congresso prese l’iniziativa di emanare il Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act. Questa legge fu impugnata in via d’azione davanti alla Corte Suprema e ne scaturì la sentenza Gonzalez v. Carhart. In questa decisione la Corte fece un passo indietro rispetto a Stenberg, affermò la legittimità del bando, sostenne che l’aborto a nascita parziale non è mai necessario per tutelare la vita della donna e che Stenberg era fondato su convinzioni erronee sul punto. Il saggio si conclude con delle interessanti considerazioni in merito ai possibili sviluppi futuri circa il tema dell’aborto negli Stati Uniti, auspica la “liberalizzazione del diritto alla vita” ed avanza una originale proposta, valida per tutti i Paesi in cui l’aborto è legalizzato. ---------- Abortion debate is always a hot subject in the United States. This essay, divided into two parts (the first part has been published on the previous issue of this review) tries to go along the development of U.S. constitutional caselaw about abortion, pointing out the change that each judgement caused to the previous law framework. In this second part, the dissertation about U.S. Supreme Court single case-law goes on by Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It was a real missed occasion in the abortion affair in the United States, because it was on the verge of overruling Roe v. Wade. However, the framework of the previous cases was substantially confirmed, considering that a decision against abortion would place out people who for a long time organized their own life in connection to the right of abortion. By this judgement, pregnancy was divided into two periods: pre-viability, when woman was completely free to have an abortion in agreement with her doctor; post-viability, when States could restrict abortion, except for woman life or health risks. Moreover, abortion right was founded on liberty, acknowledged by XIV Amendement. In the following case Gonzalez v. Carhart, partial-birth abortion was judged: a statute of Nebraska banned this activity, but it was stroked down by Supreme Court, despite of the dissenting opinion of four judges (Anthony Kennedy was one of them). After this judgement, the Congress wanted to issue Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act. This statute was pre-enforcement challenged to the Supreme Court, and Gonzalez v. Carhart was poured. In this judgment, the Court drew back Stenberg, it stated the ban was legitimate, partial-birth abortion never is necessary to safeguard woman health, and Stenberg was founded on wrong beliefs on this matter. This essay concludes with interesting considerations about possible developments about abortion affair in the United States, wishes “liberty of right to life” and proposes a solution for all the countries where abortion is legal.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-7
Author(s):  
Christopher Jenks

Opponents of abortion sometimes argue that a fetus "wants" to grow up into a real person. But every egg and sperm also "want" to become a person in this sense. And if that is the case, how can one defend either contraception or celibacy, both of which deny life to millions of eggs and sperms that "want" to become people, and both of which also involve repression of "natural" impulses? The question of whether abortion is morally wrong depends on when we become "human." Unfortunately, this does not happen all at once, as in medieval fantasies of the soul's entering the body. It happens bit by bit. We must therefore make some arbitrary decision about when to confer the "right to life." Because nature offers no clear guidance about where this line should be drawn, the most humane solution is to draw it so as to minimize human suffering. I doubt, however, that opponents of abortion will accept this approach, for once you accept it, you will almost inevitably be led to precisely the same "liberal" conclusion the Supreme Court reached five years ago in Roe v. Wade.


2019 ◽  
pp. 55-68
Author(s):  
HARSH PATHAK

The constitution and jurist characterized Article 21 as, “the procedural magna carta, protective of life and liberty”. This right has been held to be the heart of the constitution, the most organic and progressive provision in Indian constitution, the foundation of our laws. Article 21 can only be claimed when a person is deprived of his “life” or “personal liberty” by the “State” as defined in Article 12. Violation of the right by private individuals is not within the preview of it. Article 21 applies to natural persons. The right is available to every person, citizen or alien. It, however, does not entitle a foreigner the right to reside and settle in India, as mentioned in Article 19 (1) (e). Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person. The right to life is undoubtedly the most fundamental of all rights. All other rights add quality to the life in question and depend on the pre-existence of life itself for their operation. There would have been no fundamental rights worth mentioning if Article 21 had been interpreted in its original sense. This Article will examine the right to life as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court of India.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 2033-2058 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Lange

“The right of privacy … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”


1991 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 105-124
Author(s):  
Neil Snortland

Since its creation in 1965, the constitutional right of privacy has been difficult to understand, even contradictory. This may be explained as the result of the incremental implementation of the sweeping language of Griswold v. Connecticut, with privacy coming into conflict with other rights such as the freedom of the press. In addition, the initial criticisms of Griswold’s synoptic privacy reasoning intensified when Roe v. Wade provoked potent political opposition. These influences combined with the changing membership on the Supreme Court to produce an evaporation of privacy language from recent decisions, most notably Webster v. Reproductive Health Services and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. Furthermore, the Court is transforming Roe's declaration of privacy as a “fundamental right” protected by “strict scrutiny” into a “liberty interest” protected by the relaxed standard of “rational-basis scrutiny.” Finally, Rehnquist and Scalia want to give a narrow historical interpretation to any “liberty interest,” thus limiting the application of privacy to other areas of constitutional law.


Author(s):  
Lucas A. Powe

This chapter examines Supreme Court cases that were filed over the issue of abortion in Texas. Texas figured in two of the three major decisions on abortion laws in the United States: Roe v. Wade and Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt. The late 1960s witnessed the introduction of various legislative measures to reform abortion laws. Reform measures based on the American Law Institute proposal were initiated in thirty state legislatures, including Texas in 1967. The same year the American Medical Association backed abortion liberalization, abortions were first mentioned at the Supreme Court. The chapter first discusses the case about the right of married couples to obtain contraceptives, which an 1879 Connecticut law severely restricted, and another case, Griswold v. Connecticut, the third attempt at the Court to kill the Connecticut law. It also considers cases involving Roy Lucas, Texas's mandatory sonogram bill, and Texas Senate HB 2.


2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 629-672
Author(s):  
William G. Ross

Religious issues and clergy played a prominent and now largely forgotten role in the defeat of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's controversial 1937 proposal to add six Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court. Although many prominent Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish clergy and lay persons shared Roosevelt's frustration with the Court's obstruction of legislation to ameliorate the ravages of the Great Depression and reform the nation's economic system, many of the New Deal's most ardent supporters feared that Roosevelt's plan threatened religious liberty by making the Court vulnerable to political pressure. Opposition to Court-packing among clerics and lay persons, who warned that it could subject religious minorities to majoritarian tyranny, may have contributed heavily to the plan's defeat. The prevalence of these fears that diminution of judicial independence would threaten religious freedom helps to demonstrate that the Supreme Court already was widely regarded as an important guardian of personal liberty on the eve of the Court's transition from its long-time role as a defender of property rights to its modern role as a protector of personal rights.


Soft Power ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 322-346
Author(s):  
Vitulia Ivone

The Supreme Court has issued its decision in NIFLA v. Becerra, a 5–4 vote holding that the state of California cannot compel pregnancy-resource centers to advertise for the state’s abortion services. This decision represents a considerable victory for both the right to free speech and the conscience rights of pro-life Americans. The case concerned California’s Reproductive FACT Act, which mandated that both licensed and unlicensed women’s-health clinics (crisis-pregnancy or pregnancy-resource centers) not performing abortions had to provide a pre-written notice to clients. Though the law related specifically to abortion, free speech was the fundamental issue at stake. This paper analyzes the history of abortion in US legislation and the perspective of one of its fundamental civil rights.


Author(s):  
Mary Ziegler

Decided by the Supreme Court in 1973, Roe v. Wade legalized abortion across the United States. The 7-2 decision came at the end of a decades-long struggle to reform—and later repeal—abortion laws. Although all of the justices understood that Roe addressed a profoundly important question, none of them imagined that it would later become a flashpoint of American politics or shape those politics for decades to come. Holding that the right to privacy covered a woman’s choice to terminate her pregnancy, Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, struck down many of the abortion regulations on the books. The lead-up to and aftermath of Roe tell a story not only of a single Supreme Court decision but also of the historical shifts that the decision shaped and reflected: the emergence of a movement for women’s liberation, the rise of grassroots conservatism, political party realignment, controversy about the welfare state, changes to the family structure, and the politicization of science. It is a messy and complicated story that evolved parallel to different ideas about the decision itself. In later decades, Roe arguably became the best-known opinion issued by the Supreme Court, a symbol of an ever-changing set of beliefs about family, health care, and the role of the judiciary in American democracy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.


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