The Terms of Sino-Soviet Trade

1964 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 174-191
Author(s):  
Feng-Hwa Mah

The development of the ideological controversy between Communist China and the Soviet Union in recent years has aroused increased interest in a more careful evaluation of Sino-Soviet economic relations. In this paper, I attempt to deal with one specific aspect of this broad area, that is the price problem in Sino-Soviet trade.

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-64
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Klimiuk

The author analyzes in his paper the economic and trade relations between Germanyand the Soviet Union in the period of 1918–1944. During this period trade relations withGermany constituted a continuation of relations between Tsarist Russia and Germany beforeWorld War I. The German-Soviet Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, formed specialconditions for the mutual trade relations between the two countries. In addition to the normalexchange of goods, German exports to the Soviet Union were based from the very beginningon a system negotiated by the Soviet Trade Mission to Berlin under which the Soviet Union wasgranted loans for financing additional orders from Germany. Trade with Soviet Union, promotedby the first credit-based operations, led to a dynamic exchange of goods, which reached itshighest point in 1931. In the early 1930s, however, Soviet imports decreased as regime assertedpower and its weakened adherence to the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of Versaillesdecreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports. In addition, the Nazi Party’s ascent to powerincreased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Unionmade repeated efforts at reestablishing closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chieflysought to repay, with raw materials, the debts which arose from earlier trade exchange, whileGermany sought to rearm, therefore both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. The saidagreement placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union until June 30, 1937, the loans amountingto 200 million Reichsmarks, to be repaid in the period 1940–1943. The Soviet Union used183 million Reichsmarks from this credit. The preceding credit operations were, in principle,liquidated. Economic reconciliation was hampered by political tensions after the Anschluss inmid-1938 and Hitler’s increasing hesitance to deal with the Soviet Union. However, a new periodin the development of Soviet–German economic relations began after the Ribbetrop–MolotovAgreement, which was concluded in August of 1939.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-39
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Klimiuk

The author analyzes in his paper the economic and trade relations between Germany and the Soviet Union in the period of 1918–1944. During this period trade relations with Germany constituted a continuation of relations between Tsarist Russia and Germany before World War I. The German-Soviet Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, formed special conditions for the mutual trade relations between the two countries. In addition to the normal exchange of goods, German exports to the Soviet Union were based, from the very beginning, on a system negotiated by the Soviet Trade Mission in Berlin under which the Soviet Union was granted loans for financing additional orders from Germany. Trade with the Soviet Union, promoted by the first credit-based operations, led to a dynamic exchange of goods, which reached its highest point in 1931. In the early 1930s, however, Soviet imports decreased as the regime asserted power and its weakened adherence to the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of Versailles decreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports. In addition, the Nazi Party’s rise to power increased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union made repeated efforts at reestablishing closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chiefly sought to repay, with raw materials the debts which arose from earlier trade exchange, while Germany sought to rearm, therefore both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. That agreement placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union until June 30, 1937 the loans amounting to 200 million Reichsmarks which were to be repaid in the period 1940–1943. The Soviet Union used 183 million Reichsmarks from this credit. The preceding credit operations were, in principle, liquidated. Economic reconciliation was hampered by political tensions after the Anschluss in the mid-1938 and Hitler’s increasing hesitance to deal with the Soviet Union. However, a new period in the development of Soviet-German economic relations began after the Ribbetrop–Molotov Agreement, which was concluded in August of 1939.


1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 667-669 ◽  

The eighteenth plenary meeting of the International Cotton Advisory Committee was held in Washington, May 14–22, 1959. Governments from 34 countries were represented as members and 24 attended as observers; representatives from ten international organizations were also in attendance. Eight resolutions were adopted by the plenary meeting, the first four of which were concerned with budgetary matters. The fifth dealt with the future work program and instructed the secretariat to prepare a statement on government regulations on cotton and a report on harsh short staple cotton; the secretariat was also instructed to keep under review the extra-long staple cotton situation, to investigate the possibility of a similar survey on long staple cottons, and to provide as much information as possible on the effect of competition from the Soviet Union, communist China, and eastern Europe on world markets for cotton and cotton textiles. The sixth resolution drew attention to the present surplus situation of extra-long staples and indicated the desirability of convening a special meeting to examine the problems of this commodity with attention to production plans and policies, price and export policies, and steps needed to encourage consumption.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (11) ◽  
pp. 705-709
Author(s):  
Bhagyadhar Sethy ◽  

Russia and India have a long history of cooperation in the energy sector. The prospects for the development of the energy dialogue are as promising now as they were during the period of friendship between the Soviet Union and India. Since the late 2000s, the Russia–India energy partnership has been enjoying a renaissance. So why is now the time for Russia to think seriously about giving a new impetus to the energy dialogue with India? India is the worlds third largest energy consumer and a major energy importer with steadily growing demand. Russia is a key global producer and exporter of petroleum and natural gas. The two countries needs naturally complement each other. The current energy bilateral cooperation, already strong, can significantly extend to new sources such as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). Building on these can be an industry in natural gas vehicles and renewable energy, enabling economic instruments, such as energy benchmarks, and a policy framework, including labour mobility, to develop a skills corridor in energy. This paper examines the current state of Energy and economic relations between India and Russia. It flags the major issues that hinder development of economic ties between the two countries and discusses future prospects for growth. India and Russia have a long-standing relationship and securing an economic and energy partnership is important from both the diplomatic and geopolitical perspectives. Russia has a vital role in ensuring Indias energy security in the coming decade. India imports oil, mostly from the volatile region of the Middle East. However, to sustain current high rates of growth, India needs to secure and diversify its energy sources. How Russia is an obvious choice in this respect?


Slavic Review ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-83
Author(s):  
Harvey L. Dyck

In May 1927 Sir Austen Chamberlain precipitated the first great international crisis of the post-Locarno period by denouncing the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement and severing Britain's diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Although Germany was not directly involved, the dispute nevertheless was to have a profoundly disturbing effect on German-Soviet relations. By raising the possibility of a wide-ranging diplomatic, economic, and perhaps even military confrontation between London and Moscow, it strained Germany's diplomatic system, which rested on the Locarno Pact (1925) and the Treaty of Berlin (1926). Thus it posed some fundamental questions for the German Foreign Ministry: Were the policies associated with those agreements compatible with each other only in fair weather? Did Germany have the freedom to remain neutral if the dispute should deepen? In short, was it still realistic to believe that Germany could maintain equally intimate ties with London and Moscow? Because Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann had previously denned a balancing role as the sine qua non of Germany's international revival, the imbroglio soon led to a great debate in the Wilhelmstrasse. The issue on which it turned was, as a leading participant observed, “whether Germany's ties with Russia are worth enough to our present and future political interests so that it pays to assume the political expenses and risks involved in maintaining them.”


1966 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hungdah Chiu

Despite the growing interest in Chinese studies in this country, little, if any, attention has been paid to the study of Communist China’s view of international law. Some persons may feel that Communist China, as a Socialist country, cannot do other than to adhere to the Soviet concept of international law or that of Socialist countries in general. There may be some truth in this view, but it does not disclose the whole picture. Communist China does accept many principles of international law proclaimed or applied by the Soviet Union or by Soviet jurists, but in view of the growing differences of views between the two countries in handling many international problems and in conducting the international Communist movement, it is reasonable to infer that Communist China may have developed different views toward international law in some aspects. In this connection, it may be noted tha Wu Tê-feng, a prominent jurist in Communist China and President of the China Political Science and Law Association, not long ago severely criticized the Soviet concept of international law in a report delivered on October 8, 1964, to the general meeting of the Association.


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