Wronged in Her Dearest Rights: Plaintiff Wives and the Transformation of Marital Consortium, 1870–1920

2013 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-99
Author(s):  
Kimberley A. Reilly
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Legal Action ◽  
Legal Remedies ◽  
Legal Identity ◽  
Right Of Action ◽  
The Common ◽  
Hierarchical Nature ◽  
The Right

In 1871, Mary Ann Harlan brought an unprecedented suit against her neighbors, Elliot and Mary Clark, before the Superior Court of Cincinnati. She alleged that they had “wrongfully and maliciously enticed away” her husband, Robert Harlan, from their home, thus depriving her of Robert's “society, protection, and support.” The common law had long given husbands the right of action to sue third parties who enticed away, harbored, alienated the affections of, or seduced their wives. In these types of marital torts, a husband sought damages for the loss of his wife's “consortium,” a term that expressed his property in her services and society. At the time of Mary Ann's suit, however, wives had no such reciprocal right. In part, this was an outcome of the common law doctrine of marital unity, or coverture, under which a wife's legal identity was merged into that of her husband upon marriage. Unable to sue or be sued, she had to be joined by him in a legal action. Courts were hardly amenable to the idea of allowing husbands to join in suits involving their own marital transgressions, where they would stand to profit from their misdeeds if any damages were awarded. More fundamentally, however, the limitation of wives' access to legal remedies was an expression of the hierarchical nature of marital unity. No less an authority than eighteenth-century English jurist William Blackstone, the most influential expositor of the common law, put the reason plainly: “the inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the superior, as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior; and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury.” According to this theory, a wife was not barred from bringing such a suit simply because of her legal disabilities under coverture; as a subordinate in the marriage relation, she lacked any reciprocal claim to her husband's society. Mary Ann's case, then, hinged on whether she had the right to bring her suit.

Liberty and the Common Law

1945 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lord Wright
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Roman Law ◽  
Case System ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right

In preparing the few and elementary observations which I am about to make to you tonight I have wondered if the title I chose was apt or suitable. The Common Law is generally described as the law of liberty, of freedom and of free peoples. It was a home-made product. In the eighteenth century, foreign lawyers called it an insular and barbarous system; they compared it to their own system of law, developed on the basis of Roman and Civil Law. Many centuries before, and long after Bracton's day, when other civilised European nations ‘received’ the Roman Law, England held back and stood aloof from the Reception. It must have been a near thing. It seems there could have been a Reception here if the Judges had been ecclesiastics, steeped in the Civil Law. But as it turned out they were laymen, and were content as they travelled the country, and in London as well, to adopt what we now know as the Case System, instead of the rules and categories of the Civil Law. Hence the method of threshing out problems by debate in Court, and later on the basis of written pleadings which we find in the Year Books. For present purposes, all I need observe is that the Civil Lawyer had a different idea of the relation of the state or the monarch to the individual from that of the Common Lawyer. To the Civil or Roman Lawyer, the dominant maxim was ‘quod placuit principi legis habet vigorem’; law was the will of the princeps. With this may be compared the rule expressed in Magna Carta in 1215: No freeman, it was there said, was to be taken or imprisoned or exiled or in any way destroyed save by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land. Whatever the exact application of that phrase in 1215, it became a text for fixing the relations between the subject and the State. Holdsworth quotes from the Year Book of 1441; the law is the highest English inheritance the King hath, for by the law he and all his subjects are ruled. That was the old medieval doctrine that all things are governed by law, either human or divine. That is the old doctrine of the supremacy of the law, which runs through the whole of English history, and which in the seventeenth century won the day against the un-English doctrine of the divine right of Kings and of their autocratic power over the persons and property of their subjects. The more detailed definition of what all that involved took time to work out. I need scarcely refer to the great cases in the eighteenth century in which the Judges asserted the right of subjects to freedom from arbitrary arrest as against the ministers of state and against the validity of a warrant to seize the papers of a person accused of publishing a seditious libel; in particular Leach v. Money (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1001; Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1029; Wilkes v. Halifax (1769) 19 St. Tr. 1406. In this connexion may be noted Fox's Libel Act, 1792, which dealt with procedure, but fixed a substantive right to a trial by jury of the main issue in the cases it referred to.

Common Law Constitutionalism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
William E. Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Profession ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Law System ◽  
The Common ◽  
Common Law System

This chapter shows how common law pleading, the use of common law vocabulary, and substantive common law rules lay at the foundation of every colony’s law by the middle of the eighteenth century. There is some explanation of how this common law system functioned in practice. The chapter then discusses why colonials looked upon the common law as a repository of liberty. It also discusses in detail the development of the legal profession individually in each of the thirteen colonies. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of the role of legislation. It shows that, although legislation had played an important role in the development of law and legal institutions in the seventeenth century, eighteenth-century Americans were suspicious of legislation, with the result that the output of pre-Revolutionary legislatures was minimal.

Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

1991 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. M. Beattie
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Professional Training ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Criminal Trial ◽  
Criminal Courts ◽  
Defense Counsel ◽  
Trial Procedure ◽  
Eighteenth And Nineteenth Centuries ◽  
The Right

My subject is the story of the entry of lawyers into the English criminal courts and their impact on trial procedure. Until the eighteenth century lawyers played little part in the trial of felonies in England—in the trial, that is, of those accused of the most serious offenses, including murder, rape, arson, robbery, and virtually all forms of theft. Indeed, the defendants in such cases were prohibited at common law from engaging lawyers to act for them in court. In the case of less-serious crimes—misdemeanors—defendants were allowed counsel; and those accused of high treason, the most serious offense of all, were granted the right to make their defense by counsel in 1696. But not in felony. Accused felons might seek a lawyer's advice on points of law, but if they wanted to question the prosecution evidence or to put forward a defense, they had to do that on their own behalf. The victim of a felony (who most often acted as the prosecutor in a system that depended fundamentally on private prosecution) was free to hire a lawyer to manage the presentation of his or her case. But in fact few did so. The judges were generally the only participants in felony trials with professional training. They dominated the courtroom and orchestrated the brief confrontation between the victim and the accused that was at the heart of the trial.

Liberating Malawi's Administrative Justice Jurisprudence from Its Common Law Shackles

2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Right ◽  
Administrative Justice

AbstractThe 1994 Malawian Constitution is unique in that it, among other things, recognizes administrative justice as a fundamental right and articulates the notion of constitutional supremacy. This right and the idea of constitutional supremacy have important implications for Malawi's administrative law, which was hitherto based on the common law inherited from Britain. This article highlights the difficulties that Malawian courts have faced in reconciling the right to administrative justice as protected under the new constitution with the common law. In doing so, it offers some insights into what the constitutionalization of administrative justice means for Malawian administrative law. It is argued that the constitution has altered the basis and grounds for judicial review so fundamentally that the Malawian legal system's marriage to the English common law can be regarded as having irretrievably broken down as far as administrative law is concerned.

scholarly journals The publication of judicial decisions as a reason for convincing precedent

1970 ◽  
pp. 195-199
Author(s):  
Roman Sabodash
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
General Idea ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
State Register ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Right

The paper shows how the publication of court decisions influenced the formation of a precedent. The author reviewed scientific works devoted to research the precedent in common and continental law. The research explains that the formation of precedent in England was accompanied by development of the judgment’s reviews and their prevalence among lawyers. Of course, publication of court decisions was not a major factor in setting a precedent, but it played a significant role in this. The paper also describes facts of the publication of court decisions in Italy, Germany, France and the Netherlands, as well as the admissibility of their citations at the court of cassation. The general idea of the paper is that convincing precedent exists and is used although the countries of continental law do not have a «classic» precedent. The paper gives a review of the importance of the state register of court decisions for setting a convincing precedent in Ukraine. The author analyzes the pros and cons of citing court decisions. It’s stated that, unfortunately, the quotations of court decisions is not always correct and sometimes amounts to rewriting the «right» legal position without comparing the circumstances of the case. The article concludes that the practice of applying a convincing precedent in Ukraine is only emerging and needs further improvement.          It has been found out that the publication of judgments of supreme courts is one of the factors that helped to establish precedent in common law countries. The publication of court rulings also created the conditions for a convincing precedent in civil law countries (especially in private law). At the same time, the formation of a “convincing precedent» in countries where court decisions are published in publicly available electronic court registers is much faster than in common law countries. Of course, the structure and the significance of the precedent in the common law and civil law countries are different, but one cannot dismiss that publication of court decisions as one of the factors for establishing the precedent.

scholarly journals GOOD FAITH IN FRANCHISE CONTRACT

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (19) ◽  
pp. 118-127
Author(s):  
Nurli Yaacob ◽  
Nasri Naiimi
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Relational Contracts ◽  
Law System ◽  
Freedom Of Contract ◽  
Term Contract ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

Good faith has been defined as justice, fairness, reasonableness, decency, taking no chances, and so on. The concept of good faith has long been rooted in contract law under the jurisdiction of Civil law, although the definition of it is still debated until today. However, the view of the Common Law tradition does not recognize the concept of good faith as long as the contract is entered into with the freedom of contract and both parties abide by the terms of the contract. Given that a franchise contract involves a long-term contract and always been developed, it is impossible to define both rights and responsibilities base on express terms only. As such, the franchise contract gives the franchisor the right to exercise its discretion in executing the contract. It is in this context that the element of good faith is very important to ensure that the franchisor does not take advantage of the franchisee and that the business continues to prosper. Therefore, the objective of this article is to discuss the concept of good faith in a franchise contract. The findings show that the common law system that initially rejected the application of the concept of good faith also changed its approach and began to recognize the concept of good faith as it is very important for relational contracts such as franchise contracts.

scholarly journals Roles of the Courts in New Zealand in Giving Effect to International Human Rights - with Some History

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J Keith
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Common Law ◽  
General Effect ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Right ◽  
Domestic Law

The Right Honourable Sir Kenneth Keith was the fourth speaker at the NZ Institute of International Affairs Seminar. In this article he describes and reflects upon the role of courts and judges in relation to the advancement of human rights, an issue covered in K J Keith (ed) Essays on Human Rights (Sweet and Maxwell, Wellington, 1968). The article is divided into two parts. The first part discusses international lawmakers attempting to protect individual groups of people from 1648 to 1948, including religious minorities and foreign traders, slaves, aboriginal natives, victims of armed conflict, and workers. The second part discusses how from 1945 to 1948, there was a shift in international law to universal protection. The author notes that while treaties are not part of domestic law, they may have a constitutional role, be relevant in determining the common law, give content to the words of a statute, help interpret legislation which is in line with a treaty, help interpret legislation which is designed to give general effect to a treaty (but which is silent on the particular matter), and help interpret and affect the operation of legislation to which the international text has no apparent direct relation. 

Third Party Beneficiary: A Comparative Analysis

1976 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriela Shalev
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Critical Examination ◽  
Legal Research ◽  
General Part ◽  
The Common ◽  
Comparative Survey ◽  
The Right

Chapter 4 of the new Israeli Contracts (General Part) Law, 1973, introduces the concept of a contract in favour of a third party, while granting express recognition to the right of a third party beneficiary. Even those, (including the author) who maintain, that the right of a third party beneficiary could and should be derived, even before the commencement of the new Law, from the general principles and premises of the old Israeli law of contract, cannot fail to see in the above-mentioned chapter an important innovation in the Israeli legal system.This paper is a comparative analysis of the institution of third party beneficiary. The analysis will consist of a presentation and critical examination of the central concepts and doctrines involved in the institution under discussion, and it will be combined with a comparative survey of the arrangements adopted in various legal systems. The choice of this approach stems from the particular circumstances of the new legislation.While in most countries, comparative legal research is a luxury, in Israel it is a necessity. The new legislation in private law is inspired to a great extent by Continental codifications. As far as the law of contract is concerned, Israel is now in the process of becoming a “mixed jurisdiction”: departing from the common law tradition and technique, and heading towards an independent body of law, derived from various sources, mainly Continental in both substance and form.

Duty Not To Accept Benefits From Third Parties

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamlyn Lloyd ◽  
Haywood Marcus
Keyword(s):  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Common ◽  
Breach Of Duty

One of the consequences of the common law principle that a director must avoid conflicts of interest was that a director could not have an interest in a transaction with the company unless he had disclosed all material facts about the interest to the members and they had approved or authorized his having the interest. Authorization by the board was not sufficient. If the other party to the transaction had notice of the irregularity, the company might rescind the contract. The director might also be liable for breach of duty and under a duty to account for profits obtained by reason of such dealings.

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