scholarly journals On The Right to Private Property and Entitlement to One’s Income

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-74
Author(s):  
Andrei Marmor

In this short essay I argue that the main insight of Murphy and Nagel’s book, The Myth of Ownership, that people have no right to their pre-tax income, is not supported by their claim that the right to private property is not a natural right. The non-naturalness of the right to private property, I argue, is irrelevant to their moral argument. The plausibility of their moral conclusion derives from the thesis (which they also seem to endorse) that people have a right to the fruits of their labor, maintaining, however, that there is no possible conception, morally speaking, of what the fruits of one's labor are, independent of a system of legal and social norms that constitute the terms of fair bargaining, pricing, etc. People can only have a right to a fair assessment of the added value of their labor, and the latter cannot make any sense independent of the entire system of norms prevailing in the relevant society. I argue that this last conclusion is not affected by the nature of the right to private property.

1982 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. B. Drury

In this paper I hope to show that the differences between the Lockian and Nozickian ideas regarding the foundation of private property are far greater than is generally assumed. My purpose is not to criticize Nozick, but to show that the accepted interpretation of Locke on which he relies is mistaken. In particular, I hope to show (1) that the theory of appropriation by labour is not applicable after the invention of money; and is meant to show that the right to property is based on the right to life and self-preservation, and (2) that property arrangements after the introduction of money are justified primarily by utility rather than natural right, and (3) that the conditions created by the invention of money make the ‘regulation’ of private property necessary for the preservation of mankind which is required by the law of nature.


Author(s):  
David Gauthier

The right to (private) property in Hobbes’s Leviathan is established by each man authorizing the sovereign, acting in the person of each, to renounce the natural right to unlimited possession in favor of an exclusive claim right (i.e., one that obligates others) to goods acquired and exchanged in accordance with procedures established by the sovereign. Yet this useful way to ground the right to private property and other rights runs afoul of punishment because Hobbes both asserts and denies that a person may authorize his own punishment. This chapter introduces a “Neo-Hobbesian” definition of punishment, which permits authorizing the sovereign to punish oneself if one expects to gain from the system of punishment.


Problemata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 60-78
Author(s):  
Damião Benilson Gomes de Melo ◽  
José Roberto de Araújo Freire

The object of this essay is to examine Amartia Sen’s approach to the justification of substantive rights pointed out in the third chapter of ‘Development as Freedom’ and his critique of the priority of formal freedoms in rawlsian theory. He points out a conflict between liberties (formal freedoms) and freedoms (material freedoms). This opposition will be confronted with Herbert Hart’s polemic in the third part of ‘Essays in Jurisprudence and philosophy’, where he points out a problem of Rawls’ formulation in not reconciling the admission of private property as a basic freedom with the principle of maximum equal freedom. The problem is whether the Sen model better addresses this issue. Our positive hypothesis. By establishing a small number of basic freedoms, Rawls treated the right as a mere formal guarantee. Consequently, the right to private ownership of large portions of land and the extensive control by private individuals over the financial system and over major industrial, commercial, and service goods, in the absence of any greater or consistent justification, end up envisioned by something equivalent to a self-justified natural right. As Marx said, it is not scientifically possible to conceal the original fact of the conquest of private property by covering it up under the diaphanous cloak of natural law, inasmuch as, to oppose the ‘natural right of a few’ it would be enough for the previously dispossessed majority to gather sufficient strength to impose a ‘natural right’ of the reconquest of usurpation. As for the method, it is an exclusively bibliographical research, which can be based, in a merely incidental way, on empirical data.


Author(s):  
Margaret Gilbert

A moral demand-right as understood here is a demand-right discovered by moral argument without any appeal to a joint commitment as the immediate basis of the right. This chapter focuses on individualized moral demand-rights, such as a moral demand-right of each person to each person’s refraining from assaulting him, and concludes that their existence is doubtful. Among other things it critically reviews several arguments to the contrary, including H. L. A. Hart’s famous attempt to prove that there is at least one “natural” right, in a new interpretation, and some arguments suggested by Stephen Darwall. It then argues that given only a case of mutual recognition as characterized in chapter ten, the parties accrue demand-rights of joint commitment with the same content as central supposed moral demand-rights, such as a right not to be assaulted. The same goes with relevant changes for joint commitments in general.


1993 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 367-389
Author(s):  
K.A.B. Mackinnon

[P]roperty must exist wherever men exist, and…the right to such property is the necessary consequence of the natural right of men to life and liberty.Thomas Reid 1788I proceed therefore to consider in what State or Order of Society there is the least temptation to ill conduct, and I confess that to me the Utopian System of Sir Thomas More seems to have the advantage of all others in this respect. In that System, it is well known there is no private Property. All that which we call Property is under the Administration of the State for the common benefit of the whole political Family.Thomas Reid 1794The few remarks on property that are found in the Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind of the eighteenth century Scottish “Common Sense” philosopher, Thomas Reid, have led at least one commentator to treat him as a fairly traditional advocate of the natural right to (private) property, albeit one with a concern for the very poor. In an article on William Paley and the rights of the poor, Thomas Home remarks in passing that Reid’s (and Adam Ferguson's)major concern was to justify natural rights to property and that their interest in the poor was so little that a reader who accidentally skipped a paragraph or a page would miss all they had to say on the topic.


2009 ◽  
Vol 160 (8) ◽  
pp. 228-231
Author(s):  
Hansruedi Walther

A forest owner can only commercialize non-wood products and services within a tightly restricted market niche. On account of free access being permitted to the forest it is impossible to deny to third parties the consumption of many non-wood products and services: everybody has the right to be in the forest for recreation. As a result many non-wood services cannot be commercialized by the forest owner, or not exclusively. What would seem unthinkable elsewhere on private property seems to be taken for granted in the forest: third parties may take products from the forest and even sell them without being the forest owners. For certain nonwood services or products, such as the installation of rope parks or for burial in the forest, the organizer must conclude an agreement with the forest owner or draw up a contract for servitude or benefit. In addition, for these activities a permit from the Forestry Department is necessary. On the other hand, for an itinerant school class or for the production of forest honey neither a binding regulation with the forest owner nor a permit from the Forestry service is necessary, provided that no constructions are erected in the forest. The only exclusive right which remains to the forest owner, besides the sale of his property, is the exploitation of his trees within the legal framework.


2008 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-46
Author(s):  
Bert Govaerts

In 1908 verwierf België de souvereiniteit over de voormalige Congo Vrijstaat, die particulier bezit van koning Leopold II was geweest. De nieuwe kolonie kreeg een soort grondwet, het Koloniale Charter. Artikel 3 daarvan bepaalde dat er in Belgisch-Congo taalvrijheid heerste, maar ook dat de Belgen er dezelfde taalrechten en -bescherming zouden genieten als in het moederland. Uiterlijk tegen 1913 moesten speciale decreten de taalregeling in rechtszaken en in de administratie vastleggen. Die afspraak werd niet gehonoreerd. De decreten kwamen er niet en de kolonie werd in de praktijk exclusief Franstalig. Een klein aantal Vlaamse koloniale ambtenaren verzette zich daar tegen en boekte ook beperkte successen, op plaatselijk niveau. Een doorbraak kwam er pas in de nadagen van de kolonie, toen een Vlaams magistraat, Jozef Grootaert, het recht opeiste om in het Nederlands te vonnissen. Pas na een lang en bitter gevecht, uitgevochten tot op regeringsniveau en mee gekleurd door allerlei persoonlijke motieven, werd uiteindelijk in 1956, meer dan veertig jaar later dan afgesproken, een decreet over het gebruik van de talen bij het koloniale gerecht goedgekeurd. Over een decreet i.v.m. bestuurzaken raakte men het niet meer eens voor de onafhankelijkheid van de kolonie in 1960. In het onafhankelijke Congo was er voor het Nederlands geen (officiële) plaats.________The Case of Judge Grootaert and the struggle for Dutch in the Belgian CongoIn 1908 Belgium acquired the sovereignty over the former Congo Free State, which had been the private property of king Leopold II. The new colony was granted a kind of constitution, the Colonial Charter. Article 3 of this charter provided not only that there would be freedom of language in the Belgian Congo, but also that the Belgians in that country would enjoy the same rights and protection of their language as they had in their motherland. The language regulation for court cases and the administration was to be laid down in special decrees by 1913 at the latest. That agreement was not honoured. The decrees failed to be drawn up and in practice the colony became exclusively French speaking. A small number of Flemish colonial officials resisted against this situation and in fact obtained some limited successes on a local level. A breakthrough finally occurred in the latter years of the colony, when a Flemish magistrate, Jozef Grootaert claimed the right to pronounce judgement in Dutch. Only after a long and bitter struggle that was fought out until the bitter end on a governmental level and that was also characterized by all kinds of personal motives, a decree about the use of languages at the colonial court was finally approved in 1956, more than forty years after it had been agreed. It proved to be no longer possible to reach agreement about a decree concerning administrative matters before the independence of the colony in 1960. In the independent Congo Republic no (official) role was reserved for Dutch.


Author(s):  
Margaret Gilbert

This book is the first extended treatment of demand-rights, a class of rights apt to be considered rights par excellence. Centrally, to have a demand-right is to have the standing or authority to demand a particular action from another person, who has a correlative obligation to the right-holder. How are demand-rights possible? Linking its response to central themes and positions within rights theory, Rights and Demands argues for two main theses. First, joint commitment, in a sense that is explained, is a ground of demand-rights. Second, it may well be their only ground. The first thesis is developed with special reference to agreements and promises, generally understood to ground demand-rights. It argues that both of these phenomena are constituted by joint commitments, and that this is true of many other central social phenomena also. In relation to the second thesis it considers the possibility of demand-rights whose existence can be demonstrated by moral argument without appeal to any joint commitment, and the possibility of accruing demand-rights through the existence of a given legal system or other institution construed without any such appeal. The relevance of the book’s conclusions to our understanding of human rights is then explained. Classic and contemporary rights theorists whose work is discussed include Wesley Hohfeld, H. L. A. Hart, Joel Feinberg, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Scanlon, Judith Thomson, Joseph Raz, and Stephen Darwall.


Author(s):  
J. E Penner

Ranging over a host of issues, Property Rights: A Re-Examination pinpoints and addresses a number of theoretical problems at the heart of property theory. Part 1 reconsiders and refutes the bundle of rights picture of property and the related nominalist theories of property, showing that ownership reflects a tripartite structure of title, the right to immediate, exclusive, possession, and the power to licence what would otherwise be a trespass, and to transfer ownership. Part 2 explores in detail the Hohfeldian theory of jural relations, in particular liberties and powers and Hohfeld’s concept of ‘multital’ jural relations, and shows that this theory fails to illuminate the nature of property rights, and indeed obscures much that it is vital to understand about them. Part 3 considers the form and justification of property rights, beginning with the relation an owner’s liberty to use her property and her ‘right to exclude’, with particular reference to the tort of nuisance. Next up for consideration is the Kantian theory of property rights, the deficiencies of which lead us to understand that the only natural right to things is a form of use- or usufructory-right. Part 3 concludes by addressing the ever-vexed question of property rights in land.


Ethics ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-204
Author(s):  
Hillel Steiner
Keyword(s):  

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