Which electoral systems succeed at providing proportionality and concentration? Promising designs and risky tools

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Raabe ◽  
Eric Linhart

Electoral systems are typically faced with the problem of being asked to provide both proportional representation and party system concentration leading to accountable government. Which electoral system designs are able to successfully deliver on both these challenges and thus optimize the representativeness – accountability trade-off? This paper investigates the performance of different general electoral system designs as well as their specific technical details (such as legal threshold, tier linkages, and compensation mechanisms) based on a data set of 590 elections in 57 countries. The key results are that both proportional representation systems with moderate district magnitudes and mixed-member proportional systems are able to optimize performance. Going to the level of details confirms these results and deepens our understanding further: while different technical changes are able to improve the chances of reaching the best of both worlds, some of these (e.g. raising the legal threshold) also increase the risk of ending up with the worst.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.


Author(s):  
Erik S. Herron

Scholarship on the classification, origins, incentives, and consequences of mixed-member electoral systems has matured, especially over the last two decades. While mixed-member electoral systems (also known as mixed electoral systems) have been in constant use since Germany adopted a mixed-member proportional system for assembly elections following World War II, researchers did not begin to fully probe the implications of this electoral system until its expansion across the globe beginning in the 1990s. Mixed-member electoral systems share an important characteristic: voter preferences are translated into outcomes by at least two allocation formulas applied in the same election. While voters typically receive a ballot to select a representative in a constituency (often using first-past-the-post) and a ballot to select a party list (often using a form of proportional representation (PR)), the institutional features of mixed-member systems vary substantially. A crucial distinction among mixed-member systems is whether or not seat allocation in the constituency and proportional representation tiers is linked (mixed-member proportional, or MMP) or unlinked (mixed-member majoritarian, or MMM). Across the universe of mixed-member systems, one finds additional differences in the number of ballots voters receive; the electoral formulas and thresholds used to determine winners; the proportion of seats allocated to each component; the ability of candidates to contest seats in both components during the same election; and other critical aspects of the rules. Scholarship classifying mixed-member systems has highlighted different aspects of the rules to sort them into categories. A substantial amount of scholarship on mixed-member systems has emphasized the debate about the incentives that the systems generate. The “controlled comparison” approach treats the components as if they are independent from one another and the “contamination effects” approach treats the components as if they are interdependent. These competing schools of thought generate different expectations, with the former generally anticipating compliance with Duverger’s propositions and the latter anticipating divergence. Subsequent scholarship has been split about which approach better explains observed behavior. However, many of the perceived differences between the approaches may be artificial, generated by extreme interpretations of the theoretical expectations that lack appropriate nuance. In other words, it may be inappropriate to treat this scholarship as strictly dichotomous. The extant literature on mixed-member systems evaluates data from surveys, interviews, personnel files, roll-call voting, and election returns to understand the behavior of voters, candidates, parties, and legislators. It assesses how the incentives of mixed-member systems contribute to outcomes such as the party system, descriptive representation, and policy decisions. It also explores the presence or absence of a “mandate divide”: the expectation that members of parliament (MPs) selected in the constituency component might behave differently than their counterparts in the party list component. The research is often cross-national, but studies of certain countries with mixed-member systems predominate: Germany, Japan, and New Zealand among established democracies, and central or east European countries among transitional societies. The literature presents many opportunities to generate more nuanced theory, explore different research methodologies (e.g., experimental work), and extend spatial coverage to under-studied countries.


1999 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert G. Moser

Scholars studying electoral systems have consistently found that single-member plurality elections tend to constrain the number of parties operating in a polity to a much greater extent than multimember proportional representation systems. This article tests this hypothesis in the post-communist context by examining the effects of proportional representation and single-member district elections on the number of parties in five postcommunist states. It is shown that some postcommunist states, most notably Poland and Hungary, have followed the standard pattern of party consolidation over time in reaction to incentives of electoral systems, while others, most notably Russia and Ukraine, have not. The author argues that the different effects of electoral systems can be attributed to different levels of party institutionalization found in postcommunist states.These findings have policy implications. Under conditions of extreme party underdevelopment, the electoral system that promotes the use of party labels—proportional representation—may be more effective than the plurality system in constraining the number of parties, provided a legal threshold is used. This runs counter to the conventional wisdom that plurality elections offer the greatest constraint on the number of parties.


Author(s):  
Michael Marsh

The Republic of Ireland is unusual in using the single transferable vote to elect its national parliament. The system allows voters to rank candidates in order of preference, and those lower preferences are used to allocate seats when a count of first preferences shows that candidates have no overall majority or, in multiseat elections, do not reach a set quota. The party system showed little fragmentation until recently, and proportionality has been only a little less than in many proportional representation systems. The public twice rejected moves to change the system and continues to express satisfaction with the control it appears to give them over their representatives, despite the criticisms expressed by many politicians and commentators.


2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (12) ◽  
pp. 1533-1556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Birch

This article is a cross-national study of the impact of electoral system design on electoral misconduct. It argues that elections held in single-member districts (SMD) under plurality and majority rule are more likely to be the object of malpractice than those run under proportional representation (PR). Two reasons are advanced in support of this argument: Candidates in SMD systems have more to gain from individual efforts to manipulate elections than is the case for candidates in PR contests; and malfeasance is more efficient under SMD rules, in that the number of votes that must be altered to change the outcome is typically smaller than it is under PR. This hypothesis is tested and confirmed on a new data set of electoral manipulation in 24 postcommunist countries between 1995 and 2004. The proportion of seats elected in SMDs is found to be positively associated with levels of electoral misconduct, controlling for a variety of contextual factors.


Author(s):  
Michio Umeda

Abstract This paper shows how an uneven electoral system in Japan shapes political parties' mobilization strategies by utilizing a majoritarian electoral system with heterogeneous district magnitudes, which in turn contributes to the gap in turnout across districts. Scholars have long debated the relationship between electoral systems and turnout; it is known that countries with proportional representation electoral systems – those with larger district magnitude – tend to have higher turnout rates than countries with majoritarian electoral systems, especially single-member district (SMD) systems. The current discussion on turnout and district magnitude of an electoral system assumes a monotonic relationship between these factors: the larger the district magnitude of the electoral system, the more (or less) participatory the electorate, due to competitiveness and mobilization efforts by political parties and other relevant groups. In contrast, this paper shows a mixed relationship between district magnitude of the electoral system and party mobilization and subsequent turnout, investigating a majoritarian electoral system with uneven district magnitude in the Japanese Upper House. During the survey period, the party system in Japan consisted of two major parties and a few smaller parties; consequently, the two major parties focused their efforts on SMDs in order to maximize their seat share, while smaller parties focused their resource on districts electing more than two members (where they have some chance to elect their party's candidates). In combination, these party strategies have resulted in the lowest mobilization and turnout rates in districts with two members.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Radek Buben ◽  
Karel Kouba

AbstractChoosing the type of electoral system in new democracies has become a contested issue for social scientists as well as for political actors. Contrary to the state of the public debate on the issue, the article advances the position from a multidisciplinary standpoint (political science, historical sociology, economics) that proportional representation with large districts and closed lists performs better on a variety of key indicators. We review recent literature on the performance of electoral systems especially in post-communist and Latin American democracies. The article identifies the centripetal theory of democracy as a normative basis for our institutional prescriptions and discusses how distinct types of political representation relate to the debate on electoral systems. We focus especially on four main concerns commonly associated with proportional representation (the rise of “extremist” parties, government instability, party system deconsolidation, and corruption and clientelism). Contrary to much of the public debate on electoral systems, we conclude that further steps towards personalization (by opening lists or reducing district magnitude) are not advisable.


Author(s):  
Verónica Hoyo

Overall, elections in France take place in a two-round system (with the exception of the European elections), and although each different electoral arena has its own particular procedures, most promote majoritarian principles. This chapter analyzes the electoral system of the French Fifth Republic by focusing on the operation of these rules in the larger political context: including the interaction between the rules, the party system, and the main political actors that compete in them. It shows that the two-round majoritarian system has proven remarkably stable and has managed to survive both internal (a quick detour to proportional representation in 1986) and external challenges (rise of new parties, EU common rules on proportional representation).


1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 609-624 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carles Boix

Looking at the history of democracies in the developed world, I show that electoral systems derive from the decisions the ruling parties make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. As long as the electoral arena does not change and the current electoral regime benefits the ruling parties, the electoral system is not altered. As the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in voters' preferences), the ruling parties modify the electoral system, depending on the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old parties. When the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority to proportional representation if no old party enjoys a dominant position, but they do not do this if there is a dominant old party. When new entrants are weak, a system of nonproportional representation is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system.


2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry D. Clark ◽  
Jill N. Wittrock

Efforts to test Duverger’s law in the new democracies of postcommunist Europe have had mixed results. Research argues that mixed systems have an effect on the number of effective parties that is distinct from that of single-mandate district and proportional representation systems. Less attention has been given to the effect of other institutions on the party system, particularly strong presidents. Analyzing election results in postcommunist Europe, the authors find support for Duverger’s law after controlling for the strength of the executive. They argue that strong presidents substantially reduce the incentive for parties to seize control of the legislative agenda. Hence, the restraint that electoral systems exercise on the proliferation of parties and independent candidates is weakened. The authors find that a further consequence of strong presidents is that the incentive for majority control of committees and the legislative agenda is weakened.


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