The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of Justice

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 537-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulio Itzcovich

In the legal literature on European integration there is a rather stereotyped tendency to constantly discover new elements of rupture with the past. In the legal domain, at every step we are confronted with some revolutionary novelty arising from European institutions and practices; on a regular basis, we face innovations which are said to mark significant developments in respect of the traditional forms of international governance as well as in respect of the traditional forms of national federalism. The vast literature on the interpretative criteria adopted by the European Court of Justice (hereafter the “ECJ”) only partially escapes this tendency. Surely the experience of European legal integration does not lack revolutionary ruptures and, also from the viewpoint of legal argumentation, it is true that the interaction between jurists coming from different legal experiences has produced some novelties: for example, an increasing hybridization and crossover effect (“Europeanisation”) between patterns of legal reasoning which are characteristic of different national legal cultures. However, this phenomenon has been largely tempered by the typically French syllogistic judicial style of ECJ's rulings. Moreover, despite the novelties identified, the literature on Community law interpretation cannot deny the apparent fact that the interpretative criteria and, more generally, the legal argumentation techniques of the ECJ are essentially the same ones which are familiar to the national legal contexts. It would be surprising if this were not the case, since the judges of the ECJ are trained within the national legal systems and the judgments of the Court are generally expected to be implemented by the national courts. Their grounds must thus be perceived as being legally sound, and not merely political or evocative.

1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-185
Author(s):  
Christine Boch ◽  
Robert Lane

Unless the law is enforced, it cannot command respect. Securing proper observance and protection of Community rights has long been recognized to be a fundamental challenge for the Community. The burden falls principally to the national courts, guided by the European Court of Justice. However, the guidance offered appears at times at variance with itself. It seems in particular that, in some instances, the obligation of result laid down in directives simply cannot be achieved. This article looks at the case law on remedies developed by the European Court, seeks to identify inconsistencies therein and suggests how they might be cured.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 287-302
Author(s):  
Paolisa Nebbia

As a general principle of Community law elaborated by the European Court of Justice (hereinafter, ECJ or ‘the Court’), effectiveness ‘requires the effective protection of Community rights and, more generally, the effective enforcement of Community law in national courts’: its origins—it has been argued—‘lie in the interpretative techniques of the Court which, even at an early stage, favoured a liberalised construction of the Treaty provisions so as to ensure their effet utile’. In fact, the roots of the principle of effectiveness can be found in the seminal case of Van Gend en Loos, which, without expressly naming that principle, provided the conceptual tools that have moulded its construction throughout the Community case law.


2005 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 57-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per Cramér

A little more than four decades ago, the European Court of Justice declared that the law of the European Communities constitutes the supreme law of the Member States. The national institutions, most importantly the national courts, were to apply rules of Community law and, in so doing, were required to set aside conflicting provisions of national law, however framed. Since then, this judicially formulated constitutional principle has been developed and restated in later judgments by the ECJ. However, during the same period the absolute character of the principle has been continually challenged by the Member States.


2005 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 57-79
Author(s):  
Per Cramér

A little more than four decades ago, the European Court of Justice declared that the law of the European Communities constitutes the supreme law of the Member States. The national institutions, most importantly the national courts, were to apply rules of Community law and, in so doing, were required to set aside conflicting provisions of national law, however framed. Since then, this judicially formulated constitutional principle has been developed and restated in later judgments by the ECJ. However, during the same period the absolute character of the principle has been continually challenged by the Member States.


Author(s):  
Juan Ignacio Ugartemendia Eceizabarrena

The aim of this article is firstly to describe the phenomenum of «national or state incorporation« of European Union Fundamental Rights.That is a process that was launched by the European Court of Justice with its judgment Wachauf in 1989, when it established that Member states were obliged to respect European Community Fundamental Rights in the implementation of Community law rules. It implies that those afore mentioned rights become parameters of conformity with Community Law and are to be used by national courts and judges when they are asked to control national authorities’ acts (including national legislure’s) taking into account those parameters. From this point of view, this work tries likewise to analyse how that incorporation affects the activity of judicial review of national acts in the light of fundamental rights as recognized by the National constitution. And specially when judicial review deals with Acts and other legal rules with same rank.


Author(s):  
Nico van Eijk

The point of departure for this chapter is the decision of the European Court of Justice in the Digital Rights Ireland case, which annulled the European Data Retention Directive, in part because the use of retained data was not made subject to independent oversight. Next, it examines judgments from the national courts of the Netherlands and the UK, also focusing on the independent oversight issue, declaring invalid the data retention laws of those two countries. From the Digital Rights Ireland case and others, seven standards for oversight of intelligence services can be drawn: the oversight should be complete; it should encompass all stages of the intelligence cycle; it should be independent; it should take place prior to the imposition of a measure; it should be able to declare a measure unlawful and to provide redress; it should incorporate the adversary principle; and it should have sufficient resources.


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