Mental Imagery Majestically Transforming Cognitive Psychology

1983 ◽  
Vol 28 (9) ◽  
pp. 661-663 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kubovy
Author(s):  
Noe Vargas Hernandez ◽  
Jami J. Shah ◽  
Steven M. Smith

The objective of this paper is to present a series of proposed cognitive models for specific components of design ideation. Each model attempts to explain specific cognitive processes occurring during ideation. Every model presented here is constructed with elements (i.e. cognitive processes) and theories available from cognitive psychology, human problem solving, mental imagery, and visual thinking. Every model in turn is an element of a higher-level cognitive model of design ideation. These models provide a better understanding of the components involved during ideation and their relationships.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Hay ◽  
Alex H. B. Duffy ◽  
Chris McTeague ◽  
Laura M. Pidgeon ◽  
Tijana Vuletic ◽  
...  

Towards addressing ontological issues in design cognition research, this paper presents the first generic classification of cognitive processes investigated in protocol studies on conceptual design cognition. The classification is based on a systematic review of 47 studies published over the past 30 years. Three viewpoints on the nature of design cognition are outlined (search, exploration and design activities), highlighting considerable differences in the concepts and terminology applied to describe cognition. To provide a more unified view of the cognitive processes fundamentally under study, we map specific descriptions of cognitive processes provided in protocol studies to more generic, established definitions in the cognitive psychology literature. This reveals a set of 6 categories of cognitive process that appear to be commonly studied and are therefore likely to be prevalent in conceptual design: (1) long-term memory; (2) semantic processing; (3) visual perception; (4) mental imagery processing; (5) creative output production and (6) executive functions. The categories and their constituent processes are formalised in the generic classification. The classification provides the basis for a generic, shared ontology of cognitive processes in design that is conceptually and terminologically consistent with the ontology of cognitive psychology and neuroscience. In addition, the work highlights 6 key avenues for future empirical research: (1) the role of episodic and semantic memory; (2) consistent definitions of semantic processes; (3) the role of sketching from alternative theoretical perspectives on perception and mental imagery; (4) the role of working memory; (5) the meaning and nature of synthesis and (6) unidentified cognitive processes implicated in conceptual design elsewhere in the literature.


1984 ◽  
Vol 48 (12) ◽  
pp. 653-658
Author(s):  
MM Walsh ◽  
R Hannebrink ◽  
B Heckman

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Norman

A series of vignette examples taken from psychological research on motivation, emotion, decision making, and attitudes illustrates how the influence of unconscious processes is often measured in a range of different behaviors. However, the selected studies share an apparent lack of explicit operational definition of what is meant by consciousness, and there seems to be substantial disagreement about the properties of conscious versus unconscious processing: Consciousness is sometimes equated with attention, sometimes with verbal report ability, and sometimes operationalized in terms of behavioral dissociations between different performance measures. Moreover, the examples all seem to share a dichotomous view of conscious and unconscious processes as being qualitatively different. It is suggested that cognitive research on consciousness can help resolve the apparent disagreement about how to define and measure unconscious processing, as is illustrated by a selection of operational definitions and empirical findings from modern cognitive psychology. These empirical findings also point to the existence of intermediate states of conscious awareness, not easily classifiable as either purely conscious or purely unconscious. Recent hypotheses from cognitive psychology, supplemented with models from social, developmental, and clinical psychology, are then presented all of which are compatible with the view of consciousness as a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. Such a view of consciousness would open up for explorations of intermediate states of awareness in addition to more purely conscious or purely unconscious states and thereby increase our understanding of the seemingly “unconscious” aspects of mental life.


1981 ◽  
Vol 36 (10) ◽  
pp. 1181-1189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. Sternberg
Keyword(s):  

1982 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 592-593
Author(s):  
Leroy H. Pelton

1971 ◽  
Vol 16 (11) ◽  
pp. 741-741
Author(s):  
JOHN H. FLAVELL
Keyword(s):  

1975 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 504-505
Author(s):  
D. JAMES DOOLING
Keyword(s):  

1975 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 118-120
Author(s):  
RACHEL JOFFE FALMAGNE
Keyword(s):  

1995 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-285
Author(s):  
Terri Gullickson
Keyword(s):  

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